Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `SandboxPolicy.resolvePath()` and `isPathAllowed()` now use separator-anchored prefix checks (`resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)`) for both the allow-list and block-list. A sibling directory that merely shares a name prefix (e.g. `/srv/app-evil` vs base `/srv/app`) is no longer treated as in-scope.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Mon, 20 Jul 2026 23:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Jovancoding
Jovancoding network-ai |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Jovancoding
Jovancoding network-ai |
Mon, 20 Jul 2026 18:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Mon, 20 Jul 2026 16:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `SandboxPolicy.resolvePath()` and `isPathAllowed()` now use separator-anchored prefix checks (`resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)`) for both the allow-list and block-list. A sibling directory that merely shares a name prefix (e.g. `/srv/app-evil` vs base `/srv/app`) is no longer treated as in-scope. | |
| Title | Network-AI: AgentRuntime sandbox path-prefix checks allow file access outside the configured base directory | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 CWE-23 |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Projects
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-20T17:42:43.376Z
Reserved: 2026-06-30T20:21:25.811Z
Link: CVE-2026-58481
Updated: 2026-07-20T17:42:35.196Z
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-07-21T20:30:12Z