| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: bla: reacquire gw address after skb realloc
The pskb_may_pull() called by batadv_bla_is_backbone_gw() could reallocate
the buffer behind the skb. Variables which were pointing to the old buffer
need to be reassigned to avoid an use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Drop bogus WARN for write to ZCR_EL2
It is entirely possible for a guest to write to the ZCR_EL2 sysreg alias
while in a nested context, as it is expected if FEAT_NV2 is advertised
to the L1 hypervisor.
Get rid of the bogus WARN which, since the hyp vectors were installed at
this point, has the effect of a hyp_panic... |
| Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.7, DNSCache._async_add inserted every response record into cache, _expirations, _expire_heap, and service_cache without a cap, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to multicast valid mDNS responses with unique names and cause memory exhaustion, slower cache lookups, slower async_expire passes, and broken discovery, registration, and ServiceBrowser callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.7. |
| Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.6, DNSIncoming._log_exception_debug and the four QuietLogger exception-dedup methods stored an unbounded _seen_logs dictionary keyed by attacker-influenced IncomingDecodeError messages, retaining sys.exc_info() tracebacks whose frame locals kept raw packet self.data buffers and allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to drive memory growth until mDNS-dependent features degrade or the process is OOM-killed. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.6. |
| Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.5, DNSIncoming._decode_labels_at_offset recurses once per DNS-name compression pointer, and a single mDNS packet carrying chained pointers can trigger a RecursionError that escapes DNSIncoming.__init__, causing sustained CPU burn, log flooding, and degraded mDNS-dependent features for unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb). This issue is fixed in version 0.149.5. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: add bounds check before accessing EA entries
in ntfs_ea_lookup and ntfs_listxattr, this verifies that there is enough
space in the EA entry before accessing the next_entry_offset field of
the EA entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch
In alloc_hugetlb_folio(), a single h_cg pointer is used for both the rsvd
and non-rsvd hugetlb cgroup charges. When map_chg is set,
hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup_rsvd() stores the charged cgroup in h_cg, but
the immediately following hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup() overwrites h_cg
with the non-rsvd cgroup pointer.
As a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong
(non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio's rsvd slot.
When the folio is later freed, free_huge_folio() unconditionally calls
both hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio() and
hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd(). The rsvd uncharge reads back the
wrong cgroup from the folio and decrements a counter that was never
charged for that cgroup, causing a page_counter underflow:
page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512
WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel
Fix this by introducing a separate h_cg_rsvd pointer exclusively for the
rsvd charge path, keeping the rsvd and non-rsvd charges fully independent
through their charge, commit, and error uncharge paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Move kvm_io_bus_get_dev() locking responsibilities to callers
kvm_io_bus_get_dev() returns a device that is only matched by the
address, and nothing else. This can cause a lifetime issue if
the matched device is not the expected type, as by the time
the caller can introspect the object, it might be gone (the srcu
lock having been dropped).
Given that there is only a single user of this helper, the simplest
option is to move the locking responsibility to the caller, which
can keep the srcu lock held for as long as it wants.
Note that this aligns with other kvm_io_bus*() helpers, which
already require the srcu lock to be held by the callers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic: Check the interrupt is still ours before migrating it
vgic_prune_ap_list() drops both ap_list_lock and irq_lock while migrating
an interrupt to another vCPU. After reacquiring the locks it only checks
that the affinity is unchanged (target_vcpu == vgic_target_oracle(irq))
before moving the interrupt, which assumes that an interrupt whose affinity
is preserved is still queued on this vCPU's ap_list.
That assumption no longer holds if the interrupt is taken off the ap_list
while the locks are dropped. vgic_flush_pending_lpis() removes the
interrupt from the list and sets irq->vcpu to NULL, but leaves
enabled/pending/target_vcpu untouched. As the interrupt is still enabled
and pending, vgic_target_oracle() returns the same target_vcpu, so the
affinity check passes and list_del() is run a second time on an entry that
has already been removed.
Also check that the interrupt is still assigned to this vCPU
(irq->vcpu == vcpu) before moving it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Use overflow checks in control_update size calc
In sof_ipc3_control_update(), the expected_size calculation uses
firmware-provided cdata->num_elems in arithmetic that could overflow
on 32-bit platforms, wrapping to a small value. This would allow the
cdata->rhdr.hdr.size comparison to pass with mismatched sizes,
potentially leading to out-of-bounds access in snd_sof_update_control.
Use check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow() to detect and reject
overflowed size calculations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: Fix potential UAF in MLD delayed work
A race condition exists between device teardown and incoming MLD query
processing, leading to a Use-After-Free in the MLD delayed work.
During device destruction, the primary reference to inet6_dev is dropped,
which can drop its refcount to 0. The actual freeing of inet6_dev memory
is deferred via RCU.
