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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-74678 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: ax88179_178a: fix skb leak in ax88179_tx_fixup() When the interface has NETIF_F_SG enabled and skb_linearize() fails in ax88179_tx_fixup(), the function returns NULL without freeing the skb. usbnet_start_xmit() treats a NULL return from tx_fixup() as a drop (info->flags does not set FLAG_MULTI_PACKET for this driver), jumping to the "drop" label where it does `if (skb) dev_kfree_skb_any(skb)`. Because tx_fixup() returned NULL, the local skb variable in usbnet_start_xmit() is NULL, so the original skb is never freed — a memory leak on every TX frame whose linearization fails (i.e. under memory pressure). Free the skb before returning, matching the error handling already used for the pskb_expand_head() failure path in the same function. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74588 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: keep chunk->transport in step with the list it is queued on __sctp_outq_flush_rtx() moves a gap-acked chunk onto another transport's transmitted list without updating chunk->transport: if (chunk->tsn_gap_acked) { list_move_tail(&chunk->transmitted_list, &transport->transmitted); continue; } The chunk then sits on a live transport's list while chunk->transport still names a different one. If that transport is removed - sctp_assoc_rm_peer() from an ASCONF Delete-IP - sctp_transport_free() RCU-frees it and the chunk is left with a dangling pointer. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() scrubs peer->transmitted and asoc->outqueue.out_chunk_list, but the chunk is on neither. The pointer is not followed while tsn_gap_acked is set. A SACK that reneges on the TSN clears the flag, and the next SACK reaches tchunk->transport->flight_size -= sctp_data_size(tchunk); inside the freed transport. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free read in sctp_check_transmitted(), freed from sctp_assoc_rm_peer(). Both the removal and the SACKs come from the association peer. Set chunk->transport at the move. The ordinary resend path needs nothing: it reaches its list_move_tail() only after sctp_packet_append_chunk() returned SCTP_XMIT_OK, and __sctp_packet_append_chunk() has rebound the chunk by then. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> | ||||
| CVE-2026-74597 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6ip6_err() ip6ip6_err() clones an outer IPv6 ICMP error skb, pulls it to the quoted inner IPv6 packet, and then passes the clone to icmpv6_send(). The clone still carries the outer packet's inet6_skb_parm in skb->cb. If the outer packet had a Home Address Option, IP6CB(skb2)->dsthao remains non-zero after skb_pull(). icmpv6_send() later calls mip6_addr_swap(), which uses that stale dsthao offset against the quoted inner packet. A malformed inner destination-options header can then make the HAO lookup and address swap run past the end of the quoted packet and corrupt skb_shared_info. Clear skb2->cb[] before pulling the quoted inner IPv6 packet so the reply path does not reuse metadata left by the outer IPv6 stack. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74598 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: fix Route Information option length validation rt6_route_rcv() validates the Route Information option (RFC 4191) length against the prefix length, but both checks are off by one. rinfo->length is the ND option length in units of 8 octets and it *includes* the 8-byte option header, so an option carrying N bytes of prefix has length == 1 + N/8. RFC 4191 section 2.3 requires length 3 when Prefix Length is greater than 64, and 2 or 3 when it is greater than 0. The code accepts length >= 2 and length >= 1 respectively. ipv6_addr_prefix() then copies prefix_len/8 bytes out of rinfo->prefix, so a Router Advertisement with (prefix_len=128, length=2) or (prefix_len=64, length=1) makes the kernel read up to 8 bytes past the end of the option. Those bytes end up in the prefix of the route that gets installed, so they are visible to userspace: # RA with a Route Information option (prefix_len=128, length=2) # followed by a source link-layer address option, 01 01 de ad be ef ca fe $ ip -6 route show 2001:db8:dead:beef:101:dead:beef:cafe via fe80::1234 dev veth0 proto ra ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ the next option, read out of bounds When the Route Information option is the last one in the packet, those eight bytes come from the skb tail room instead. Reject the option lengths RFC 4191 does not allow. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74617 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dibs: initialise dibs->lock in dibs_dev_alloc() dibs->lock is initialised by dibs_dev_add(), but a dibs device can already take interrupts before that call: ism_probe() runs ism_dev_init(), and hence request_irq(), before it calls dibs_dev_add(). No client can have registered a dmb at that point, so no dmb interrupt can occur, but a GID event interrupt can, and ism_handle_irq() takes dibs->lock unconditionally on entry, before it inspects anything else. Initialise the lock in dibs_dev_alloc() instead, so that it is valid as soon as a driver can publish the device to its interrupt handler. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74686 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rqspinlock: Reset tail when preserving queue on deadlock Currently, the destruction of the waiter queue is suppressed for rqspinlock in cases where a deadlock is detected. Deadlock checks happen relatively frequently (on entry for AA, within 1ms for ABBA), and waiter threads may not be involved in locking scenarios involving deadlocks. Thus, it is useful to not flush the queue and let other waiters take a stab at acquiring the lock after we detect a deadlock and exit. However, we need to follow the same logic as what we did previously for the waitq_timeout label: reset the tail, and if we cannot, signal the next waiter appropriately. In case of deadlocks, this signal would just mark the MCS node as unlocked, and in case of timeouts, it would signal RES_TIMEOUT_VAL. The difference thus is in the value propagated, which decides whether the queue remains active or gets flushed. Not doing the tail reset, and waiting for the next waiter can lead to cases where we are the final waiter, and thus no next waiter arrives, leading to intermittent stalls in this path. Once the next waiter does join, we will be unblocked. In the theoretical case when the next waiter never joins, we risk stalling indefinitely. This can only happen for ABBA deadlocks, since entry into the wait queue is guarded with AA checks. A precise sequence of executions leading up to this scenario can be: CPU 0 holds lock A. CPU 1 holds lock B. CPU 2 attempts lock B, becomes the pending waiter for B. CPU 0 attempts lock B. B has locked+pending bits set, thus CPU 0 queues. CPU 1 attempts lock A. CPU 0 detects an ABBA deadlock. Once deadlock detection happens for CPU 0, it will sit waiting for the next waiter in the queue to populate node->next, which will experience delays until such a waiter arrives. Fix this by adjusting the logic for the check for deadlocks preceding the waitq_timeout label. It would make sense to consolidate code for both cases and use 'ret' to distinguish the value being propagated, but that is left as an exercise for a future refactoring task to avoid diff noise in this patch. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74690 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/ism: Fix UAF of sba and ieq during ism_dev_exit() A ism interrupt handler can be active in parallel with ism_dev_exit(), accessing freed data structures. No new interrupts will be generated after unregister_ieq(). Drain ongoing interrupt handlers by free_irq(), before freeing ism data structures. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74692 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix TOCTOU race between smc_listen_out() and listener close smc_listen_out() reads lsmc->sk.sk_state without the listener lock, then acquires lock_sock_nested() only after the check passes. This opens a window where smc_close_active() can transition the listener to SMC_CLOSED, call smc_close_cleanup_listen() to drain the accept queue, and release the lock, all between the lockless read and the delayed lock acquisition: smc_listen_work (smc_hs_wq) smc_close_active() ------------------------------- ------------------------- release_sock(child) if (sk_state == SMC_LISTEN) TRUE lock_sock(listener) sk_state = SMC_CLOSED smc_close_cleanup_listen() release_sock(listener) flush_work(tcp_listen_work) lock_sock_nested(listener) smc_accept_enqueue(listener, child) /* child enqueued on dead listener */ smc_close_active() flushes only tcp_listen_work. Work items already dispatched onto smc_hs_wq for the CLC handshake continue running unguarded. smc_accept_enqueue() takes a sock_hold() on the child that is never released, so the child smc_sock, its clcsock, and the reference all leak. A remote peer that opens TCP connections while the server calls close() can exhaust kernel memory. Move lock_sock_nested() to before the sk_state check so that the test and the enqueue are atomic under the listener lock. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74696 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix TFO max_qlen accounting across reuseport migration A listener's TCP_FASTOPEN max_qlen stops being accurate and lets through far more pending Fast Open requests than it was configured for. This only shows up with SO_REUSEPORT listener migration, where closing a listener hands its still-pending TFO children over to a surviving one. fastopenq.qlen is charged in tcp_fastopen_create_child() when the child is created and uncharged in reqsk_fastopen_remove() when the handshake completes. The uncharge follows rsk_listener of the request the child points at, and inet_reqsk_clone() has repointed the child at a new request owned by the new listener, so the ++ and the -- land on two different sockets. The new listener's qlen drifts negative and its limit no longer binds. Charge the new listener during migration, like reqsk_queue_migrated() already does for queue->young and queue->qlen. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74697 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnxt_en: Disable EOP for TPA on all chips to prevent data corruption EOP (End of frame padding) on the AGG ring may cause overlapping of zero padding at the end of one segment with the next segment's data. If Relaxed Ordering (RO) is enabled, the zero padding may overwrite valid data in the next segment and corrupt the data. Older chips (P5 and older) do not automatically disable RO when EOP is enabled. On some ARM systems, data corruption was reported on 57508 (P5) chips with RO enabled. Always disable EOP on all chips on the AGG rings when TPA is enabled to fix the data corruption. