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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-63966 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: imu: adis16550: fix stack leak in trigger handler adis16550_trigger_handler() declares the scan data array on the stack without initializing it. The memcpy() at the bottom fills only the first 28 bytes (TEMP + 6 channels of GYRO/ACCEL data), and iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() writes the s64 timestamp at the 8-byte-aligned offset 32. Bytes 28-31 remain uninitialized stack data which leaks to userspace on ever trigger. Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63965 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: pressure: bmp280: fix stack leak in bmp580 trigger handler bmp580_trigger_handler() declares its scan buffer on the stack without an initializer and then memcpy()s 3 bytes of 24-bit sensor data into each 4-byte __le32 field. The high byte of comp_temp and comp_press is left uninitialized, and the channel storagebits is 32, so two bytes of stack are pushed to userspace per scan. This is a regression from when the buffer lived in the private data, the move to a stack-local struct dropped the implicit zeroing. bme280_trigger_handler() was fixed up to handle this bug, but this driver was not fixed because there was no padding hole, but rather a short-fill issue. Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63964 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a ':' record header do_flash() locates the first .cyacd record with p = strnchr(fw->data, fw->size, ':'); while (p < eof) { s = strnchr(p + 1, eof - p - 1, ':'); ... } If the firmware image contains no ':' byte, strnchr() returns NULL. NULL compares less than the valid kernel pointer eof, so the loop body runs and strnchr() is called with p + 1 == (void *)1 and a length of roughly (unsigned long)eof, causing a wonderful crash. The not_signed_fw fallthrough earlier in do_flash() and the chip-state branches in ccg_fw_update_needed() allow an unsigned blob to reach this loop, so a root user who can place a crafted file under /lib/firmware and write the do_flash sysfs attribute can trigger the oops. Bail out with -EINVAL when the initial strnchr() returns NULL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63963 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: validate VDO count in Discover Identity ACK handlers Properly validate the count passed from a device when calling svdm_consume_identity() or svdm_consume_identity_sop_prime() as the device-controlled value could index off of the static arrays, which could leak data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63962 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes() svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every point in the loop. In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming ACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port->partner is set, an unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken or malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra Discover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes, the loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For mode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the partner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen SVID/VDO bytes. Move the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed past ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner supplies or how the function was reached. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63961 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: altmodes/displayport: validate count before reading Status Update VDO A broken/malicious device can send the incorrect count for a status update VDO, which will cause the kernel to read uninitialized stack data and send it off elsewhere. Fix this up by correctly verifying the count for the update object. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63960 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: wcove: don't write past struct pd_message in wcove_read_rx_buffer() wcove_read_rx_buffer() copies the PD RX FIFO into the caller's struct pd_message with for (i = 0; i < USBC_RXINFO_RXBYTES(info); i++) regmap_read(wcove->regmap, USBC_RX_DATA + i, msg + i); which has two problems: USBC_RXINFO_RXBYTES() is a 5-bit field (max 31) while struct pd_message is 30 bytes (__le16 header + __le32 payload[PD_MAX_PAYLOAD], packed). The byte count latched in RXINFO is the number of bytes the port partner put on the wire, so a malicious partner that transmits a 31-byte frame can drive the loop one byte past the destination if the WCOVE BMC receiver does not enforce the PD object-count limit in hardware. The existing FIXME flagged this as unverified. Independently, regmap_read() takes an unsigned int * and stores a full unsigned int at the destination. Passing the byte pointer msg + i means each iteration writes four bytes; the high three are zero (val_bits is 8) and are normally overwritten by the next iteration, but the final iteration's high bytes are not. With RXBYTES == 30 the i == 29 iteration already writes three zero bytes past msg, which sits on the IRQ thread's stack in wcove_typec_irq(). Clamp the loop to sizeof(struct pd_message) and read each register into a local before storing only its low byte, so the copy can never exceed the destination regardless of what RXINFO reports. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63959 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm/tcpci_maxim: validate header NDO against RX_BYTE_CNT A broken/malicious port can transmit a CRC-valid frame whose header advertises up to seven data objects but whose body carries fewer than that. Check for this, and rightfully reject the message, instead of reading from uninitialized stack memory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63958 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: ucsi: validate connector number in ucsi_connector_change() The connector number in a UCSI CCI notification is a 7-bit field supplied by the PPM. ucsi_connector_change() uses it to index the ucsi->connector[] array without checking it against the number of connectors the PPM reported at init time, so a buggy or malicious PPM (EC firmware, or an I2C-attached UCSI controller on the ccg / stm32g0 / glink transports) can drive schedule_work() on memory past the end of the array. Reject connector numbers that are zero or exceed cap.num_connectors before dereferencing the array. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63957 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: safe_serial: fix memory corruption with small endpoint Make sure that the bulk-out buffer size is at least eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption in "safe" mode should a malicious device report a smaller size. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63956 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: cypress_m8: fix memory corruption with small endpoint Make sure that the interrupt-out endpoint max packet size is at least eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption or NULL-pointer dereference should a malicious device report a smaller size. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63953 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/migrate_device: fix pgtable leak in migrate_vma_insert_huge_pmd_page When migrate_vma_insert_huge_pmd_page() jumps to unlock_abort due to a PMD check failure, the pgtable allocated earlier via pte_alloc_one() is never freed, causing a memory leak. Added free_abort label to release the pgtable in error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63949 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: auxdisplay: line-display: fix OOB read on zero-length message_store() linedisp_display() unconditionally reads msg[count - 1] before checking whether count is zero, so a write of zero bytes to the message sysfs attribute hits msg[-1]: write(fd, "", 0); -> message_store(..., buf, count=0) -> linedisp_display(linedisp, buf, count=0) -> msg[count - 1] == '\n' ; OOB read The kernfs write buffer for that store is a 1-byte allocation (kernfs_fop_write_iter() does kmalloc(len + 1) with len == 0), so msg[-1] is a 1-byte read before the slab object. On a KASAN-enabled kernel this trips an out-of-bounds report and panics; on stock kernels it silently reads adjacent slab data and, if that byte happens to be '\n', the following count-- wraps ssize_t 0 to -1 and is then passed to kmemdup_nul(). linedisp_display() is reached from the message_store() sysfs callback (drivers/auxdisplay/line-display.c message attribute, mode 0644) and from the in-tree initial-message setup with count == -1, so the OOB path is only userspace-triggerable via zero-byte writes; vfs_write() does not short-circuit on count == 0 and kernfs_fop_write_iter() dispatches the store callback regardless. Guard the trailing-newline trim with a count check. The existing if (!count) block then takes the clear-display path unchanged. Affects every auxdisplay driver that registers via linedisp_register() / linedisp_attach(): ht16k33, max6959, img-ascii-lcd, seg-led-gpio. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63948 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix chan ref leak in l2cap_chan_timeout() on !conn __set_chan_timer() takes a l2cap_chan reference via l2cap_chan_hold() before scheduling the delayed work. The normal path in l2cap_chan_timeout() drops this reference with l2cap_chan_put() at the end, but the early return when chan->conn is NULL skips the put, leaking the reference. Add the missing l2cap_chan_put() before the early return. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63943 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: xpad - fix out-of-bounds access for Share button xpadone_process_packet() receives len directly from urb->actual_length and uses it to index the share-button byte at data[len - 18] or data[len - 26]. Since both len and data[0] are under the device's control, a broken controller can send a GIP_CMD_INPUT packet with actual_length < 18 (e.g. 5 bytes) and reach this code path, causing accesses beyond the actual array. Fix this by calculating the offset and checking bounds against the packet length. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63936 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: mt6359: fix unchecked return value in mt6358_read_imp In mt6358_read_imp(), the variable val_v is passed to regmap_read() but the return value is not checked. If the read fails, val_v remains uninitialized and its random stack content is subsequently reported as a measurement result. Initialize val_v to zero to ensure a predictable value is reported in case of bus failure and to prevent potential stack data leakage. This also satisfies static analyzers that might otherwise flag the variable as used uninitialized. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63935 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: nxp-sar-adc: fix division by zero in write_raw Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it as a divisor. A user writing zero or a negative value to the sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel. Also prevent unsigned integer underflow when the computed cycle count is smaller than NXP_SAR_ADC_CONV_TIME, which would wrap the u32 inpsamp to a huge value. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63934 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: gyro: itg3200: fix i2c read into the wrong stack location itg3200_read_all_channels() takes `__be16 *buf' as a parameter and fills the i2c_msg destination as `(char *)&buf'. Since `buf' is the parameter (a pointer), `&buf' is the address of the local pointer slot on the stack of itg3200_read_all_channels(), not the address of the caller's scan buffer. The (char *) cast hides the type mismatch. i2c_transfer() therefore writes ITG3200_SCAN_ELEMENTS * sizeof(s16) = 8 bytes into the parameter's stack slot, which is discarded when the function returns. The caller's scan buffer in itg3200_trigger_handler() is never written to, so iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() pushes uninitialised stack contents to userspace via /dev/iio:deviceX every scan -- both a functional bug (no actual gyroscope or temperature data is delivered through the triggered buffer) and an information leak. The non-buffered read_raw() path is unaffected: it goes through itg3200_read_reg_s16() which uses `&out' on a local s16 value, where that is correct. Drop the spurious `&' so the i2c read writes into the caller's buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63933 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: gyro: adis16260: fix division by zero in write_raw Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it as a divisor. A user writing zero to the sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63932 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: chemical: mhz19b: reject oversized serial replies mhz19b_receive_buf() appends each serdev chunk into the fixed MHZ19B_CMD_SIZE receive buffer and advances buf_idx by len without checking that the chunk fits in the remaining space. A large callback can therefore overflow st->buf before the command path validates the reply. Reset the reply state before each command and reject oversized serial replies before copying them into the fixed buffer. When an oversized reply is detected, wake the waiter and report -EMSGSIZE instead of overwriting st->buf. | ||||