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Wed, 10 Jun 2026 17:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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Wed, 10 Jun 2026 15:45:00 +0000
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| First Time appeared |
Roxy-wi
Roxy-wi roxy-wi |
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| Vendors & Products |
Roxy-wi
Roxy-wi roxy-wi |
Wed, 10 Jun 2026 14:45:00 +0000
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| Description | Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches. | |
| Title | Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-639 CWE-862 CWE-863 |
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| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-10T16:31:33.373Z
Reserved: 2026-05-12T17:48:47.879Z
Link: CVE-2026-45550
Updated: 2026-06-10T16:24:57.365Z
Status : Deferred
Published: 2026-06-10T15:16:36.160
Modified: 2026-06-10T19:37:41.437
Link: CVE-2026-45550
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-10T15:30:15Z