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74634 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Prevent subbuf order change when resizing is disabled Because ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set() frees buffer pages, we can't allow it when resizing is disabled. A non-consuming reader is at risk of use-after-free (rb_advance_iter()). Return -EBUSY on resize_disabled, matching ring_buffer_resize() behaviour. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74636 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix race between update_event_fields and, event_define_fields The following sequence may leads race between event_define_fields() and update_event_fields(): CPU0 (loads module A) CPU1 (loads module B) =============================== =============================== load_module(A) load_module(B) notifier_call_chain notifier_call_chain trace_module_notify trace_module_notify mutex_lock(&event_mutex) trace_event_update_all() trace_module_add_events(A) down_write(&trace_event_sem) __register_event(call_A) __add_event_to_tracers(call_A) event_define_fields(call_A) for each f: list_for_each_entry(field, list_add(&f->link, &class->fields, link) &class->fields) field = class->fields->next; Where access to the class->fields is not protected by the event_mutex in trace_event_update_all(). This produces the following panic: Unable to handle kernel access ... at virtual address 0000000000000018 pc : update_event_fields+0xf8/0x368 Call trace: update_event_fields+0xf8/0x368 trace_event_update_all+0x7c/0x2b4 trace_module_notify+0x4c/0x1dc notifier_call_chain+0x84/0x168 blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x64/0xd4 load_module+0x10c8/0x123c __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x230/0x31c Fix by taking event_mutex in trace_event_update_all() before trace_event_sem. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74638 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/v3d: Serialize the scheduler timeout handlers V3D exposes several independent hardware queues (BIN, RENDER, TFU and CSD) but has only a single, global reset. A timeout on any one queue therefore has to stop, reset and restart the schedulers of every other queue as well. That makes concurrent timeout handlers unsafe. `reset_lock` was never able to make them safe, as a driver-side lock can only cover the driver's &drm_sched_backend_ops.timedout_job callback. The scheduler handles the timed out job and its pending list around that callback, outside of the driver's control, so a global reset triggered by one queue can still interfere with another queue that is in the middle of handling a timeout of its own. Consequently, if a reset happens in the CSD queue while a CL-intensive application is running, the global reset stops and restarts the CL queue's scheduler while that queue is handling a timeout of its own. As drm_sched_stop() and drm_sched_start() subtract and add the credits of every job sitting on the pending list of the scheduler they are called on, and as the CL queue's handler concurrently takes its job off that same list and puts it back, the stop and the start no longer see the same set of jobs. The CL queue is left with more credits in flight than its limit: [ 327.302739] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 327.302744] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 43 at drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c:102 drm_sched_run_job_work+0x238/0x4d0 [gpu_sched] [ 327.302884] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 43 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Not tainted 6.18.39-v8-16k+ #3 PREEMPT [ 327.302889] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 5 Model B Rev 1.0 (DT) [ 327.302893] Workqueue: v3d_bin drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] [ 327.302984] Call trace: [ 327.302987] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x238/0x4d0 [gpu_sched] (P) [ 327.302997] process_scheduled_works+0x180/0x3d0 [ 327.303010] worker_thread+0x268/0x3e8 [ 327.303016] kthread+0x140/0x250 [ 327.303022] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 327.303031] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- From that point on, the credit count of the CL queue is broken, causing a complete GPU hang and UI freeze. The DRM scheduler already provides a mechanism to serialize the timeout handlers of different schedulers: an ordered workqueue passed as drm_sched_init()'s @timeout_wq parameter. By default, each scheduler queues its timeout work on the system workqueue, which runs the handlers concurrently. Give all of the queues a shared ordered workqueue instead, as recommended by the DRM scheduler documentation for hardware that has distinct queues but resets globally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74643 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: samples/damon/mtier: error out for zero quota goal target values Patch series "mm/damon: avoid division by zero from damos_quota_score()". DAMON_SAMPLE_MTIER and DAMON_LRU_SORT allow the user to trigger division by zero in damos_quota_score(). Avoid it by adding parameters validation checks. This patch (of 2): damos_quota_score() can trigger division by zero if the target_value is zero. DAMON_SAMPLE_MTIER lets users set the target_value via node0_mem_{used,free}_bp