| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: imx: fix locked bus on SMBus block-read of 0 (IRQ)
SMBus 3.1 6.5.7 allows a Block Read byte count of 0, but the
interrupt-driven block-read state machine rejects it as -EPROTO. Worse,
it returns without a NACK+STOP: the next receive cycle has already
started, so the target keeps holding SDA and the bus stays stuck until a
power cycle of this i2c controller.
Accept count=0: NACK the in-flight dummy byte (TXAK) and set msg->len to
2 so i2c_imx_isr_read_continue() emits STOP via its normal last-byte
path. The dummy byte is discarded; block-read callers only consume
buf[0..count-1].
Reading I2DR has likewise already armed the next byte on the
count > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX error path, so NACK it (TXAK) before aborting
with -EPROTO; otherwise the failing transfer's STOP cannot complete and
the bus stays held.
The atomic path regressed earlier (v3.16) and is fixed separately; this
patch covers only the v6.13 state-machine rework. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
locking/rt: Fix the incorrect RCU protection in rt_spin_unlock()
rt_spin_unlock() releases the RCU protection before unlocking the
lock. That opens the door for the following UAF scenario:
T1 T2
spin_lock(&p->lock); rcu_read_lock();
invalidate(p); p = rcu_dereference(ptr);
rcu_assign_pointer(ptr, NULL); if (!p) return;
spin_unlock(&p->lock); spin_lock(&p->lock)
lock(&lock->lock);
rcu_read_lock();
kfree_rcu(p); rcu_read_unlock();
....
spin_unlock(&p->lock)
rcu_read_unlock(); // Ends grace period
rcu_do_batch()
kfree(p);
UAF -> rt_mutex_cmpxchg_release(&lock->lock...)
Regular spinlocks keep preemption disabled accross the unlock operation,
which provides full RCU protection, but the RT substitution fails to
resemble that. Same applies for the rwlock substitution.
Move the rcu_read_unlock() invocation past the unlock operations to match
the non-RT semantics. This makes it asymmetric vs. rt_xxx_lock(), but
that's harmless as the caller needs to hold RCU read lock across the lock
operation. The migrate_enable() call stays before the unlock operation
because there is no per CPU operation in the unlock path which would
require migration to be kept disabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libertas_tf: fix use-after-free in lbtf_free_adapter()
lbtf_free_adapter() calls timer_delete(&priv->command_timer), which does
not wait for a running command_timer_fn() callback. lbtf_free_adapter()
runs on the teardown path right before ieee80211_free_hw() frees priv,
both in lbtf_remove_card() and in the probe error path. command_timer is
armed by mod_timer() in lbtf_cmd() whenever a firmware command is sent.
command_timer_fn() dereferences priv. If a command times out as the
device is removed, command_timer_fn() runs concurrently with teardown and
dereferences priv after it has been freed.
This is the same use-after-free that commit 03cc8f90d053 ("wifi: libertas:
fix use-after-free in lbs_free_adapter()") fixed in the sibling libertas
driver. The libertas_tf variant has the identical pattern and was left
unchanged. Use timer_delete_sync() so any in-flight callback completes
before priv is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/user_events: Fix use-after-free in user_event_mm_dup()
user_event_mm_dup() walks the parent mm's enabler list locklessly under
rcu_read_lock() during fork() (from copy_process()); it does not take
event_mutex:
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(enabler, &old_mm->enablers, mm_enablers_link)
enabler->event = user_event_get(orig->event);
user_event_enabler_destroy() removes an enabler from that list with
list_del_rcu() and then, without waiting for a grace period, drops the
enabler's user_event reference with user_event_put() and frees the enabler
with kfree(). A reader that loaded the enabler before the list_del_rcu()
can still be walking it, which leads to two use-after-frees:
- kfree(enabler) frees the enabler while that reader dereferences
enabler->event.
- user_event_put() may drop the last reference to the user_event, which
is then freed (via delayed_destroy_user_event() on a work queue), while
the same reader does user_event_get(orig->event) on it.
Both are reachable by an unprivileged task that can open user_events_data:
one multithreaded process that registers an enabler and then concurrently
unregisters it and calls fork() triggers the race. KASAN reports a
slab-use-after-free in user_event_mm_dup() during clone(), with a
"refcount_t: addition on 0" warning when the user_event is freed.
