Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. From 0.13.0 to before 0.19.4, the Note Mark application allows authenticated users to upload assets to notes via POST /api/notes/{noteID}/assets, where the asset filename is provided through the X-Name HTTP request header. This value is stored directly in the database without any sanitization or validation - no path separator filtering, no directory traversal sequence rejection, and no use of filepath.Base() to strip directory components. The unsanitized name is persisted as-is in the note_assets table (Name column, varchar(80)). When an administrator subsequently runs the data export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export-v1 or note-mark migrate export), the stored asset name is passed directly into filepath.Join() and path.Join() calls as part of the output file path argument to os.Create(). Since Go's filepath.Join() resolves ../ sequences during path normalization, an attacker-controlled asset name containing directory traversal sequences causes the export process to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem, completely outside the intended export directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.19.4.

Project Subscriptions

No data.

Advisories
Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3 Note Mark: Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in Asset Names Leads to Remote Code Execution
Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Thu, 14 May 2026 19:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. From 0.13.0 to before 0.19.4, the Note Mark application allows authenticated users to upload assets to notes via POST /api/notes/{noteID}/assets, where the asset filename is provided through the X-Name HTTP request header. This value is stored directly in the database without any sanitization or validation - no path separator filtering, no directory traversal sequence rejection, and no use of filepath.Base() to strip directory components. The unsanitized name is persisted as-is in the note_assets table (Name column, varchar(80)). When an administrator subsequently runs the data export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export-v1 or note-mark migrate export), the stored asset name is passed directly into filepath.Join() and path.Join() calls as part of the output file path argument to os.Create(). Since Go's filepath.Join() resolves ../ sequences during path normalization, an attacker-controlled asset name containing directory traversal sequences causes the export process to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem, completely outside the intended export directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.19.4.
Title Note Mark: Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in Asset Names Leading to Remote Code Execution
Weaknesses CWE-20
CWE-22
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.6, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


Projects

Sign in to view the affected projects.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-05-14T19:44:31.854Z

Reserved: 2026-05-06T19:38:10.566Z

Link: CVE-2026-44522

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-05-14T19:16:37.330

Modified: 2026-05-14T20:17:08.343

Link: CVE-2026-44522

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses