mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise's trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task's tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command='…') }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There's no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.

Project Subscriptions

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-77g9-363w-rccq Mise vulnerable to arbitrary command execution via task-include files in an untrusted, config-less repository
Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Fri, 26 Jun 2026 19:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Fri, 26 Jun 2026 17:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise's trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task's tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command='…') }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There's no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.
Title mise: Arbitrary command execution via task-include files in an untrusted, config-less repository
Weaknesses CWE-732
CWE-78
CWE-94
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.6, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-06-26T18:41:26.486Z

Reserved: 2026-06-16T21:59:57.017Z

Link: CVE-2026-55441

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-06-26T18:14:27.698Z

cve-icon NVD

No data.

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-06-26T19:30:04Z

Weaknesses