Concurrently, the packet receive path runs under RCU read lock and obtains
the inet6_dev pointer. Because the memory is RCU-protected, CPU-0 can
safely dereference inet6_dev even if its refcount has hit 0.
However, if CPU-0 calls igmp6_event_query() and schedules delayed work, it
attempts to acquire a reference using in6_dev_hold(). This increments the
refcount from 0 to 1, triggering a "refcount_t: addition on 0" warning.
Since the inet6_dev memory is still scheduled to be freed after the RCU
grace period, the device is freed while the work is still scheduled.
When the work runs, it accesses the freed memory, causing a kernel panic.
Fix this by using refcount_inc_not_zero() (via a new helper
in6_dev_hold_safe()) to prevent acquiring a reference if the device is
already being destroyed. If the refcount is 0, we do not schedule the work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: igmp: Fix potential UAF in igmp_gq_start_timer()
A race condition exists between device teardown (inetdev_destroy) and
incoming IGMP query processing (igmp_rcv), leading to a Use-After-Free
in the IGMP timer callback.
During device destruction, inetdev_destroy() drops the primary reference
to in_device, which can drop its refcount to 0. The actual freeing of
in_device memory is deferred via RCU (using call_rcu()).
Concurrently, igmp_rcv() runs under RCU read lock and obtains the
in_device pointer. Because the memory is RCU-protected, CPU-0 can safely
dereference in_device even if its refcount has hit 0.
However, if CPU-0 calls igmp_gq_start_timer() and re-arms the timer, it
attempts to acquire a reference using in_dev_hold(). This increments the
refcount from 0 to 1, triggering a "refcount_t: addition on 0" warning.
Since the in_device memory is still scheduled to be freed after the RCU
grace period (as the free callback does not check the refcount again),
the device is freed while the timer is still armed. When the timer
expires, it accesses the freed memory, causing a kernel panic.
Fix this by using refcount_inc_not_zero() (via a new helper
in_dev_hold_safe()) to prevent acquiring a reference if the device is
already being destroyed. If the refcount is 0, we do not arm the timer.
A similar issue in IPv6 MLD is fixed in a subsequent patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block
The VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked
independently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are
backed by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and
command registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL
register and moves data through the shared cache registers.
Accessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The
per-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a
different lock.
The locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of
the vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs
decodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache
read) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule
write to another Super VCAP instance.
Besides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache
between the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer
commits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry.
Introduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule
lock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the
per-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that
serializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new
admin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the
control lock instead of a per-instance one.
No path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a
single mutex cannot self-deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats agent registration race
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() registers the stats agent through
mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(). The helper publishes the agent in
hv_vhca->agents[type] under agents_lock and immediately schedules an
asynchronous control invalidation on the HV VHCA workqueue before
returning to mlx5e.
The asynchronous invalidation invokes the control agent's invalidate
callback, which reads the hypervisor control block and forwards the
command to mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_control(). That callback may either:
- call cancel_delayed_work_sync(&priv->stats_agent.work), or
- call queue_delayed_work(priv->wq, &sagent->work, sagent->delay).
However, the delayed_work and priv->stats_agent.agent are only
initialized after mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create() returns to mlx5e:
agent = mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(...); /* publish + invalidate */
...
priv->stats_agent.agent = agent; /* too late */
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&priv->stats_agent.work, ...); /* too late */
If the asynchronous control path runs before the two assignments
above, it can:
- Operate on an uninitialized delayed_work whose timer.function is
NULL. queue_delayed_work() calls add_timer() unconditionally, so
when the timer expires the timer softirq invokes a NULL function
pointer.
- Re-initialize the timer later through INIT_DELAYED_WORK() while
the timer is already enqueued in the timer wheel, corrupting the
hlist (entry.pprev cleared while the previous bucket node still
points at this entry).
- When the worker eventually runs, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() reads
sagent->agent (NULL) and dereferences it inside
mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_write().
Fix this by:
- Initializing priv->stats_agent.work before invoking
mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(), so the work is always in a valid
state when the control callback observes it.
- Adding a struct mlx5_hv_vhca_agent **ctx_update out-parameter
to mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(). The helper writes the agent
pointer to *ctx_update before publishing into hv_vhca->agents[]
and triggering the agents_update flow, so any callback
subsequently invoked from that flow already sees a valid
priv->stats_agent.agent. This avoids having the control
callback participate in agent initialization.
While at it, access priv->stats_agent.agent with
READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for the cross-CPU access with the worker, and
clear priv->stats_agent.buf on the agent_create() failure path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: stp: Fix a potential use-after-free when deleting a bridge
The three STP timers are not supposed to be armed while the bridge is
administratively down. They are synchronously deactivated when the
bridge is put administratively down and the various call sites check for
'IFF_UP' before arming them.
