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CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-46111 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in create_big_sync Add hci_conn_valid() check in create_big_sync() to detect stale connections before proceeding with BIG creation. Handle the resulting -ECANCELED in create_big_complete() and re-validate the connection under hci_dev_lock() before dereferencing, matching the pattern used by create_le_conn_complete() and create_pa_complete(). Keep the hci_conn object alive across the async boundary by taking a reference via hci_conn_get() when queueing create_big_sync(), and dropping it in the completion callback. The refcount and the lock are complementary: the refcount keeps the object allocated, while hci_dev_lock() serializes hci_conn_hash_del()'s list_del_rcu() on hdev->conn_hash, as required by hci_conn_del(). hci_conn_put() is called outside hci_dev_unlock() so the final put (which resolves to kfree() via bt_link_release) does not run under hdev->lock, though the release path would be safe either way. Without this, create_big_complete() would unconditionally dereference the conn pointer on error, causing a use-after-free via hci_connect_cfm() and hci_conn_del().
CVE-2026-46110 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.5 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer's physical address and a status flag ("OWN") indicating which side owns the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both "submissions" and "completions." In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called. This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own): - `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid) - `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated) - `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer NULL) But because stmmac_rx() only checks OWN, it confuses `full`/`dirty`. In the past (see 'Fixes:'), there was a bug where the loop could cycle `cur_rx` all the way back to the first descriptor it dirtied, resulting in a NULL dereference when mistaken for `full`. The aforementioned commit resolved that *specific* failure by capping the loop's iteration limit at `dma_rx_size - 1`, but this is only a partial fix: if the previous stmmac_rx_refill() didn't complete, then there are leftover `dirty` descriptors that the loop might encounter without needing to cycle fully around. The current code therefore panics (see 'Closes:') when stmmac_rx_refill() is memory-starved long enough for `cur_rx` to catch up to `dirty_rx`. Fix this by explicitly checking, before advancing `cur_rx`, if the next entry is dirty; exit the loop if so. This prevents processing of the final, used descriptor until stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, but fully prevents the `cur_rx == dirty_rx` ambiguity as the previous bugfix intended: so remove the clamp as well. Since stmmac_rx_zc() is a copy-paste-and-tweak of stmmac_rx() and the code structure is identical, any fix to stmmac_rx() will also need a corresponding fix for stmmac_rx_zc(). Therefore, apply the same check there. In stmmac_rx() (not stmmac_rx_zc()), a related bug remains: after the MAC sets OWN=0 on the final descriptor, it will be unable to send any further DMA-complete IRQs until it's given more `empty` descriptors. Currently, the driver simply *hopes* that the next stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, risking an indefinite stall of the receive process if not. But this is not a regression, so it can be addressed in a future change.
CVE-2026-46105 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: mpt3sas: Limit NVMe request size to 2 MiB The HBA firmware reports NVMe MDTS values based on the underlying drive capability. However, because the driver allocates a fixed 4K buffer for the PRP list, accommodating at most 512 entries, the driver supports a maximum I/O transfer size of 2 MiB. Limit max_hw_sectors to the smaller of the reported MDTS and the 2 MiB driver limit to prevent issuing oversized I/O that may lead to a kernel oops.
CVE-2026-46100 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: afs: revert mmap_prepare() change Partially reverts commit 9d5403b1036c ("fs: convert most other generic_file_*mmap() users to .mmap_prepare()"). This is because the .mmap invocation establishes a refcount, but .mmap_prepare is called at a point where a merge or an allocation failure might happen after the call, which would leak the refcount increment. Functionality is being added to permit the use of .mmap_prepare in this case, but in the interim, we need to fix this.
CVE-2026-46093 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/vmalloc: take vmap_purge_lock in shrinker decay_va_pool_node() can be invoked concurrently from two paths: __purge_vmap_area_lazy() when pools are being purged, and the shrinker via vmap_node_shrink_scan(). However, decay_va_pool_node() is not safe to run concurrently, and the shrinker path currently lacks serialization, leading to races and possible leaks. Protect decay_va_pool_node() by taking vmap_purge_lock in the shrinker path to ensure serialization with purge users.
