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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-72173 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc/task_mmu: do not warn on seeing non-migration pmd entry Patch series "mm/hmm: A fix and a selftest", v3. Patch 1 fixes a stale warning present from the time when only migration softleaf entries were supported at the PMD level. Patch 2 adds some code into hmm-tests.c which exercises the pagemap path for PMD device-private entries. This patch (of 2): pagemap_pmd_range_thp() warns if a non-present PMD is not a migration entry. This became false once device-private entries at the PMD level were added. Therefore, remove the stale migration-only assertion. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72172 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mm_init: fix uninitialized struct pages for ZONE_DEVICE If DAX memory is hotplugged into an unoccupied subsection of an early section, section_activate() reuses the unoptimized boot memmap. However, compound_nr_pages() still assumes that vmemmap optimization is in effect and initializes only the reduced number of struct pages. As a result, the remaining tail struct pages are left uninitialized, which can later lead to unexpected behavior or crashes. Fix this by treating early sections as unoptimized when calculating how many struct pages to initialize. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72171 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: slram: remove failed entries from the device list register_device() links a new slram_mtdlist entry before allocating all of the state needed by the entry. If a later allocation, memremap(), or mtd_device_register() fails, the partially initialized entry remains on the global list. A later cleanup can then dereference or free invalid state from that failed entry. Unwind the partially initialized entry and clear the list tail on each failure path after the entry has been linked. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72170 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 9p: skip nlink update in cacheless mode to fix WARN_ON v9fs_dec_count() unconditionally calls drop_nlink() on regular files, even when the inode's nlink is already zero. In cacheless mode the client refetches inode metadata from the server (the source of truth) on every operation, so by the time v9fs_remove() returns, the locally cached nlink may already reflect the post-unlink value: 1. Client initiates unlink, server processes it and sets nlink to 0 2. Client refetches inode metadata (nlink=0) before unlink returns 3. Client's v9fs_remove() completes successfully 4. Client calls v9fs_dec_count() which calls drop_nlink() on nlink=0 This race is easily triggered under heavy unlink workloads, such as stress-ng's unlink stressor, producing the following warning: WARNING: fs/inode.c:417 at drop_nlink+0x4c/0xc8 Call trace: drop_nlink+0x4c/0xc8 v9fs_remove+0x1e0/0x250 [9p] v9fs_vfs_unlink+0x20/0x38 [9p] vfs_unlink+0x13c/0x258 ... In cacheless mode the server is authoritative and the inode is on its way out, so locally adjusting nlink buys nothing. Skip v9fs_dec_count() entirely when neither CACHE_META nor CACHE_LOOSE is set, which both avoids the warning and removes a class of nlink races (two concurrent unlinkers observing nlink > 0 and both calling drop_nlink()) that an nlink == 0 guard alone would only narrow rather than close. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72169 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kho: make sure scratch size is always aligned by CMA_MIN_ALIGNMENT_BYTES When using scratch_scale, the scratch sizes are rounded up to CMA_MIN_ALIGNMENT_BYTES since they will be released as MIGRATE_CMA. This is not done when using fixed scratch sizes via command line. This can result in user specifying a size which is not aligned, and thus kernel releasing a pageblock that is only partially scratch. Do the rounding up for both cases in scratch_size_update(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72168 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: maps: vmu-flash: fix fault in unaligned fixup Use kzalloc_obj() / kzalloc_objs() to allocate the memcard structs, instead of kmalloc_obj() / kmalloc_objs() to prevent access to uninitialized data. Fixes runtime error: Fault in unaligned fixup: 0000 [#1] at mtd_get_fact_prot_info. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72167 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: rawnand: pl353: fix probe resource allocation During probe(), the devm_ioremap() is called with the parent device instead of the current one. So when the module is unloaded, the register area isn't released. Target the pl35x device in the devm_ioremap() instead of its parent. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72166 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/9p: fix infinite loop in p9_client_rpc on fatal signal When p9_client_rpc() is called with type P9_TFLUSH and the transport has no peer (e.g. fd transport backed by pipes with no 9p server), a fatal signal causes an infinite loop: again: err = io_wait_event_killable(req->wq, ...) /* SIGKILL wakes the task, returns -ERESTARTSYS */ if (err == -ERESTARTSYS && c->status == Connected && type == P9_TFLUSH) { sigpending = 1; clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING); goto again; } clear_thread_flag() clears TIF_SIGPENDING before jumping back to io_wait_event_killable(). signal_pending_state() checks TIF_SIGPENDING, finds it zero, and the task goes to sleep again. The task can only wake on the next signal delivery that calls signal_wake_up() and sets TIF_SIGPENDING again. When that happens the loop repeats, clears TIF_SIGPENDING, and sleeps again indefinitely. This is triggered in practice by coredump_wait(): when a thread in a multi-threaded process causes a coredump (e.g. via SIGSYS from Syscall User Dispatch), coredump_wait() sends SIGKILL to all other threads and waits for them to call mm_release(). If one of those threads is blocked in p9_client_rpc() over an fd transport with no peer, it enters the P9_TFLUSH loop and never calls mm_release(), so coredump_wait() stalls forever: INFO: task syz.0.18:676 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1 task:syz.0.18 state:D stack:27600 pid:676 tgid:673 ppid:630 flags:0x00000004 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5344 [inline] __schedule+0xcb4/0x5d50 kernel/sched/core.c:6724 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6801 [inline] schedule+0xe5/0x350 kernel/sched/core.c:6816 schedule_timeout+0x253/0x290 kernel/time/timer.c:2593 do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:95 [inline] __wait_for_common+0x409/0x600 kernel/sched/completion.c:116 wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:127 [inline] wait_for_completion_state+0x1d/0x40 kernel/sched/completion.c:264 coredump_wait fs/coredump.c:448 [inline] do_coredump+0x854/0x4350 fs/coredump.c:629 get_signal+0x1425/0x2730 kernel/signal.c:2903 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x81/0x880 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xf9/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0x102/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:84 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Fix: check fatal_signal_pending() before clearing TIF_SIGPENDING in the P9_TFLUSH retry loop. At that point TIF_SIGPENDING is still set, so fatal_signal_pending() works correctly. If a fatal signal is pending, jump to recalc_sigpending to restore TIF_SIGPENDING and return -ERESTARTSYS to the caller. The same defect is present in stable kernels back to 5.4. On those kernels the infinite loop is broken earlier by a second SIGKILL from the parent process (e.g. kill_and_wait() retrying after a timeout), resulting in a zombie process and a shutdown delay rather than a permanent D-state hang, but the underlying flaw is the same. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72165 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: rawnand: fix condition in 'nand_select_target()' 'cs' here must be in range [0:nanddev_ntargets[. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72164 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: avoid moving extents to occupied clusters For non-auto OCFS2_IOC_MOVE_EXT operations, userspace supplies a physical me_goal. ocfs2_move_extent() initializes new_phys_cpos from that goal and expects ocfs2_probe_alloc_group() to replace it with a free run in the target block group. The probe currently leaves *phys_cpos unchanged if the scan reaches the end of the group without finding a free run. An occupied goal at the last bit can therefore survive the probe and be passed to __ocfs2_move_extent(), which copies file data into a cluster still owned by another inode before the bitmap is updated. When the probe does find a free run, it also subtracts move_len from the ending bit. The start of an N-bit run ending at i is i - N + 1, so the current calculation can report the bit immediately before the free run. Clear *phys_cpos before scanning and use the correct free-run start. Callers already treat a zero result as -ENOSPC, so failed probes no longer continue with an occupied caller-controlled goal. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72163 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix NULL h_transaction deref in ocfs2_assure_trans_credits [BUG] A direct write over unwritten extents can panic the kernel in ocfs2_assure_trans_credits() when the journal aborts during DIO completion. The crash is a general protection fault from a NULL pointer dereference. [CAUSE] ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() loops over a direct write's unwritten extents, marking each written under a single journal handle. If the journal aborts (for example after an I/O error) while the extent tree is being updated, the handle is left aborted with its transaction pointer cleared. The extent merge treats that failure as not critical and reports success, so the loop keeps using the handle. ocfs2_assure_trans_credits() reads the handle's remaining credits without first checking whether the handle is aborted, and that read dereferences the cleared transaction pointer. [FIX] A journal abort is recorded in the handle itself, so callers are expected to test the handle rather than rely on a returned error. Make ocfs2_assure_trans_credits() do that, as the other ocfs2 journal helpers already do, and return -EROFS when the handle is aborted. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72162 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix UBSAN array-index-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_sum_rightmost_rec [BUG] On-disk corruption setting l_next_free_rec to 0 in an inode's embedded extent list triggers a UBSAN panic on the next write to that file. [CAUSE] ocfs2_sum_rightmost_rec() computes i = le16_to_cpu(el->l_next_free_rec) - 1 and accesses el->l_recs[i] without validating i. When l_next_free_rec is 0, i becomes -1; when l_next_free_rec exceeds l_count, i falls past the end of the array. Either case violates the __counted_by_le(l_count) annotation on l_recs[] and triggers UBSAN. [FIX] Validate the inode's embedded extent list when the inode is read, in ocfs2_validate_inode_block(): l_count must be non-zero and no larger than the inode block can hold, and l_next_free_rec must not exceed l_count. A corrupt list is rejected at read time, before the b-tree code can index l_recs[] out of bounds. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72161 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: add journal NULL check in ocfs2_checkpoint_inode() During unmount, ocfs2_journal_shutdown() frees the journal and sets osb->journal to NULL. Later, when VFS evicts remaining cached inodes, ocfs2_evict_inode() -> ocfs2_clear_inode() -> ocfs2_checkpoint_inode() -> ocfs2_ci_fully_checkpointed() dereferences osb->journal, causing a NULL pointer dereference. Fix this by adding a NULL check for osb->journal in ocfs2_checkpoint_inode(). If the journal is NULL, it has already been fully flushed and destroyed during shutdown, so there is nothing to checkpoint. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72160 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: reject dinodes with non-canonical i_mode type Patch series "ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata", v2. This series adds three structural checks to OCFS2 dinode validation so malformed on-disk fields are rejected before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies them into the in-core inode. The checks cover: - i_mode values whose type bits do not name a canonical POSIX file type; - non-device dinodes whose id1.dev1.i_rdev field is non-zero; and - non-inline dinodes that claim non-zero i_size while i_clusters is zero, covering directories unconditionally and regular files on non-sparse volumes. The normal read path reports these through ocfs2_error(), matching the existing suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list, and refcount checks. The online filecheck path uses the same structural predicates but keeps its own reporting contract, returning OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of calling ocfs2_error(). This patch (of 3): ocfs2_validate_inode_block() currently accepts any non-zero i_mode value. ocfs2_populate_inode() then copies that mode verbatim into inode->i_mode and dispatches on i_mode & S_IFMT to the file/dir/symlink/special_file iops; an unrecognised type falls through to ocfs2_special_file_iops and init_special_inode(). Reject dinodes whose type bits do not name one of the seven canonical POSIX file types. Use fs_umode_to_ftype(), the same generic file-type conversion helper OCFS2 already uses for directory entries, so the accepted inode type set matches the kernel file-type vocabulary instead of open-coding a local switch. Apply the same structural check to the online filecheck read path. filecheck keeps its own error namespace, so it reports malformed i_mode through the filecheck logger and OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of calling ocfs2_error(), but it must not allow a malformed dinode to proceed into ocfs2_populate_inode(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72159 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: reject non-inline dinodes with i_size and zero i_clusters On a volume mounted without OCFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SPARSE_ALLOC, a non-inline regular file with non-zero i_size and zero i_clusters is structurally malformed: the extent map declares no allocated clusters yet the size header claims content exists. Keep rejecting that shape, but express it through a shared predicate so the same invariant is available to normal inode reads and online filecheck. The same zero-cluster shape is also malformed for non-inline directories. ocfs2 directory growth allocates backing storage before advancing i_size, and ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el() later walks until ctx->pos reaches i_size_read(inode). A forged directory dinode with a huge i_size and no clusters would repeatedly fail on holes while advancing through the claimed size. Sparse regular files remain exempt: on sparse-alloc volumes, truncate can legitimately grow i_size without allocating clusters. System inodes and inline-data dinodes also retain their separate storage rules. Mirror the check in ocfs2_filecheck_validate_inode_block() as well. filecheck