Relyra is a strict-by-default SAML 2.0 Service Provider library for Elixir and Phoenix. Versions 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 accept forged SAML signatures because SignatureValue was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result. The XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete as :public_key.verify over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized SignedInfo was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, DigestValue was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and canonicalize/2 remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes. A forged SignatureValue carrying an attacker-controlled NameID could be accepted as {:ok}. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0.
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7 | Relyra SAML SignatureValue not cryptographically verified -> authentication bypass |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Mon, 22 Jun 2026 16:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Sun, 21 Jun 2026 09:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Sztheory
Sztheory relyra |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Sztheory
Sztheory relyra |
Thu, 18 Jun 2026 21:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Relyra is a strict-by-default SAML 2.0 Service Provider library for Elixir and Phoenix. Versions 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 accept forged SAML signatures because SignatureValue was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result. The XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete as :public_key.verify over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized SignedInfo was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, DigestValue was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and canonicalize/2 remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes. A forged SignatureValue carrying an attacker-controlled NameID could be accepted as {:ok}. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0. | |
| Title | Relyra SAML SignatureValue not cryptographically verified -> authentication bypass | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-287 CWE-347 |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Projects
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-22T15:51:42.595Z
Reserved: 2026-05-30T02:43:33.107Z
Link: CVE-2026-49454
Updated: 2026-06-22T15:51:10.767Z
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-20T22:55:42Z
Github GHSA