| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Wertheim SafeController Family 65000, Controller 65000 - AssemblyVersion 6.11.8130.22319, uses weak custom cryptographic algorithms with hard-coded cryptographic keys to protect communication. An attacker in an adversary-in-the-middle position can decrypt the data traffic. During reassessment, it was possible to break the encryption/decryption routine and decrypt messages without knowledge of the encryption key. It was also possible to gain knowledge about the encryption key by intercepting enough messages. |
| The Wertheim SafeController Software, AssemblyVersion 6.15.8328.28014, contains a hard-coded cryptographic key in the SafeSystem.Infrastructure.Security.dll component. An attacker with access to the application files can reverse engineer the DLL and recover the hard-coded cryptographic key. This key can be used to decrypt the licence.whs file, which contains sensitive information about the licensing party and a second key that can be used to decrypt other configuration files. |
| Use of hard-coded cryptographic keys in Canon EOS Network Setting Tool Version 1.5.0 or earlier |
| Use of weak SSH cryptographic algorithms in Canon EOS Network Setting Tool Version 1.5.0 or earlier |
| A vulnerability has been identified in centraldogma-server-mirror-git versions prior to 0.84.0, where the Git mirror SSH client does not verify remote host keys for git+ssh:// connections, allowing an on-path attacker to perform man-in-the-middle attacks and compromise mirrored repositories. |
| crypto-js is a JavaScript library of crypto standards. Prior to version 4.2.0, crypto-js PBKDF2 is 1,000 times weaker than originally specified in 1993, and at least 1,300,000 times weaker than current industry standard. This is because it both defaults to SHA1, a cryptographic hash algorithm considered insecure since at least 2005, and defaults to one single iteration, a 'strength' or 'difficulty' value specified at 1,000 when specified in 1993. PBKDF2 relies on iteration count as a countermeasure to preimage and collision attacks. If used to protect passwords, the impact is high. If used to generate signatures, the impact is high. Version 4.2.0 contains a patch for this issue. As a workaround, configure crypto-js to use SHA256 with at least 250,000 iterations. |
| Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.1, node:crypto.checkPrime(candidate[, options][, callback]) and crypto.checkPrimeSync(candidate[, options]) ran no Miller-Rabin rounds at all when the caller left options.checks at its default of 0. In that mode, the only test applied to the candidate was trial division by the primes up to 17,863. Any composite whose smallest prime factor exceeds that bound — for example the product of two primes just above it, such as 17,881 × 17,891 — was reported as true ("probably prime"). The same divergence affected the lower-level op_node_check_prime / op_node_check_prime_bytes paths that the polyfill calls into. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1. |
| NetComm NF20MESH routers running firmware R6B031 and earlier contain an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to gain administrative access by exploiting a hardcoded AES-256 key used to encrypt session cookies for the web management interface. Attackers can forge a valid encrypted session cookie using the shared hardcoded key and bypass authentication checks to obtain full administrative control of the management interface while any legitimate administrator session is active. |
| Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to 22.0.1, 21.2.17, and 20.3.25, Angular's HttpTransferCache caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration. This avoids repeating the same HTTP requests on the client. The cached responses are stored in TransferState using a cache key generated by hashing request properties (method, response type, mapped URL, serialized body, and sorted query parameters). The cache keys are generated using a weak 32-bit DJB2-like polynomial rolling hash. The 32-bit hash space is extremely small, allowing attackers to find hash collisions. An attacker can easily find a query parameter string (e.g., q=aaCAZMMM for a search request) that produces the exact same 32-bit hash as a sensitive endpoint (e.g., /api/user/profile). When a victim visits a crafted link containing the colliding parameter, the SSR process executes both the search request and the profile request. Due to the hash collision, the search response overwrites the profile response in the TransferState cache. This vulnerability is fixed in 22.0.1, 21.2.17, and 20.3.25. |
| Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. In Steeltoe.Configuration.Encryption 4.0.0 through 4.1.0, configuring `encrypt:rsa:algorithm=OAEP` does not enable OAEP encryption. Due to an incorrect BouncyCastle transformation string, the `OAEP` setting selects PKCS#1 v1.5, which is the same algorithm as the `DEFAULT` setting. Steeltoe.Configuration.Encryption version 4.2.0 patches the issue. |
| Dell PowerFlex Manager, version(s) 4.6.0.1, contain(s) an Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information disclosure and Information tampering. |
| Crypt::DSA versions before 1.21 for Perl reused the nonce across signatures, leading to private-key recovery.
Crypt::DSA::sign caches the per-signature nonce material in the Key object without ever clearing it.
The first sign() on a Key object picks a nonce, and every later sign() on that same object reuses it, producing an identical "r".
Keys used to sign more than once with an affected version should be considered compromised. |
| Discuz! X5.0 releases 20260320 through 20260501 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to gain unauthorized access to database backup and restore functionality by exploiting a shared cryptographic key between UCenter integration and the database backup API exposed by dbbak.php. Attackers can inject a crafted payload through the username parameter during login to abuse the encryption oracle in logging_ctl::logging_more(), obtain a legitimately signed token, and use it to bypass authorization for database export and import operations, with the additional ability to trigger a race condition to impersonate arbitrary users. |
| Issue summary: When EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() is called with a DHX (X9.42)
peer key, the peer key is not properly checked for the subgroup membership.
Impact summary: A malicious peer which presents an X9.42 key carrying the
victim's p and g parameters, a forged q = r (a small prime factor of the
cofactor (p−1)/q_local), and a public value Y of order r can recover the
victim's private key after a small number of key exchange attempts.
When EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() is called with a DHX (X9.42) peer key, the
subgroup membership check Y^q ≡ 1 (mod p) is performed using the peer's
own q parameter, not the local key's q. The peer's domain parameters are
then matched against the domain parameters of the private key, but the value
of q is not compared.
A malicious peer who presents an X9.42 key carrying the victim's p, g,
a forged q = r (a small prime factor of the cofactor), and a public
value Y of order r passes all checks. The shared secret then takes only
r distinct values, leaking priv mod r. Repeating for each small-prime
factor of the cofactor and combining via CRT recovers the full private
key (Lim–Lee / small-subgroup-confinement attack).
The realistic attack surface is narrow: principally CMP deployments with
long-lived RA/CA DHX keys and bespoke enterprise or government applications
using X9.42 DHX static keys with interactive protocols and therefore this
issue was assigned Low severity.
The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are affected by this
issue. |
| Issue summary: When an application drives an AES-OCB context through the
public EVP_Cipher() one-shot interface, the application-supplied
initialisation vector (IV) is silently discarded.
Impact summary: Every message encrypted under the same key uses the
same effective nonce regardless of the IV supplied by the caller,
resulting in (key, nonce) reuse and loss of confidentiality. If the
same code path is used to compute the authentication tag, the tag
depends only on the (key, IV) pair and not on the plaintext or
ciphertext, allowing universal forgery of arbitrary ciphertext from a
single captured message.
OpenSSL provides two ways to drive a cipher: the documented streaming
interface (EVP_CipherUpdate / EVP_CipherFinal_ex) and a lower-level
one-shot, EVP_Cipher(), whose documentation explicitly recommends
against use by applications in favour of EVP_CipherUpdate() and
EVP_CipherFinal_ex(). The OCB provider's streaming handler flushes
the application-supplied IV into the OCB context before processing
data; the one-shot handler did not. Every call to EVP_Cipher() on an
AES-OCB context therefore ran with the all-zero key-derived offset
state left by cipher initialisation, regardless of the caller's IV.
If EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() is subsequently used to obtain the
authentication tag, the deferred IV setup runs at that point and
clears the running checksum that should have been accumulated over the
plaintext. The resulting tag is a function of (key, IV) only and
verifies against any ciphertext produced under the same (key, IV)
pair.
