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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-64323 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size: map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset = le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader); map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries = (sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size - map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2; lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads ((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block] so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read. Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one entry within the VAT inode. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64324 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: validate free block extents against the partition length udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound. A crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap array. A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably panics the kernel. This is a local availability issue. On desktop systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable file on it. Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the image have a higher prerequisite. No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by a kernel panic. Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the partition length check. Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted callers cannot walk past the flexible array. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64325 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7921/mt7925: fix NULL dereference in CSA beacon This patch is based on a BUG as reported by Bongani Hlope at https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/ When a channel-switch announcement (CSA) beacon is received, cfg80211 queues a wiphy work item that eventually calls mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). If the station disconnects (or the channel context is otherwise torn down) between the time the work is queued and the time it runs, the driver's dev->new_ctx pointer can already have been cleared to NULL. mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() then dereferences new_ctx unconditionally, triggering a NULL pointer dereference at address 0x0: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon+0x1f/0x100 [mt7921_common] The same missing guard exists in mt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(), which shares the same code pattern introduced by the same commit. Add an early-return NULL check for dev->new_ctx in both mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() and mt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). When new_ctx is NULL there is no pending channel switch to process, so returning immediately is the correct and safe action. Oops-Analysis: http://oops.fenrus.org/reports/lkml/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/report.html | ||||
| CVE-2026-64326 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: skip sync_blockdev() on surprise removal in bdev_mark_dead() bdev_mark_dead()'s @surprise == true means the device is already gone. The filesystem callback fs_bdev_mark_dead() honours this and skips sync_filesystem(), but the bare block device path (no ->mark_dead op) lost its !surprise guard when the holder ->mark_dead callback was wired up (see Fixes), and now calls sync_blockdev() unconditionally, which can hang forever waiting on writeback that can no longer complete. syzkaller hit this via nvme_reset_work()'s "I/O queues lost" path: nvme_mark_namespaces_dead() -> blk_mark_disk_dead() -> bdev_mark_dead(bdev, true) -> sync_blockdev() blocks in folio_wait_writeback(), wedging the reset worker and every task waiting on it. Skip the sync on surprise removal, matching fs_bdev_mark_dead(); invalidate_bdev() still runs. Orderly removal (surprise == false) is unchanged. Found by FuzzNvme(Syzkaller with FEMU fuzzing framework). | ||||
| CVE-2026-64328 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix DMA fence leak In ffs_dmabuf_transfer(), a ffs_dma_fence object is kmalloc'd, with the underlying dma_fence later initialized by dma_fence_init(), which sets its kref counter to 1. Then, dma_resv_add_fence() gets a second reference, and a pointer to the ffs_dma_fence is passed as the usb_request's "context" field. The dma-resv mechanism will manage the second reference, but the first reference is never properly released; the ffs_dmabuf_cleanup() function decreases the reference count, but only to balance with the reference grab in ffs_dmabuf_signal_done(). The code will then slowly leak memory as more ffs_dma_fence objects are created without being ever freed. Address this issue by transferring ownership of the fence to the DMA reservation object, by calling dma_fence_put() right after dma_resv_add_fence(). The ffs_dma_fence then gets properly discarded after being signalled. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64335 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix broken rx after throttle If the port is closed while throttled, the read urb is never resubmitted and the port will not receive any further data until the device is reconnected (or the driver is rebound). Clear the throttle flags and submit the urb if needed when opening the port. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64338 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: misc: uss720: unregister parport on probe failure uss720_probe() registers a parport before reading the 1284 register used to detect unsupported Belkin F5U002 adapters. If get_1284_register() fails, the error path drops the driver private data and the USB device reference, but leaves the parport device registered. Leaving the port registered is more than a private allocation leak: parport_register_port() has already reserved a parport number and registered the parport bus device, while pp->private_data still points at the private data that the common error path is about to release. Undo the pre-announce registration in the get_1284_register() failure branch before jumping to the common private-data cleanup path. Clear priv->pp first, matching the disconnect path and avoiding a stale pointer in the private data. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64341 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on disconnect race mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly (unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2] Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect(). [1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is non-atomic") [2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object after it's unlocked") | ||||
| CVE-2026-64342 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on disconnect Submitted write URBs are not stopped on close() and therefore need to be stopped unconditionally on disconnect() to avoid use-after-free in the completion handler. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64344 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: idmouse: fix use-after-free on disconnect race mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly (unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2] Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect(). [1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is non-atomic") [2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object after it's unlocked") | ||||
| CVE-2026-64346 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: udc: Fix use-after-free in gadget_match_driver The udc structure acts as the management structure for the gadget, but their lifecycles are decoupled. A race condition exists where usb_del_gadget() frees the udc memory (e.g., via mode-switch work) while gadget_match_driver() concurrently accesses the freed udc memory (e.g., via configfs), causing a Use-After-Free (UAF) that triggers a NULL pointer dereference when the freed memory is zeroed: [39430.908615][ T1171] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [39430.911397][ T1171] pc : __pi_strcmp+0x20/0x140 [39430.911441][ T1171] lr : gadget_match_driver+0x34/0x60 ... [39430.911890][ T1171] usb_gadget_register_driver_owner+0x50/0xf8 [39430.911910][ T1171] gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0xf4/0x140 [39430.931308][ T1171] configfs_write_iter+0xec/0x134 [39430.957058][ T1171] Workqueue: events_freezable __dwc3_set_mode [39430.957287][ T1171] dwc3_gadget_exit+0x34/0x8c [39430.957304][ T1171] __dwc3_set_mode+0xc0/0x664 Fix this by ensuring the udc structure remains allocated until the gadget is released. To achieve this, introduce a new usb_gadget_release() routine to the core. When the gadget is added, usb_add_gadget() stores the gadget's release routine in the udc structure and takes a reference to the udc. When the gadget is released, usb_gadget_release() drops the reference to the udc and then calls the gadget's release routine. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64354 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Validate BTF repeated field counts before expansion btf_parse_struct_metas() walks user-supplied BTF during BPF_BTF_LOAD, and btf_repeat_fields() expands repeatable fields from array elements into the fixed BTF_FIELDS_MAX scratch array used by btf_parse_fields(). The remaining-capacity check performs the expanded field count calculation in u32. A malformed BTF can wrap that calculation, causing the check to pass even when the expanded field count exceeds the scratch array capacity. The following memcpy() can then write past the end of the array. Use checked addition and multiplication before copying repeated fields and reject impossible counts. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64359 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: reject CLEAN_SEGMENTS ioctl with out-of-range segment numbers Syzbot reported a hung task in nilfs_transaction_begin() where multiple tasks performing chmod() on a nilfs2 mount blocked for over 143 seconds waiting to acquire ns_segctor_sem for read: INFO: task syz.0.17:5918 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Call Trace: schedule+0x164/0x360 rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x6d9/0x940 down_read+0x99/0x2e0 nilfs_transaction_begin+0x364/0x710 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:221 nilfs_setattr+0x124/0x2c0 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:921 notify_change+0xc1a/0xf40 chmod_common+0x273/0x4a0 do_fchmodat+0x12d/0x230 The writer holding ns_segctor_sem was a concurrent NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS caller, stuck inside printk while emitting per-element warnings from nilfs_sufile_updatev(): __nilfs_msg+0x373/0x450 fs/nilfs2/super.c:78 nilfs_sufile_updatev+0x21c/0x6d0 fs/nilfs2/sufile.c:186 nilfs_sufile_freev fs/nilfs2/sufile.h:93 [inline] nilfs_free_segments fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1140 [inline] nilfs_segctor_collect_blocks fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1261 [inline] nilfs_segctor_do_construct+0x1f55/0x76c0 nilfs_clean_segments+0x3bd/0xa50 nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:922 [inline] nilfs_ioctl+0x261f/0x2780 The root cause is that user-supplied segment numbers are not validated before nilfs_clean_segments() begins doing work; the range check on each segnum is performed deep inside the call chain by nilfs_sufile_updatev(), which emits a nilfs_warn() per invalid entry while still holding the segctor lock and the sufile mi_sem. Under load (repeated invocations across multiple mounts saturating the global printk path), the cumulative printk latency keeps ns_segctor_sem held long enough to trip the hung_task watchdog, blocking concurrent operations such as chmod() that need ns_segctor_sem for read. Fix by validating the contents of kbufs[4] in nilfs_clean_segments() immediately after acquiring ns_segctor_sem via nilfs_transaction_lock(). Holding ns_segctor_sem serializes the check against nilfs_ioctl_resize(), which can modify ns_nsegments, so the validation uses a consistent value. Out-of-range segment numbers are rejected with -EINVAL before any segment-cleaning work begins, so the bad entries never reach the per-element diagnostic path inside nilfs_sufile_updatev(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-64363 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: appleir: fix UAF on pending key_up_timer in remove() appleir_remove() runs hid_hw_stop() before timer_delete_sync(). hid_hw_stop() synchronously unregisters the HID input device via hid_disconnect() -> hidinput_disconnect() -> input_unregister_device(), which drops the last reference and frees the underlying input_dev when no userspace handle holds it open. key_up_tick() reads appleir->input_dev and calls input_report_key() / input_sync() on it. The timer is armed from appleir_raw_event() with a HZ/8 (~125 ms) timeout on every keydown and key-repeat report. If a key was pressed shortly before the device is disconnected, the timer can fire after hid_hw_stop() has freed input_dev but before the teardown drains it. A simple reorder is not sufficient. Putting the timer drain first still leaves a window where a USB URB completion (raw_event) running during hid_hw_stop() can call mod_timer() and re-arm the timer, which then fires after hidinput_disconnect() has freed input_dev. The same URB-completion window also lets raw_event() reach key_up(), key_down() and battery_flat() directly, all of which dereference appleir->input_dev. Introduce a 'removing' flag on struct appleir, gated by the existing spinlock. appleir_remove() sets the flag under the lock and then shuts down the timer with timer_shutdown_sync(), which both drains any in-flight callback and permanently disables further mod_timer() calls. appleir_raw_event() and key_up_tick() bail out early if the flag is set, so no path can arm or run the timer, or dereference appleir->input_dev, after remove() has started tearing down. The keyrepeat and flatbattery branches of appleir_raw_event() previously called into the input layer without holding the spinlock; take it now so the flag check is well-defined. This incidentally closes a pre-existing read-side race on appleir->current_key in the keyrepeat branch. This bug is structurally a sibling of commit 4db2af929279 ("HID: appletb-kbd: fix UAF in inactivity-timer cleanup path") and has been present since the driver was introduced. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64365 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: letsketch: fix UAF on inrange_timer at driver unbind letsketch_driver does not provide a .remove callback, but letsketch_probe() arms a per-device timer: timer_setup(&data->inrange_timer, letsketch_inrange_timeout, 0); The timer is re-armed from letsketch_raw_event() with a 100 ms timeout on every pen-in-range report, and its callback dereferences data->input_tablet to deliver a synthetic BTN_TOOL_PEN release. letsketch_data is allocated with devm_kzalloc(), and its input_dev fields are devm-allocated via letsketch_setup_input_tablet(). On device unbind (USB unplug or rmmod), the HID core runs its default teardown and devm cleanup frees both letsketch_data and the input devices. Because no .remove callback exists, nothing drains the timer first: if raw_event armed it within ~100 ms of the unbind, the pending timer fires on freed memory. This is a UAF read of data and of data->input_tablet, followed by input_report_key() / input_sync() into the freed input_dev. The same problem can occur on the probe error path: if hid_hw_start() enabled I/O on an always-poll-quirk device and then failed, raw_event may have armed the timer before devm releases data. Fix by adding a .remove callback that calls hid_hw_stop() first. hid_hw_stop() synchronously kills the URBs that deliver raw_event(), so once it returns no path can re-arm the timer. timer_shutdown_sync() then drains any in-flight callback and permanently disables further mod_timer() calls. Apply the same timer_shutdown_sync() in the probe error path so the timer is guaranteed not to outlive data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64367 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hid-goodix-spi: validate report size to prevent stack buffer overflow goodix_hid_set_raw_report() builds a protocol frame in a 128-byte stack buffer (tmp_buf), writing an 11-12 byte header followed by the caller-supplied report data. The HID core caps report size at HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, while the driver does not set hid_ll_driver.max_buffer_size and performs no bounds checking before copying the payload: memcpy(tmp_buf + tx_len, buf, len); A hidraw SET_REPORT ioctl with a report larger than ~116 bytes overflows the stack buffer. Add a size check after constructing the header, rejecting reports that would exceed the buffer capacity. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64369 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390: Revert support for DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS load_unaligned_zeropad() reads eight bytes from unaligned addresses and may cross page boundaries. It handles exceptions which may happen if reading from the second page results in an exception. For pages which are donated to the Ultravisor for secure execution purposes the do_secure_storage_access() exception handler however does not handle such exceptions correctly. Such an exception may result in an endless exception loop which will never be resolved. An attempt to fix this [1] turned out to be not sufficient. For now revert load_unaligned_zeropad() until this problem has been resolved in a proper way. Note that the implementation of load_unaligned_zeropad() itself is correct. The revert is just a temporary workaround until there is complete fix for secure storage access exceptions. [1] commit b00be77302d7 ("s390/mm: Add missing secure storage access fixups for donated memory") | ||||