The enabler use-after-free was found first; the user_event one was reported
by XIAO WU, and the earlier enabler-only fix did not address it.
Defer both the user_event_put() and the kfree(enabler) to a work item
queued with queue_rcu_work(), so they run only after an RCU grace period,
once all readers walking the enabler list have finished. The put must run
in process context because user_event_put() takes event_mutex on the last
reference, so a work queue is used rather than call_rcu(). The now-unlocked
put lets the locked argument of user_event_enabler_destroy() be removed;
all callers are updated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: ims-pcu - fix type confusion in CDC union descriptor parsing
The driver currently trusts the bMasterInterface0 from the CDC union
descriptor without verifying that it matches the interface being
probed. This could lead to the driver overwriting the private data of
another interface.
Validate that the control interface found in the descriptor is indeed
the one we are probing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: ims-pcu - fix race condition in reset_device sysfs callback
The ims_pcu_reset_device() sysfs callback calls ims_pcu_execute_command()
without acquiring pcu->cmd_mutex. This can lead to data races and
corruption of the shared command buffer if triggered concurrently with
other commands.
Acquire pcu->cmd_mutex before calling ims_pcu_execute_command(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: ims-pcu - fix out-of-bounds read in ims_pcu_irq() debug logging
The debug logging in ims_pcu_irq() unconditionally prints data from
pcu->urb_in_buf. However, if the interrupt fired for pcu->urb_ctrl, the
actual data resides in pcu->urb_ctrl_buf. If urb->actual_length for the
control URB exceeds pcu->max_in_size, this leads to an out-of-bounds
read.
Fix this by printing from the correct buffer associated with the URB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/resctrl: Fix use-after-free during unmount
During unmount or failure teardown all mon_data structures that contain
monitoring event file private data are freed after which kernfs nodes are
removed. However, the RDT_DELETED flag is never set for the statically
allocated default resource group.
A concurrent reader of an event file associated with the default resource
group may, after dropping kernfs active protection, block on rdtgroup_mutex
while unmount proceeds to free the file private data and destroy the kernfs
node without waiting for the reader.
When the mutex is released, the reader wakes up, observes that RDT_DELETED
is not set for the default group, and dereferences the already-freed
file private data.
The scenario can be depicted as follows:
CPU0 CPU1
/*
* Default resource group's
* monitoring data accessible via
* kernfs file with kernfs_node::priv
* pointing to a struct mon_data.
* User opens the file for reading.
*/
rdtgroup_mondata_show() /* arch encounters fatal error */
rdtgroup_kn_lock_live() resctrl_exit()
atomic_inc(&rdtgroup_default.waitcount) cpus_read_lock()
kernfs_break_active_protection(kn) mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex)
cpus_read_lock() resctrl_fs_teardown()
mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex) rmdir_all_sub()
mon_put_kn_priv()
/* Delete all mon_data structures */
rdtgroup_destroy_root()
kernfs_destroy_root()
rdtgroup_default.kn = NULL
mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex)
/*
* rdtgroup_default.flags is empty so
* rdtgroup_kn_lock_live() returns
* &rdtgroup_default
*/
md = of->kn->priv;
/* md points to freed mon_data */
Set RDT_DELETED for the default group unconditionally since the flag does
not lead to the freeing of this statically allocated group.
Do not allow a new resctrl mount if there are any waiters on default group
of previous mount. A new mount will re-initialize the default group that
would appear to waiters from previous mount as though the default group is
accessible causing them to access the mon_data structures from the previous
mount that have been removed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: elx: efct: Fix I/O leak on unsupported additional CDB
efct_dispatch_fcp_cmd() allocates an efct_io before dispatching an
unsolicited FCP command. If the command has an unsupported additional
CDB, the function returns -EIO before handing the IO to the SCSI layer.
Free the allocated IO before returning from this error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: Bound PR-OUT TransportID parsing to the received buffer
core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() and core_scsi3_emulate_register_and_move()
hand the raw PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT parameter buffer to
target_parse_pr_out_transport_id() without telling it how many bytes are
valid. For an iSCSI TransportID (FORMAT CODE 01b),
iscsi_parse_pr_out_transport_id() locates the ",i,0x" ISID separator with
an unbounded strstr() (and on the error path prints the name with a further
unbounded "%s"). An initiator can submit a TransportID whose iSCSI name
contains neither a ",i,0x" substring nor a NUL terminator, filling the
parameter list to its end, so the scan runs off the end of the buffer.
When the parameter list spans more than one page the buffer is a multi-page
vmap (transport_kmap_data_sg()), so the over-read walks into the trailing
vmalloc guard page and oopses (KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in strstr). It
is reachable by any fabric that delivers a PR OUT to a device exported
through an iSCSI TPG, including a guest via vhost-scsi.
Pass the number of received bytes down to the parser and validate the iSCSI
TransportID's own self-described length (ADDITIONAL LENGTH + 4) once, up
front: reject it if it is below the spc4r17 minimum or larger than the
received buffer, then bound the separator search, the ISID walk and the
name copy by that length. This is the length check the callers already
perform after the parse (core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() compares tid_len
against tpdl, core_scsi3_emulate_register_and_move() validates it against
data_length), moved ahead of the scan. Also drop the unbounded "%s" of the
unterminated name.
Add per-format explicit name-length checks before copying into i_str,
rather than silently truncating with min_t: for FORMAT CODE 00b reject if
the descriptor body (tid_len - 4 bytes) cannot fit in
i_str[TRANSPORT_IQN_LEN]; for FORMAT CODE 01b reject if the name portion
(from &buf[4] up to the separator) cannot fit. Both checks make the bounds
intent explicit at each format branch.
While here, also reject a FORMAT CODE 01b TransportID whose ",i,0x"
separator sits at the very end of the descriptor: that leaves an empty ISID
and points the returned port nexus pointer at buf + tid_len, one past the
descriptor, which the registration code (__core_scsi3_locate_pr_reg(),
__core_scsi3_alloc_registration()) then dereferences as the ISID string --
the same over-read of the parameter buffer for a malformed descriptor. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: xen: scsiback: Free the command tag on the TMR submit-failure path
scsiback_device_action() obtains a command tag in
scsiback_get_pend_req() and submits a task-management request with
target_submit_tmr(). When target_submit_tmr() fails it returns < 0 and
scsiback jumps to the err: label, which sends a response but frees
nothing, leaking the tag.
Impact: a pvSCSI guest can leak the command tags of a LUN's session,
stopping the LUN, by issuing VSCSIIF_ACT_SCSI_ABORT or RESET requests
whenever target_submit_tmr() fails.
transport_generic_free_cmd() cannot be used here. By the time
target_submit_tmr() returns an error it has already run
__target_init_cmd() (so se_cmd->cmd_kref is one, not zero), and on its
target_get_sess_cmd() error path it has freed se_cmd->se_tmr_req via
core_tmr_release_req() while leaving SCF_SCSI_TMR_CDB set and the
pointer dangling. Letting the command release run target_free_cmd_mem()
would then double-free se_tmr_req.
Use the same helper, which returns just the tag, on this path too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Reject firmware log with size smaller than header
fw_log_from_bo() validates the tracing buffer header_size and that the
log fits within the BO, but never checks that log->size is at least
log->header_size. fw_log_print_buffer() then computes:
u32 data_size = log->size - log->header_size;
which underflows to a near-U32_MAX value when firmware reports a log whose
size is smaller than its header. That huge data_size defeats the
log_start/log_end bounds clamps added by commit dd1311bcf0e6 ("accel/ivpu:
Add bounds checks for firmware log indices"), so fw_log_print_lines() reads
far past the small real data region of the BO. A size of 0 also makes
fw_log_from_bo() advance the offset by 0, causing the callers to loop
forever on the same header.
Reject logs whose size is smaller than the header (which also rejects
size == 0). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: reject user command submission without a command BO
amdxdna_drm_submit_execbuf() passes the user-supplied command BO handle
straight into amdxdna_cmd_submit() with drv_cmd == NULL. When the handle
is AMDXDNA_INVALID_BO_HANDLE (0), the block that fetches job->cmd_bo is
skipped, leaving it NULL, and no check rejects it on the user path (the
!job->cmd_bo guard lives inside the != INVALID branch).
The job is then armed and pushed to the DRM scheduler.
aie2_sched_job_run() takes the drv_cmd == NULL path and calls
amdxdna_cmd_set_state(job->cmd_bo) -> amdxdna_gem_vmap(NULL) ->
to_gobj(NULL)->dev, a NULL pointer dereference in the drm_sched worker.