reports through its own error namespace, so malformed size/cluster state is logged as a filecheck invalid-inode result rather than via ocfs2_error(), but it must not proceed into ocfs2_populate_inode(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72158 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fpga: dfl: add bounds check in dfh_get_param_size() dfh_get_param_size() can return a parameter size larger than the feature region because the loop bounds check is evaluated before incrementing size. If the EOP (End of Parameters) bit is set in the same iteration, the inflated size is returned without re-validation against max. This can cause create_feature_instance() to call memcpy_fromio() with a size exceeding the ioremap'd region when a malicious FPGA device provides crafted DFHv1 parameter headers. Add a bounds check after the size increment to ensure the accumulated size never exceeds the feature boundary. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72157 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: thunderbolt: Fix frags[] overflow by bounding frame_count tbnet_poll() assembles a multi-frame ThunderboltIP packet into one skb. The first frame goes into the skb linear area and every further frame is added as a page fragment. skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags, page, hdr_size, frame_size, TBNET_RX_PAGE_SIZE - hdr_size); A packet of frame_count frames therefore ends up with frame_count - 1 fragments. tbnet_check_frame() only bounds the peer supplied frame_count to TBNET_RING_SIZE / 4 (64), which is far above MAX_SKB_FRAGS (17 by default). A peer that sends a packet of 19 or more small frames pushes nr_frags past MAX_SKB_FRAGS, so skb_add_rx_frag() writes past skb_shinfo()->frags[] and corrupts memory after the shared info. Tighten the start of packet bound to MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 so a packet can never produce more fragments than frags[] can hold. This matches the recent skb frags overflow fixes in other receive paths, for example f0813bcd2d9d ("net: wwan: t7xx: fix potential skb->frags overflow in RX path") and 600dc40554dc ("net: usb: cdc-phonet: fix skb frags[] overflow in rx_complete()"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72156 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fpga: microchip-spi: fix zero header_size OOB read in mpf_ops_parse_header() mpf_ops_parse_header() reads header_size from the bitstream at MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET (24). When header_size is zero, the expression *(buf + header_size - 1) reads one byte before the buffer start. Since initial_header_size is set to 71 in mpf_ops, the fpga-mgr core guarantees the buffer is large enough to reach MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET. The only real gap is the zero header_size case, which cannot be resolved by providing a larger buffer, so return -EINVAL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72155 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: spi-nor: swp: Improve locking user experience In the case of the first block being locked (or the few first blocks), if the user want to fully unlock the device it has two possibilities: - either it asks to unlock the entire device, and this works; - or it asks to unlock just the block(s) that are currently locked, which fails. It fails because the conditions "can_be_top" and "can_be_bottom" are true. Indeed, in this case, we unlock everything, so the TB bit does not matter. However in the current implementation, use_top would be true (as this is the favourite option) and lock_len, which in practice should be reduced down to 0, is set to "nor->params->size - (ofs + len)" which is a positive number. This is wrong. An easy way is to simply add an extra condition. In the unlock() path, if we can achieve the same result from both sides, it means we unlock everything and lock_len must simply be 0. A comment is added to clarify that logic. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72154 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openrisc: Fix jump_label smp syncing The original commit 8c30b0018f9d ("openrisc: Add jump label support") copies from arm64 and does not properly consider how icache invalidation on remote cores works in OpenRISC. On OpenRISC remote icaches need to be invalidated otherwise static key's may remain state after updating. Fix SMP cache syncing by: 1. Properly invalidate remote core icaches on SMP systems by using icache_all_inv. The old code uses kick_all_cpus_sync() which runs a no-op IPI function call on remote CPU's which does execute a lot of code and flushes many cache lines in the process, but does not flush all and it's not correct on OpenRISC. 2. For architectures that do not have WRITETHROUGH caches be sure to flush the dcache after patching. To test this I first reproduced the issue using a custom test module [0]. The test confirmed that some icache lines maintained stale static_key code sequences after calling static_branch_enable(). After this patch there are no longer jump_label coherency issues. [0] https://github.com/stffrdhrn/or1k-utils/tree/master/tests/smp_static_key_test | ||||