CVE-2026-46090 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: aloop: Fix peer runtime UAF during format-change stop loopback_check_format() may stop the capture side when playback starts with parameters that no longer match a running capture stream. Commit 826af7fa62e3 ("ALSA: aloop: Fix racy access at PCM trigger") moved the peer lookup under cable->lock, but the actual snd_pcm_stop() still runs after dropping that lock. A concurrent close can clear the capture entry from cable->streams[] and detach or free its runtime while the playback trigger path still holds a stale peer substream pointer. Keep a per-cable count of in-flight peer stops before dropping cable->lock, and make free_cable() wait for those stops before detaching the runtime. This preserves the existing behavior while making the peer runtime lifetime explicit.
CVE-2026-46085 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.5 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix rxkad crypto unalignment handling Fix handling of a packet with a misaligned crypto length. Also handle non-ENOMEM errors from decryption by aborting. Further, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE() so that it can't be remotely triggered (a trace line can still be emitted).
CVE-2026-46081 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: acomp - fix wrong pointer stored by acomp_save_req() acomp_save_req() stores &req->chain in req->base.data. When acomp_reqchain_done() is invoked on asynchronous completion, it receives &req->chain as the data argument but casts it directly to struct acomp_req. Since data points to the chain member, all subsequent field accesses are at a wrong offset, resulting in memory corruption. The issue occurs when an asynchronous hardware implementation, such as the QAT driver, completes a request that uses the DMA virtual address interface (e.g. acomp_request_set_src_dma()). This combination causes crypto_acomp_compress() to enter the acomp_do_req_chain() path, which sets acomp_reqchain_done() as the completion callback via acomp_save_req(). With KASAN enabled, this manifests as a general protection fault in acomp_reqchain_done(): general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe000040000000000 KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000400000000000-0x0000400000000007] RIP: 0010:acomp_reqchain_done+0x15b/0x4e0 Call Trace: <IRQ> qat_comp_alg_callback+0x5d/0xa0 [intel_qat] adf_ring_response_handler+0x376/0x8b0 [intel_qat] adf_response_handler+0x60/0x170 [intel_qat] tasklet_action_common+0x223/0x820 handle_softirqs+0x1ab/0x640 </IRQ> Fix this by storing the request itself in req->base.data instead of &req->chain, so that acomp_reqchain_done() receives the correct pointer. Simplify acomp_restore_req() accordingly to access req->chain directly.
CVE-2026-46076 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.9 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nSVM: Raise #UD if unhandled VMMCALL isn't intercepted by L1 Explicitly synthesize a #UD for VMMCALL if L2 is active, L1 does NOT want to intercept VMMCALL, nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled() is true, and the hypercall is something other than one of the supported Hyper-V hypercalls. When all of the above conditions are met, KVM will intercept VMMCALL but never forward it to L1, i.e. will let L2 make hypercalls as if it were L1. The TLFS says a whole lot of nothing about this scenario, so go with the architectural behavior, which says that VMMCALL #UDs if it's not intercepted. Opportunistically do a 2-for-1 stub trade by stub-ifying the new API instead of the helpers it uses. The last remaining "single" stub will soon be dropped as well. [sean: rewrite changelog and comment, tag for stable, remove defunct stubs]
CVE-2026-46065 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: defio: Disconnect deferred I/O from the lifetime of struct fb_info Hold state of deferred I/O in struct fb_deferred_io_state. Allocate an instance as part of initializing deferred I/O and remove it only after the final mapping has been closed. If the fb_info and the contained deferred I/O meanwhile goes away, clear struct fb_deferred_io_state.info to invalidate the mapping. Any access will then result in a SIGBUS signal. Fixes a long-standing problem, where a device hot-unplug happens while user space still has an active mapping of the graphics memory. The hot- unplug frees the instance of struct fb_info. Accessing the memory will operate on undefined state.
CVE-2026-45951 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix a potential use-after-free of BTF object Refcounting in the check_pseudo_btf_id() function is incorrect: the __check_pseudo_btf_id() function might get called with a zero refcounted btf. Fix this, and patch related code accordingly. v3: rephrase a comment (AI) v2: fix a refcount leak introduced in v1 (AI)
CVE-2026-45942 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix e4b bitmap inconsistency reports A bitmap inconsistency issue was observed during stress tests under mixed huge-page workloads. Ext4 reported multiple e4b bitmap check failures like: ext4_mb_complex_scan_group:2508: group 350, 8179 free clusters as per group info. But got 8192 blocks Analysis and experimentation confirmed that the issue is caused by a race condition between page migration and bitmap modification. Although this timing window is extremely narrow, it is still hit in practice: folio_lock ext4_mb_load_buddy __migrate_folio check ref count folio_mc_copy __filemap_get_folio folio_try_get(folio) ...... mb_mark_used ext4_mb_unload_buddy __folio_migrate_mapping folio_ref_freeze folio_unlock The root cause of this issue is that the fast path of load_buddy only increments the folio's reference count, which is insufficient to prevent concurrent folio migration. We observed that the folio migration process acquires the folio lock. Therefore, we can determine whether to take the fast path in load_buddy by checking the lock status. If the folio is locked, we opt for the slow path (which acquires the lock) to close this concurrency window. Additionally, this change addresses the following issues: When the DOUBLE_CHECK macro is enabled to inspect bitmap-related issues, the following error may be triggered: corruption in group 324 at byte 784(6272): f in copy != ff on disk/prealloc Analysis reveals that this is a false positive. There is a specific race window where the bitmap and the group descriptor become momentarily inconsistent, leading to this error report: ext4_mb_load_buddy ext4_mb_load_buddy __filemap_get_folio(create|lock) folio_lock ext4_mb_init_cache folio_mark_uptodate __filemap_get_folio(no lock) ...... mb_mark_used mb_mark_used_double mb_cmp_bitmaps mb_set_bits(e4b->bd_bitmap) folio_unlock The original logic assumed that since mb_cmp_bitmaps is called when the bitmap is newly loaded from disk, the folio lock would be sufficient to prevent concurrent access. However, this overlooks a specific race condition: if another process attempts to load buddy and finds the folio is already in an uptodate state, it will immediately begin using it without holding folio lock.
CVE-2026-45935 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot In the 'DeleteIndexEntryRoot' case of the 'do_action' function, the entry size ('esize') is retrieved from the log record without adequate bounds checking. Specifically, the code calculates the end of the entry ('e2') using: e2 = Add2Ptr(e1, esize); It then calculates the size for memmove using 'PtrOffset(e2, ...)', which subtracts the end pointer from the buffer limit. If 'esize' is maliciously large, 'e2' exceeds the used buffer size. This results in a negative offset which, when cast to size_t for memmove, interprets as a massive unsigned integer, leading to a heap buffer overflow. This commit adds a check to ensure that the entry size ('esize') strictly fits within the remaining used space of the index header before performing memory operations.