The OpenSSL SSL/TLS implementation is not affected: AES-OCB is not a
TLS cipher suite, and libssl does not call EVP_Cipher() in any case.
Applications that drive AES-OCB through the documented streaming AEAD
API (EVP_CipherUpdate / EVP_CipherFinal_ex) are not affected. Only
applications that combine the AES-OCB cipher with the EVP_Cipher()
one-shot API are vulnerable.
The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4 and 3.0 are not affected by
this issue, as AES-OCB is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary. |
| Issue summary: The implementations of AES-SIV (RFC 5297) and AES-GCM-SIV
(RFC 8452) mishandle the authentication of AAD (Additional Authenticated
Data) with an empty ciphertext allowing a forgery of such messages.
Impact summary: An attacker can forge empty messages with arbitrary AAD
to the victim's application using these ciphers.
AES-SIV (RFC 5297) and AES-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452) are nonce-misuse-resistant AEAD
modes: they accept a key, nonce, optional AAD (bytes that are authenticated
but not encrypted), and plaintext, and produces ciphertext plus a 16-byte
tag. On decrypt, `EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()` is documented to return success only
if the tag is verified succesfully.
In OpenSSL's provider implementation of these ciphers, the expected tag is
computed only when decryption function is invoked with non-empty data.
If the caller supplies AAD and then calls `EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()` without
invocation of the ciphertext update, which can happen when the received
ciphertext length is zero, the tag is never recalculated and still holds its
all-zeros value.
When AES-GCM-SIV is used, an attacker who sends arbitrary AAD, empty
ciphertext, and all-zeros tag passes authentication under any key they do not
know, single-shot. When AES-SIV is used, for mounting the attack it's
necessary for the application to reuse the decryption context without
resetting the key.
AES-SIV is implemented since OpenSSL 3.0. AES-GCM-SIV is implemented since
OpenSSL 3.2.
No protocols implemented in OpenSSL itself (TLS/CMS/PKCS7/HPKE/QUIC) support
either AES-GCM-SIV or AES-SIV. To mount an attack, the applications must
implement their own protocol and use the EVP interface. Also they must skip the
ciphertext update when a message with an empty ciphertext arrives.
The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are not affected by this
issue, as these algorithms are not FIPS approved and the affected code is
outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary. |
| The Aqara IAM/SSO gateway (gw-builder.aqara.com) exposes bidirectional AES round-trups against the platform's signing key without authentication. This is an instance of "CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function" and "CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm," and has an estimated CVSS of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (7.5 High). |
| Aqara Home Android (com.lumiunited.aqarahome) 6.0.0 (and white-label clients embedding the same liblumidevsdk.so) uses hard-coded cryptographic keys, which is an instance of "CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key" and has an estimated CVSS of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (9.1 Critical). |
| Naxclow devices use a uniform request-signing scheme based on a hard-coded, platform-wide salt embedded in every firmware image. Once this salt is recovered from any device, an attacker can generate valid signatures for arbitrary device or account operations due to the absence of per-device keys, server-side nonce tracking, or replay protections. Combined with the system’s use of plain HTTP for control-plane traffic, the construction enables broad request forgery and impersonation across the platform. |
| A Missing Required Cryptographic Step vulnerability has been identified in Moxa's embedded Linux firmware for industrial computers and controllers. This vulnerability represents an incomplete remediation of CVE-2026-0714. The firmware introduced TPM2 parameter encryption as a countermeasure against CVE-2026-0714. However, an omission in the authorization session configuration causes the parameter encryption to provide no effective protection. An attacker with invasive physical access to the device can still capture TPM communications on the SPI bus and derive the LUKS disk encryption key in plaintext. While successful exploitation results in full compromise of the encrypted disk volume, the attack requires invasive physical access, including opening the device and attaching external equipment to the SPI bus. Remote exploitation is not possible, and the attack does not affect any downstream systems. |
