Dancer::Session::Abstract versions through 1.3522 for Perl generates session ids insecurely.
The session id is generated from summing the character codepoints of the absolute pathname with the process id, the epoch time and calls to the built-in rand() function to return a number between 0 and 999-billion, and concatenating that result three times.
The path name might be known or guessed by an attacker, especially for applications known to be written using Dancer with standard installation locations.
The epoch time can be guessed by an attacker, and may be leaked in the HTTP header.
The process id comes from a small set of numbers, and workers may have sequential process ids.
The built-in rand() function is seeded with 32-bits and is considered unsuitable for security applications.
Predictable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.
The session id is generated from summing the character codepoints of the absolute pathname with the process id, the epoch time and calls to the built-in rand() function to return a number between 0 and 999-billion, and concatenating that result three times.
The path name might be known or guessed by an attacker, especially for applications known to be written using Dancer with standard installation locations.
The epoch time can be guessed by an attacker, and may be leaked in the HTTP header.
The process id comes from a small set of numbers, and workers may have sequential process ids.
The built-in rand() function is seeded with 32-bits and is considered unsuitable for security applications.
Predictable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BIGPRESH | Dancer::Session::Abstract | unaffected |
|
No data.
No data.
No data.
Project Subscriptions
No data.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
Apply the linked patch.
References
History
Thu, 30 Apr 2026 12:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Dancer::Session::Abstract versions through 1.3522 for Perl generates session ids insecurely. The session id is generated from summing the character codepoints of the absolute pathname with the process id, the epoch time and calls to the built-in rand() function to return a number between 0 and 999-billion, and concatenating that result three times. The path name might be known or guessed by an attacker, especially for applications known to be written using Dancer with standard installation locations. The epoch time can be guessed by an attacker, and may be leaked in the HTTP header. The process id comes from a small set of numbers, and workers may have sequential process ids. The built-in rand() function is seeded with 32-bits and is considered unsuitable for security applications. Predictable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems. | |
| Title | Dancer::Session::Abstract versions through 1.3522 for Perl generates session ids insecurely | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-338 CWE-340 |
|
| References |
|
Projects
Sign in to view the affected projects.
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: CPANSec
Published:
Updated: 2026-04-30T11:49:29.736Z
Reserved: 2026-03-28T19:06:14.484Z
Link: CVE-2026-5080
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-04-30T12:16:24.333
Modified: 2026-04-30T12:16:24.333
Link: CVE-2026-5080
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.