CVE-2026-45933 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Preserve id of register in sync_linked_regs() sync_linked_regs() copies the id of known_reg to reg when propagating bounds of known_reg to reg using the off of known_reg, but when known_reg was linked to reg like: known_reg = reg ; both known_reg and reg get same id known_reg += 4 ; known_reg gets off = 4, and its id gets BPF_ADD_CONST now when a call to sync_linked_regs() happens, let's say with the following: if known_reg >= 10 goto pc+2 known_reg's new bounds are propagated to reg but now reg gets BPF_ADD_CONST from the copy. This means if another link to reg is created like: another_reg = reg ; another_reg should get the id of reg but assign_scalar_id_before_mov() sees BPF_ADD_CONST on reg and assigns a new id to it. As reg has a new id now, known_reg's link to reg is broken. If we find new bounds for known_reg, they will not be propagated to reg. This can be seen in the selftest added in the next commit: 0: (85) call bpf_get_prandom_u32#7 ; R0=scalar() 1: (57) r0 &= 255 ; R0=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) 2: (bf) r1 = r0 ; R0=scalar(id=1,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) R1=scalar(id=1,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) 3: (07) r1 += 4 ; R1=scalar(id=1+4,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=4,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=259,var_off=(0x0; 0x1ff)) 4: (a5) if r1 < 0xa goto pc+4 ; R1=scalar(id=1+4,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=10,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=259,var_off=(0x0; 0x1ff)) 5: (bf) r2 = r0 ; R0=scalar(id=2,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=6,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255) R2=scalar(id=2,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=6,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255) 6: (a5) if r1 < 0xe goto pc+2 ; R1=scalar(id=1+4,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=14,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=259,var_off=(0x0; 0x1ff)) 7: (35) if r0 >= 0xa goto pc+1 ; R0=scalar(id=2,smin=umin=smin32=umin32=6,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=9,var_off=(0x0; 0xf)) 8: (37) r0 /= 0 div by zero When 4 is verified, r1's bounds are propagated to r0 but r0 also gets BPF_ADD_CONST (bug). When 5 is verified, r0 gets a new id (2) and its link with r1 is broken. After 6 we know r1 has bounds [14, 259] and therefore r0 should have bounds [10, 255], therefore the branch at 7 is always taken. But because r0's id was changed to 2, r1's new bounds are not propagated to r0. The verifier still thinks r0 has bounds [6, 255] before 7 and execution can reach div by zero. Fix this by preserving id in sync_linked_regs() like off and subreg_def.
CVE-2026-45932 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.3 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix tcx/netkit detach permissions when prog fd isn't given This commit fixes a security issue where BPF_PROG_DETACH on tcx or netkit devices could be executed by any user when no program fd was provided, bypassing permission checks. The fix adds a capability check for CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN in this case.
CVE-2026-45931 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: Hold mm structure across iommu_sva_unbind_device() Some tests trigger a crash in iommu_sva_unbind_device() due to accessing iommu_mm after the associated mm structure has been freed. Fix this by taking an explicit reference to the mm structure after successfully binding the device, and releasing it only after the device is unbound. This ensures the mm remains valid for the entire SVA bind/unbind lifetime.
CVE-2026-45929 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: fix possible use-after-free in ovpn_net_xmit When building the skb_list in ovpn_net_xmit, skb_share_check will free the original skb if it is shared. The current implementation continues to use the stale skb pointer for subsequent operations: - peer lookup, - skb_dst_drop (even though all segments produced by skb_gso_segment will have a dst attached), - ovpn_peer_stats_increment_tx. Fix this by moving the peer lookup and skb_dst_drop before segmentation so that the original skb is still valid when used. Return early if all segments fail skb_share_check and the list ends up empty. Also switch ovpn_peer_stats_increment_tx to use skb_list.next; the next patch fixes the stats logic.