parameters. It doesn't guard zero value case, though. As a result, users can trigger division by zero. Fix the issue by returning an error when the user tries to start DAMON with zero node0_mem_{used,free}_bp parameter values. DAMON_SAMPLE_MTIER is just a sample module, but the consequence is quite bad. Also the zero node0_mem_free_bp parameter might look like a reasonable setup to some users. Hence, the issue might really happen in the real world. One reliable way to reproduce the issue is like below: # cd /sys/module/damon_sample_mtier/parameters # echo 4096 > node0_start_addr # echo 8192 > node0_end_addr # echo 8192 > node1_start_addr # echo 81920 > node1_end_addr # echo 0 > node0_mem_free_bp # echo Y > enabled # dmesg -w [...] [18792.235916] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [...] [18792.242787] RIP: 0010:damos_quota_score+0x6f/0x480 [...] This issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74645 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/lru_sort: error out for >10000 active_mem_bp damos_quota_score() can trigger division by zero if the target value is zero. DAMON_LRU_SORT lets users set the target value for the hot memory scheme via active_mem_bp parameter. It avoids setting it as the target value if the parameter value is zero. However, it also sets the cold memory scheme with a target value that is calculated as '10000 - active_mem_bp + 2'. Hence, if a user sets active_mem_bp 10002, the cold memory scheme's quota goal target value can be zero. As a result, division by zero can be triggered. Fix by returning an error when the user tries to start DAMON with >10000 active_mem_bp parameter value. It makes no sense to set active_mem_bp with 10002. It also requires module parameters write permission to reproduce the issue. That said, the consequence is quite bad. One reliable way to reproduce the issue is like below: # cd /sys/module/damon_lru_sort/parameters # echo 1000 > wmarks_high # echo 995 > wmarks_mid # echo 0 > wmarks_low # echo 10002 > active_mem_bp # echo Y > enabled # dmesg -w [...] [ 597.421247] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 597.428848] RIP: 0010:damos_quota_score+0x6f/0x480 This issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74646 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: fastrpc: take fl->lock when moving mmaps on interrupted invoke When an invoke is interrupted by a signal, wait_for_completion_interruptible() returns -ERESTARTSYS and fastrpc_internal_invoke() moves every buffer from fl->mmaps onto cctx->invoke_interrupted_mmaps. This list_del()/list_add_tail() walk runs without holding fl->lock, the lock that serialises fl->mmaps in fastrpc_req_mmap() and fastrpc_req_munmap() everywhere else. Take fl->lock around the move, matching every other fl->mmaps accessor. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74650 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler() WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a received information element without checking that the element is long enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE. The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at pIE->data + 6, so it requires pIE->length to be at least 24 (WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a 4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE->data + 6 read past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer. The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with "pIE->length == WLAN_WMM_LEN". Move the equivalent check into the handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(), ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE->length. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74604 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Revert "thermal/drivers/hwmon: Cleanup coding style a bit" Revert commit 030a48b0f6ce ("thermal/drivers/hwmon: Cleanup coding style a bit") that introduced a use-after-free into the error path of thermal_add_hwmon_sysfs() by removing a valid check from it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74606 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventfs: Fix use-after-free in eventfs_remove_rec() eventfs_remove_rec() recursively removes the child at the current loop position. After the recursive call returns, list_for_each_entry() advances by reading list.next from the removed child. If free_ei() drops the final reference, release_ei() reuses the list/rcu union to queue an SRCU callback. The child may be freed before that read. The eventfs_mutex serializes list updates, but it does not keep the removed child alive or prevent the SRCU callback from running. Use list_for_each_entry_safe() to save the next sibling before recursively removing the current child. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74608 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_try_adding_channels() cifs_try_adding_channels() takes a temporary reference to an interface before dropping iface_lock. If cifs_ses_add_channel() fails, it drops that reference and then increments iface->weight_fulfilled. A concurrent interface list refresh can remove the list reference while channel creation is in progress. In that case, the failure-path kref_put() releases the last reference and frees iface. Updating weight_fulfilled afterward then accesses freed memory. Increment weight_fulfilled before dropping the temporary reference, keeping iface alive for the final access. | ||||