The webhook URL validator in `website/notifications/webhooks.py` uses
`ip.is_global` to reject non-public addresses after DNS resolution. IPv6
transition addresses (NAT64 `64:ff9b::/96`, 6to4 `2002::/16`, Teredo
`2001:0000::/32`) are classified as globally routable by IANA, so `is_global`
returns `True` even when the embedded IPv4 targets a private, loopback, or
cloud metadata destination. An attacker can register a webhook pointing at a
hostname that resolves to a transition address to bypass the SSRF guard and
exfiltrate vulnerability data to an internal endpoint.
The vulnerability was introduced on a non-release version. The fix was already done on HEAD. It only affects
organisation running the HEAD.
`ip.is_global` to reject non-public addresses after DNS resolution. IPv6
transition addresses (NAT64 `64:ff9b::/96`, 6to4 `2002::/16`, Teredo
`2001:0000::/32`) are classified as globally routable by IANA, so `is_global`
returns `True` even when the embedded IPv4 targets a private, loopback, or
cloud metadata destination. An attacker can register a webhook pointing at a
hostname that resolves to a transition address to bypass the SSRF guard and
exfiltrate vulnerability data to an internal endpoint.
The vulnerability was introduced on a non-release version. The fix was already done on HEAD. It only affects
organisation running the HEAD.
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Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Mon, 10 Aug 2026 18:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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Mon, 10 Aug 2026 14:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The webhook URL validator in `website/notifications/webhooks.py` uses `ip.is_global` to reject non-public addresses after DNS resolution. IPv6 transition addresses (NAT64 `64:ff9b::/96`, 6to4 `2002::/16`, Teredo `2001:0000::/32`) are classified as globally routable by IANA, so `is_global` returns `True` even when the embedded IPv4 targets a private, loopback, or cloud metadata destination. An attacker can register a webhook pointing at a hostname that resolves to a transition address to bypass the SSRF guard and exfiltrate vulnerability data to an internal endpoint. The vulnerability was introduced on a non-release version. The fix was already done on HEAD. It only affects organisation running the HEAD. | |
| Title | Webhook SSRF guard bypassed by IPv6 transition addresses (NAT64/6to4/Teredo pass is_global check) in vulnerability-lookup | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: CIRCL
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-10T17:00:48.661Z
Reserved: 2026-08-10T14:32:19.844Z
Link: CVE-2026-72761
Updated: 2026-08-10T17:00:45.442Z
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-10T18:15:11Z
Weaknesses