FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an off-by-one heap-based buffer overflow in the dynamic_binary_buffer_t class (src/dynamic_binary_buffer.hpp). Five methods (append_dynamic_buffer, append_data_as_pointer, append_data_as_object_ptr, memcpy_from_ptr, memcpy_from_object_ptr) use an incorrect bounds check of the form 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size + 1)' instead of the correct 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size)'. This allows writing exactly one byte past the end of the heap-allocated buffer. The class is used pervasively in BGP message encoding/decoding, NetFlow template processing, and Flow Spec NLRI construction. An attacker who can send network traffic (NetFlow, sFlow, IPFIX, or BGP) to a FastNetMon instance can trigger this overflow, potentially achieving arbitrary code execution by corrupting heap metadata. Notably, the append_byte() method uses the correct bounds check, confirming the inconsistency.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Tue, 26 May 2026 21:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | FastNetMon Community Edition Heap Overflow in Dynamic Binary Buffer Allows Remote Code Execution |
Tue, 26 May 2026 20:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-787 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:pavel-odintsov:fastnetmon:*:*:*:*:community:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Tue, 26 May 2026 19:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an off-by-one heap-based buffer overflow in the dynamic_binary_buffer_t class (src/dynamic_binary_buffer.hpp). Five methods (append_dynamic_buffer, append_data_as_pointer, append_data_as_object_ptr, memcpy_from_ptr, memcpy_from_object_ptr) use an incorrect bounds check of the form 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size + 1)' instead of the correct 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size)'. This allows writing exactly one byte past the end of the heap-allocated buffer. The class is used pervasively in BGP message encoding/decoding, NetFlow template processing, and Flow Spec NLRI construction. An attacker who can send network traffic (NetFlow, sFlow, IPFIX, or BGP) to a FastNetMon instance can trigger this overflow, potentially achieving arbitrary code execution by corrupting heap metadata. Notably, the append_byte() method uses the correct bounds check, confirming the inconsistency. | |
| References |
|
Projects
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: mitre
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-26T18:46:33.597Z
Reserved: 2026-05-22T00:00:00.000Z
Link: CVE-2026-48689
No data.
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2026-05-26T19:16:28.663
Modified: 2026-05-26T20:20:38.970
Link: CVE-2026-48689
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-26T21:00:13Z
Weaknesses