| CVE-2026-64373 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpufreq: Fix hotplug-suspend race during reboot During system reboot, cpufreq_suspend() is called via the kernel_restart() -> device_shutdown() path. Unlike the normal system suspend path, the reboot path does not call freeze_processes(), so userspace processes and kernel threads remain active. This allows CPU hotplug operations to run concurrently with cpufreq_suspend(). The original code has no synchronization with CPU hotplug, leading to a race condition where governor_data can be freed by the hotplug path while cpufreq_suspend() is still accessing it, resulting in a null pointer dereference: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference Call Trace: do_kernel_fault+0x28/0x3c cpufreq_suspend+0xdc/0x160 device_shutdown+0x18/0x200 kernel_restart+0x40/0x80 arm64_sys_reboot+0x1b0/0x200 Fix this by adding cpus_read_lock()/cpus_read_unlock() to cpufreq_suspend() to block CPU hotplug operations while suspend is in progress. [ rjw: Changelog edits ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-64374 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/rt: Have RT_PUSH_IPI be default off for non PREEMPT_RT RT migration is done aggressively. When a CPU schedules out a high priority RT task for a lower priority task, it will look to see if there's any RT tasks that are waiting to run on another CPU that is of higher priority than the task this CPU is about to run. If it finds one, it will pull that task over to the CPU and allow it to run there instead. Normally, this pulling is done by looking at the RT overloaded mask (rto) which contains all the CPUs in the scheduler domain with RT tasks that are waiting to run due to a higher priority RT task currently running on their CPU. The CPU that is about to schedule a lower priority task will grab the rq lock of the overloaded CPU and move the RT task from that CPU's runqueue to the local one and schedule the higher priority RT task. This caused issues when a lot of CPUs would schedule a lower priority task at the same time. They would all try to grab the same runqueue lock of the CPU with the overloaded RT tasks. Only the first CPU that got in will get that task. All the others would wait until they got the runqueue lock and see there's nothing to pull and do nothing. On systems with lots of CPUs, this caused a large latency (up to 500us) which is beyond what PREEMPT_RT is to allow. The solution to that was to create an RT_PUSH_IPI logic. When any CPU wanted to pull a task, instead of grabbing the runqueue lock of the overloaded CPU, it would start by sending an IPI to the overloaded CPU, and that IPI handler would have the CPU with the waiting RT task do a push instead. Then that handler would send an IPI to the next CPU with overloaded RT tasks, and so on. Note, after the first CPU starts this process, if another CPU wanted to do a pull, it would see that the process has already begun and would only increment a counter to have the IPIs continue again. The RT_PUSH_IPI solved the latency problem with PREEMPT_RT but could cause a new issue with non PREEMPT_RT. Namely, softirqs run in a threaded context on PREEMPT_RT but they can run in an interrupt context in non-RT. If an IPI lands on a CPU that has just woken up multiple RT tasks and the current CPU is running a non RT or a low priority RT task, instead of doing a push, it would simply do a schedule on that CPU. But if a softirq was also executing on this CPU, the schedule would need to wait until the softirq finished. Until then, the CPU would still be considered overloaded as there are RT tasks still waiting to run on it. A live lock occurred on a workload that was doing heavy networking traffic on a large machine where the softirqs would run 500us out of 750us. And it would also be waking up RT tasks, causing the RT pull logic to be constantly executed. When a softirq triggered on a CPU with RT tasks queued but not running yet, and the other CPUs would see this CPU as being overloaded, they would send an IPI over to it. The CPU would notice that the waiting RT tasks are of higher priority than the currently running task and simply schedule that CPU instead. But because the softirq was executing, before it could schedule, it would receive another IPI to do the same. The amount of IPIs would slow down the currently running softirq so much that before it could return back to task context, it would execute another softirq never allowing the CPU to schedule. This live locked that CPU. As RT_PUSH_IPI was created to help PREEMPT_RT, make it default off if PREEMPT_RT is not enabled. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64375 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (FD links) proc_pid_get_link() and proc_pid_readlink() currently look up the task from the pid once, then do the ptrace access check on that task, then look up the task from the pid a second time to do the actual access. That's racy in several ways. To fix it, pass the task to the ->proc_get_link() handler, and instead of proc_fd_access_allowed(), introduce a new helper call_proc_get_link() that looks up and locks the task, does the access check, and calls ->proc_get_link(). | ||||