FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains a stack-based buffer overflow in the BGP NLRI (Network Layer Reachability Information) decoder. The function decode_bgp_subnet_encoding_ipv4_raw() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp reads prefix_bit_length directly from the BGP packet (line 99) without validating it is <= 32 for IPv4 prefixes. This value is passed to how_much_bytes_we_need_for_storing_certain_subnet_mask() which computes ceil(prefix_bit_length / 8), returning up to 32 bytes for a prefix_bit_length of 255. The result is used as the length argument to memcpy() (line 106), which copies into a 4-byte uint32_t stack variable (prefix_ipv4). This causes a stack buffer overflow of up to 28 bytes, which can be exploited for arbitrary code execution. Additionally, the unvalidated prefix_bit_length is passed to convert_cidr_to_binary_netmask_local_function_copy() (line 111), where a shift of (32 - cidr) with cidr > 32 causes undefined behavior.
Advisories
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Fixes
Solution
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Workaround
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References
History
Tue, 26 May 2026 16:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Stack Corruption in FastNetMon BGP NLRI Decoder Leading to Arbitrary Code Execution | |
| First Time appeared |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-120 | |
| Vendors & Products |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
Tue, 26 May 2026 15:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains a stack-based buffer overflow in the BGP NLRI (Network Layer Reachability Information) decoder. The function decode_bgp_subnet_encoding_ipv4_raw() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp reads prefix_bit_length directly from the BGP packet (line 99) without validating it is <= 32 for IPv4 prefixes. This value is passed to how_much_bytes_we_need_for_storing_certain_subnet_mask() which computes ceil(prefix_bit_length / 8), returning up to 32 bytes for a prefix_bit_length of 255. The result is used as the length argument to memcpy() (line 106), which copies into a 4-byte uint32_t stack variable (prefix_ipv4). This causes a stack buffer overflow of up to 28 bytes, which can be exploited for arbitrary code execution. Additionally, the unvalidated prefix_bit_length is passed to convert_cidr_to_binary_netmask_local_function_copy() (line 111), where a shift of (32 - cidr) with cidr > 32 causes undefined behavior. | |
| References |
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: mitre
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-26T14:46:38.784Z
Reserved: 2026-05-22T00:00:00.000Z
Link: CVE-2026-48686
No data.
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2026-05-26T16:16:26.693
Modified: 2026-05-26T19:29:02.327
Link: CVE-2026-48686
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-26T16:30:10Z
Weaknesses