A process with access to the accel node on a system with a probed AMD NPU
can trigger a kernel oops with a single AMDXDNA_EXEC_CMD ioctl
(cmd_handles = 0).
Only internal driver commands (SYNC_DEBUG_BO / ATTACH_DEBUG_BO)
legitimately pass AMDXDNA_INVALID_BO_HANDLE, and they always set drv_cmd.
Reject the invalid handle for user submissions (drv_cmd == NULL) at the
submit choke point so every user path is covered.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: reject command submission on devices without a submit op
amdxdna_cmd_submit() calls xdna->dev_info->ops->cmd_submit()
unconditionally, but only aie2_dev_ops defines that callback.
aie4_vf_ops (the AIE4 SR-IOV virtual function) does not, so a user
AMDXDNA_EXEC_CMD ioctl on an AIE4 device reaches a NULL function-pointer
call and oopses the kernel. AIE4 submits work through a mapped user queue
and doorbell, not this ioctl path.
Reject the submission early with -EOPNOTSUPP when the device provides no
cmd_submit op, so the shared EXEC ioctl is a clean no-op on such devices.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-verity: fix a possible NULL pointer dereference
Fix a possible NULL pointer dereference dm_verity_loadpin_is_bdev_trusted
if the device has no table. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-verity: fix buffer overflow in FEC calculation
There's a buffer overflow in dm-verity-fec:
if (neras && *neras <= v->fec->roots)
fio->erasures[(*neras)++] = i;
This allows *neras to reach roots + 1 (the post-increment pushes it past
roots). This value is then passed as no_eras to decode_rs8(). Inside the
RS decoder (lib/reed_solomon/decode_rs.c:113-121), the erasure locator
polynomial loop writes lambda[j] where j can reach nroots + 1 — one
element past the end of lambda[] (which is sized nroots + 1, valid
indices 0..nroots). The out-of-bounds write lands on syn[0], corrupting
the syndrome buffer. |
| The TrueBooker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.6. This is due to the add_front_user_update() AJAX handler being registered for unauthenticated users and accepting an arbitrary truebooker_wp_user_id value, which is passed directly to wp_update_user() without verifying authentication or ownership. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change any WordPress user account email address, including an administrator, by submitting the target user ID and an attacker-controlled email address. An attacker can then use the native WordPress password reset flow to receive the reset link at the attacker-controlled email address and take over the account. |
| The Real Estate Manager Pro plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 12.8.6. This is due to improper capability handling in the allow_attachment_actions() function, which can treat a target user ID as a media attachment ID during user capability checks. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to edit an administrator account and escalate their privileges to Administrator when the targeted user ID matches the ID of an existing media attachment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
liveupdate: validate session type before performing operation
The sessions ioctls are not applicable to all session types. PRESERVE_FD
is only applicable to outgoing sessions. RETRIEVE_FD and FINISH are only
valid for incoming session. Calling a incoming ioctl on an outgoing
session is invalid and can cause file handlers to run into unexpected
errors.
For example, a user can create a (outgoing) session, preserve a memfd,
and then immediately do a retrieve without doing a kexec in between.
This would result in memfd's retrieve handler to run. The handlers
expects to be called from a post-kexec context, and will try to do a
kho_restore_vmalloc() or kho_restore_folio() to try and restore memory.
KHO catches this (thanks to KHO_PAGE_MAGIC) and returns an error, but
since this is considered an internal error and KHO throws out a bunch of
WARN()s.
Associate a type with each ioctl op and validate the type in
luo_session_ioctl() before dispatching the ioctl handler to make sure
the op is being called for the right session type. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: use opener credentials for FSCTL mutations
SET_SPARSE, SET_ZERO_DATA and SET_COMPRESSION operate on an open SMB
handle but call VFS xattr, fallocate or fileattr helpers with the current
ksmbd worker credentials. Those helpers can revalidate inode permissions,
ownership and LSM policy independently of the SMB handle access mask.
Run each operation with the credentials captured in the target file when
the handle was opened. Keep credential handling local to these single-file
FSCTLs rather than applying session credentials to the complete IOCTL
handler, which also contains handle-less and multi-handle operations. |
