In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: pin upper rpc_clnt across the TLS connect_worker
The TLS connect path has a use-after-free: nothing pins the
upper rpc_clnt across the delayed connect_worker. xs_connect()
stores task->tk_client in sock_xprt::clnt as a raw pointer
and queues the worker; for TLS-secured transports that worker
is xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket(), which reads several fields out
of the saved pointer (cl_timeout, cl_program, cl_prog,
cl_vers, cl_cred, cl_stats) to construct the args for the
inner handshake rpc_clnt.
The xprt does not reference the rpc_clnt; the rpc_clnt
references the xprt. xs_destroy() does cancel the
connect_worker, but it runs only when the xprt's refcount
drops to zero, which cannot happen until the rpc_clnt
releases its cl_xprt reference in rpc_free_client_work().
When a TLS handshake fails fatally (for example, an mTLS
mount whose client cert does not match the server), the
connecting task is woken with -EACCES and exits, the mount
caller invokes rpc_shutdown_client(), and the upper rpc_clnt
is freed before the queued connect_worker fires.
xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket() then dereferences the freed clnt,
producing the refcount_t underflow Michael Nemanov reported.
Take a reference on the upper rpc_clnt in xs_connect() for
TLS transports via a new rpc_hold_client() helper, and drop
it in the connect_worker's exit path with rpc_release_client().
The xprt_lock_connect() / xprt_unlock_connect() pairing
already serialises xs_connect() with xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket(),
so the take and release are balanced one-for-one.
The non-TLS connect worker (xs_tcp_setup_socket) never reads
sock_xprt::clnt, so leave that path alone and avoid the
clnt-holds-xprt-holds-clnt cycle that would otherwise prevent
xprt destruction.
SUNRPC: pin upper rpc_clnt across the TLS connect_worker
The TLS connect path has a use-after-free: nothing pins the
upper rpc_clnt across the delayed connect_worker. xs_connect()
stores task->tk_client in sock_xprt::clnt as a raw pointer
and queues the worker; for TLS-secured transports that worker
is xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket(), which reads several fields out
of the saved pointer (cl_timeout, cl_program, cl_prog,
cl_vers, cl_cred, cl_stats) to construct the args for the
inner handshake rpc_clnt.
The xprt does not reference the rpc_clnt; the rpc_clnt
references the xprt. xs_destroy() does cancel the
connect_worker, but it runs only when the xprt's refcount
drops to zero, which cannot happen until the rpc_clnt
releases its cl_xprt reference in rpc_free_client_work().
When a TLS handshake fails fatally (for example, an mTLS
mount whose client cert does not match the server), the
connecting task is woken with -EACCES and exits, the mount
caller invokes rpc_shutdown_client(), and the upper rpc_clnt
is freed before the queued connect_worker fires.
xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket() then dereferences the freed clnt,
producing the refcount_t underflow Michael Nemanov reported.
Take a reference on the upper rpc_clnt in xs_connect() for
TLS transports via a new rpc_hold_client() helper, and drop
it in the connect_worker's exit path with rpc_release_client().
The xprt_lock_connect() / xprt_unlock_connect() pairing
already serialises xs_connect() with xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket(),
so the take and release are balanced one-for-one.
The non-TLS connect worker (xs_tcp_setup_socket) never reads
sock_xprt::clnt, so leave that path alone and avoid the
clnt-holds-xprt-holds-clnt cycle that would otherwise prevent
xprt destruction.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Sat, 15 Aug 2026 06:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: pin upper rpc_clnt across the TLS connect_worker The TLS connect path has a use-after-free: nothing pins the upper rpc_clnt across the delayed connect_worker. xs_connect() stores task->tk_client in sock_xprt::clnt as a raw pointer and queues the worker; for TLS-secured transports that worker is xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket(), which reads several fields out of the saved pointer (cl_timeout, cl_program, cl_prog, cl_vers, cl_cred, cl_stats) to construct the args for the inner handshake rpc_clnt. The xprt does not reference the rpc_clnt; the rpc_clnt references the xprt. xs_destroy() does cancel the connect_worker, but it runs only when the xprt's refcount drops to zero, which cannot happen until the rpc_clnt releases its cl_xprt reference in rpc_free_client_work(). When a TLS handshake fails fatally (for example, an mTLS mount whose client cert does not match the server), the connecting task is woken with -EACCES and exits, the mount caller invokes rpc_shutdown_client(), and the upper rpc_clnt is freed before the queued connect_worker fires. xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket() then dereferences the freed clnt, producing the refcount_t underflow Michael Nemanov reported. Take a reference on the upper rpc_clnt in xs_connect() for TLS transports via a new rpc_hold_client() helper, and drop it in the connect_worker's exit path with rpc_release_client(). The xprt_lock_connect() / xprt_unlock_connect() pairing already serialises xs_connect() with xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket(), so the take and release are balanced one-for-one. The non-TLS connect worker (xs_tcp_setup_socket) never reads sock_xprt::clnt, so leave that path alone and avoid the clnt-holds-xprt-holds-clnt cycle that would otherwise prevent xprt destruction. | |
| Title | SUNRPC: pin upper rpc_clnt across the TLS connect_worker | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Projects
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-15T05:55:31.022Z
Reserved: 2026-08-09T03:40:39.919Z
Link: CVE-2026-72317
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-15T06:22:04.620
Modified: 2026-08-15T06:22:04.620
Link: CVE-2026-72317
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.