This check is missing from br_topology_change_detection() and it is
possible to engineer a situation in which the topology change timer is
armed while the bridge is administratively down, resulting in a
use-after-free [1] when the bridge is deleted.
Fix by adding the missing check and for good measures synchronously
shutdown the three timers when the bridge is deleted.
[1]
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff88811662b9b0 object type: timer_list hint: br_topology_change_timer_expired (net/bridge/br_stp_timer.c:120)
WARNING: lib/debugobjects.c:629 at debug_print_object+0x1bc/0x450, CPU#9: ip/359 |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.http.cors.CorsHandler setVaryHeader replaces application Vary headers such as Authorization or Cookie with Origin, allowing a caching proxy or CDN to reuse authenticated responses across users and disclose sensitive information. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: close durable scavenger races against m_fp_list lookups
ksmbd_durable_scavenger() has two related races against any walker
that iterates f_ci->m_fp_list, including ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode()
(used by ksmbd_vfs_rename) and the share-mode checks in
fs/smb/server/smb_common.c.
(1) fp->node list-head reuse. Durable-preserved handles can remain
linked on f_ci->m_fp_list after session teardown so share-mode checks
still see them while the handle is reconnectable. The scavenger
collected expired handles by adding fp->node to a local
scavenger_list after removing them from the global durable idr.
Because fp->node is the same list_head used by m_fp_list,
list_add(&fp->node, &scavenger_list) overwrites the m_fp_list links
and corrupts both lists. CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST can report this on the
share-mode walk path.
(2) Refcount race against m_fp_list walkers. The scavenger qualifies
an expired durable handle with atomic_read(&fp->refcount) > 1 and
fp->conn under global_ft.lock, removes fp from global_ft, then drops
global_ft.lock before unlinking fp from m_fp_list and freeing it.
During that gap fp is still linked on m_fp_list with f_state ==
FP_INITED. ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode() under m_lock read calls
ksmbd_fp_get() (atomic_inc_not_zero on refcount that is still 1) and
takes a live reference; the scavenger then unlinks and frees fp
while the holder owns a reference, leading to UAF on the holder's
subsequent ksmbd_fd_put() and on any field reads performed by a
concurrent share-mode walker that iterates m_fp_list without taking
ksmbd_fp_get() (smb_check_perm_dleases-like paths).
Fix both:
* Stop reusing fp->node as a scavenger-private list node. Remove
one expired handle from global_ft under global_ft.lock, take an
explicit transient reference, drop the lock, unlink fp->node
from m_fp_list under f_ci->m_lock, then drop both the durable
lifetime and transient references with atomic_sub_and_test(2,
&fp->refcount). If the scavenger is the last putter the close
runs there; otherwise an in-flight holder that already raced
through the m_fp_list lookup owns the final close via its
ksmbd_fd_put() path. The one-at-a-time disposal can rescan the
durable idr when multiple handles expire in the same pass, but
durable scavenging is a background expiration path and the final
full scan recomputes min_timeout before the next wait.
* Clear fp->persistent_id inside __ksmbd_remove_durable_fd() right
after idr_remove(), so a delayed final close from a holder that
snatched fp does not re-issue idr_remove() on a persistent id
that idr_alloc_cyclic() in ksmbd_open_durable_fd() may have
already handed out to a brand-new durable handle.
* Bypass the per-conn open_files_count decrement in
__put_fd_final() when fp is detached from any session table
(fp->conn cleared by session_fd_check() at durable preserve --
paired with the volatile_id clear at unpublish, so checking
fp->conn alone is sufficient). The walker that owns the final
close runs from an unrelated work->conn whose
stats.open_files_count never tracked this durable fp; without
this guard the holder would underflow that unrelated counter.
The two races are folded into one patch because patch (1) alone
cleans up the corrupted list but leaves a deterministic UAF window
for m_fp_list walkers that the transient-reference and
persistent_id discipline in (2) close; bisecting onto an
intermediate state would land on a UAF that pre-patch chaos merely
made less reproducible.
Validation:
* CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST coverage for the list_head reuse path.
* KASAN-enabled direct SMB2 durable-handle coverage that exercised
ksmbd_durable_scavenger() and non-NULL ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode()
returns while durable handles expired under concurrent rename
lookups, with no KASAN, UAF, list-corruption, ODEBUG, or WARNING
reports.
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: uniwill-laptop: Do not enable the charging limit even when forced
It seems that on some older models (~2020) the battery charging limit
can permanently damage the battery. Prevent users from enabling this
feature thru the "force" module parameter to avoid causing permanent
hardware damage on such devices. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtk: fix urb->setup_packet leak in error paths
The setup_packet of control urb is not freed if usb_submit_urb fails or
the submitted urb is killed. Add free in these two paths. |