CVE-2026-45910 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Fix race condition in QP timer handlers I encontered the following warning: WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:249 at rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ... libsha1 [last unloaded: ip6_udp_tunnel] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G C 6.19.0-rc5-64k-v8+ #37 PREEMPT Tainted: [C]=CRAP Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.2 Call trace: rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe] (P) retransmit_timer+0x130/0x188 [rdma_rxe] call_timer_fn+0x68/0x4d0 __run_timers+0x630/0x888 ... WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:38 at rxe_sched_task+0x1c0/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ... WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:111 at do_work+0x488/0x5c8 [rdma_rxe], CPU#3: kworker/u17:4/93400 ... refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:28 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1a0, CPU#3: kworker/u17:4/93400 The issue is caused by a race condition between retransmit_timer() and rxe_destroy_qp, leading to the Queue Pair's (QP) reference count dropping to zero during timer handler execution. It seems this warning is harmless because rxe_qp_do_cleanup() will flush all pending timers and requests. Example of flow causing the issue: CPU0 CPU1 retransmit_timer() { spin_lock_irqsave rxe_destroy_qp() __rxe_cleanup() __rxe_put() // qp->ref_count decrease to 0 rxe_qp_do_cleanup() { if (qp->valid) { rxe_sched_task() { WARN_ON(rxe_read(task->qp) <= 0); } } spin_unlock_irqrestore } spin_lock_irqsave qp->valid = 0 spin_unlock_irqrestore } Ensure the QP's reference count is maintained and its validity is checked within the timer callbacks by adding calls to rxe_get(qp) and corresponding rxe_put(qp) after use.
CVE-2026-45909 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: mediatek: Drop __initconst from gates Since commit 8ceff24a754a ("clk: mediatek: clk-gate: Refactor mtk_clk_register_gate to use mtk_gate struct") the mtk_gate structs are no longer just used for initialization/registration, but also at runtime. So drop __initconst annotations.
CVE-2026-45898 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-05-30 9.8 Critical
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/iwcm: Fix workqueue list corruption by removing work_list The commit e1168f0 ("RDMA/iwcm: Simplify cm_event_handler()") changed the work submission logic to unconditionally call queue_work() with the expectation that queue_work() would have no effect if work was already pending. The problem is that a free list of struct iwcm_work is used (for which struct work_struct is embedded), so each call to queue_work() is basically unique and therefore does indeed queue the work. This causes a problem in the work handler which walks the work_list until it's empty to process entries. This means that a single run of the work handler could process item N+1 and release it back to the free list while the actual workqueue entry is still queued. It could then get reused (INIT_WORK...) and lead to list corruption in the workqueue logic. Fix this by just removing the work_list. The workqueue already does this for us. This fixes the following error that was observed when stress testing with ucmatose on an Intel E830 in iWARP mode: [ 151.465780] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ffff9f0915c69c08, but was ffff9f0a1116be08. (next=ffff9f0a15b11c08) [ 151.466639] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 151.466986] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67! [ 151.467349] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 151.467753] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 2306 Comm: kworker/u64:18 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc4+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 151.468466] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 151.469192] Workqueue: 0x0 (iw_cm_wq) [ 151.469478] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xf0/0x100 [ 151.469942] Code: c7 58 5f 4c b2 e8 10 50 aa ff 0f 0b 48 89 ef e8 36 57 cb ff 48 8b 55 08 48 89 e9 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 a8 5f 4c b2 e8 f0 4f aa ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 [ 151.471323] RSP: 0000:ffffb15644e7bd68 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 151.471712] RAX: 000000000000006d RBX: ffff9f0915c69c08 RCX: 0000000000000027 [ 151.472243] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f0a37d9c600 [ 151.472768] RBP: ffff9f0a15b11c08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffff7fff [ 151.473294] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb15644e7bba8 R12: ffff9f092339ee68 [ 151.473817] R13: ffff9f0900059c28 R14: ffff9f092339ee78 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 151.474344] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f0a847b5000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 151.474934] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 151.475362] CR2: 0000559e233a9088 CR3: 000000020296b004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 151.475895] PKRU: 55555554 [ 151.476118] Call Trace: [ 151.476331] <TASK> [ 151.476497] move_linked_works+0x49/0xa0 [ 151.476792] __pwq_activate_work.isra.46+0x2f/0xa0 [ 151.477151] pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x1e0/0x2f0 [ 151.477479] process_scheduled_works+0x1c8/0x410 [ 151.477823] worker_thread+0x125/0x260 [ 151.478108] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.478430] kthread+0xfe/0x240 [ 151.478671] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.478955] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.479240] ret_from_fork+0x208/0x270 [ 151.479523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.479806] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 151.480103] </TASK>