Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per payment by a large multiplier, degrading the sponsor's operating margin.
When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including the EIP-2930 access list, without validating its length or contents. EIP-2930 access list entries incur intrinsic gas (~2,400 gas per address, plus 1,900 gas per storage key) charged before any opcode executes, regardless of whether the listed addresses are ever touched. A malicious client submits a valid transferWithMemo call alongside a large number of fabricated access-list entries. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The intended transfer executes normally, but the fee-payer wallet pays a large multiple of the expected gas cost with no corresponding on-chain work.
At the maintainer's default of 137 access-list entries (fitting within Bandit's 10,000-byte per-header-field limit) and 100 Gwei max_fee_per_gas, per-payment gas cost rises from ~51,287 to ~380,087 gas, a 7.4x multiplier. Sustained abuse destroys the sponsor's operating margin on low-cost payments and, over time, drains the fee-payer wallet.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.
When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including the EIP-2930 access list, without validating its length or contents. EIP-2930 access list entries incur intrinsic gas (~2,400 gas per address, plus 1,900 gas per storage key) charged before any opcode executes, regardless of whether the listed addresses are ever touched. A malicious client submits a valid transferWithMemo call alongside a large number of fabricated access-list entries. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The intended transfer executes normally, but the fee-payer wallet pays a large multiple of the expected gas cost with no corresponding on-chain work.
At the maintainer's default of 137 access-list entries (fitting within Bandit's 10,000-byte per-header-field limit) and 100 Gwei max_fee_per_gas, per-payment gas cost rises from ~51,287 to ~380,087 gas, a 7.4x multiplier. Sustained abuse destroys the sponsor's operating margin on low-cost payments and, over time, drains the fee-payer wallet.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.
Advisories
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Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Fri, 17 Jul 2026 13:30:00 +0000
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ssvc
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Fri, 17 Jul 2026 10:30:00 +0000
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| Description | Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per payment by a large multiplier, degrading the sponsor's operating margin. When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including the EIP-2930 access list, without validating its length or contents. EIP-2930 access list entries incur intrinsic gas (~2,400 gas per address, plus 1,900 gas per storage key) charged before any opcode executes, regardless of whether the listed addresses are ever touched. A malicious client submits a valid transferWithMemo call alongside a large number of fabricated access-list entries. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The intended transfer executes normally, but the fee-payer wallet pays a large multiple of the expected gas cost with no corresponding on-chain work. At the maintainer's default of 137 access-list entries (fitting within Bandit's 10,000-byte per-header-field limit) and 100 Gwei max_fee_per_gas, per-payment gas cost rises from ~51,287 to ~380,087 gas, a 7.4x multiplier. Sustained abuse destroys the sponsor's operating margin on low-cost payments and, over time, drains the fee-payer wallet. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0. | |
| Title | Unbounded access list in mpp Tempo fee-payer inflates gas cost per payment | |
| First Time appeared |
Zenhive
Zenhive mpp |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-1284 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Zenhive
Zenhive mpp |
|
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-17T12:22:45.224Z
Reserved: 2026-07-06T14:05:47.003Z
Link: CVE-2026-59694
Updated: 2026-07-17T12:22:35.614Z
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses