| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, the chat message listener allows non-same-origin input:prompt and action:submit messages, so an external site can set prompt text and trigger submitPrompt() in an authenticated victim session. I validated this with a cross-origin attacker page that auto-posted messages and caused unauthorized POST /api/v1/chats/new and POST /api/chat/completions requests containing attacker-controlled prompts. This enables cross-site forced actions and model/tool execution under victim privileges without consent. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, several direct, index-addressed Ollama proxy routes accept a caller-supplied url_idx path parameter and use it as a raw index into the admin-configured OLLAMA_BASE_URLS list. Access control on these routes validates only whether the user may use the requested model, never which backend the request is routed to. Any authenticated user can append an arbitrary url_idx to force their request onto an Ollama backend they were never authorized to reach, including internal, higher-privilege, or explicitly admin-disabled backends. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, Open WebUI's prompt version-history endpoints authorize the prompt_id in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id). This affects /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff, /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version, and /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}. An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim prompt_history.id, can read or delete another user's private prompt history. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.8.11, the ydoc:document:join Socket.IO handler checks note ownership only when the document_id starts with note: (colon). However, the YdocManager storage layer normalizes all document IDs by replacing colons with underscores (document_id.replace(":", "_")). An attacker can join a document room using note_<id> (underscore) instead of note:<id> (colon), bypassing the authorization check entirely while accessing the same underlying Yjs document. The server then returns the full document state, leaking the victim's private note contents. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.11. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, Open WebUI added collection-level ACL checks, but the patch can still be bypassed when Milvus multitenancy mode is enabled. The ACL allows unknown non-KB collection names as legacy/ephemeral collections. In Milvus multitenancy mode, that user-controlled collection name becomes a resource_id and is interpolated into a Milvus expression without escaping. This is caused by an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-44560 This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, the SafePlaywrightURLLoader implements a validate_url function to prevent SSRF attacks by checking the IP address of the user-provided URL. However, this validation is performed only on the initial URL. Since Playwright automatically follows HTTP redirects (301/302) by default, an attacker can bypass the validation by providing a safe URL that redirects to a restricted internal network address (e.g., localhost, Docker container network, or Cloud Metadata). This allows the application to access internal services despite ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH being set to False This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, Open WebUI has a Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) vulnerability in the builtin search_knowledge_files tool. When native function calling is enabled and the selected model has no attached knowledge bases, an authenticated user can call search_knowledge_files with an arbitrary knowledge_id. The function then returns file metadata from that knowledge base without checking whether the user has read access. This allows unauthorized enumeration of private or restricted knowledge base files. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, a path traversal vulnerability exists in open-webui's cache file serving endpoint that allows any authenticated user to read files from sibling directories outside the intended cache directory, by exploiting an incomplete startswith containment check that lacks a trailing path separator. The root cause is that serve_cache_file() in open_webui/main.py validates the resolved path with file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR)) — without appending os.sep. This allows any path resolving to a sibling directory whose name begins with cache (e.g. cache_sibling, cache_backup, cached_models) to pass validation. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, Open WebUI patched SVG XSS in user profile images and webhook profile images but forgot to apply the same fix to model profile images. The ModelMeta class has no validate_profile_image_url field validator, and the model image serving endpoint has no MIME allowlist or nosniff header. Any authenticated user with workspace.models permission (enabled by default) can store a data:image/svg+xml;base64,... payload in a model's profile image and achieve full account takeover of anyone who navigates to the image URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, Open WebUI lets a user who can create, update, or import workspace models store arbitrary meta.knowledge entries on their model without checking whether they own or can read the referenced files. Open WebUI then treats meta.knowledge entries of type file as an authorization source in two places: the built-in view_file tool reads the file's extracted text, and has_access_to_file()'s model branch authorizes the file content and file delete endpoints. A malicious model owner can therefore attach another user's file ID to their model metadata and read or delete that private file. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6,Open WebUI renders Mermaid blocks from Markdown files in the file preview panel and inserts the generated SVG into the DOM using innerHTML. Because Mermaid is configured with securityLevel: 'loose', attacker-controlled Mermaid content can be rendered unsafely in this flow. A working payload was validated through the Markdown preview path, resulting in JavaScript execution in the victim’s browser under the application origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, Open WebUI lets an authenticated user attach arbitrary file_id values to their own chat message without checking whether they own or can read those files. If the attacker then shares that chat and grants themselves read access, has_access_to_file() treats the victim file as accessible through the shared chat, and the file endpoints read or delete the victim file. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, POST /api/chat/completions accepts an image_url.url value that, when it does NOT start with http://, https://, or data:image/, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. an authenticated user can therefore set image_url.url to another user's file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. the user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py::_process_picture_url calls validate_url(picture_url) on the initial URL only, then invokes aiohttp.ClientSession.get(picture_url, ...) without allow_redirects=False. aiohttp's default is allow_redirects=True, max_redirects=10; the function does not pass the project's AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS env constant either. An attacker with a valid OAuth IdP identity can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address and read the internal response body via the attacker's own profile_image_url field. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, POST /api/v1/calendars/events/{event_id}/update validates that the caller has write access to the calendar the event currently belongs to, but does not validate the destination calendar_id supplied in the request body. The model layer then persists the new calendar_id unconditionally. A regular user-role account can therefore create an event in their own calendar and immediately move it into any other user's calendar whose ID they know — bypassing the authorization check that create_event correctly performs. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, the terminal-server reverse proxy in `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` does not fully confine the user-controlled `path` segment before forwarding it to an admin-configured terminal server. An authenticated user who has been granted access to a terminal server can craft `path` values containing encoded `../` traversal sequences that escape the intended path (or policy) scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files on the terminal-server host. Where the terminal server fans requests out to internal services, this also gives SSRF-style reach into those services. This is a separate code path from the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` SSRF (GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685), with its own input. Two distinct vectors are consolidated here: first, raw path forwarding / single-encoded traversal (original report); and second, a bypass of the subsequently-added `_sanitize_proxy_path` mitigation using double-encoded dots (`%252e%252e`). The attacker-controlled input is the request `path`, supplied by the non-admin user, not anything an administrator configures, so this is not an admin-trust / Rule-9 situation. Version 0.9.6 fixes the issue. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, the LDAP and OAuth authentication flows use a TOCTOU (Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use) pattern for first-user admin role assignment. The regular signup handler (signup_handler in auths.py, line 663) was explicitly patched to prevent this race with the comment "Insert with default role first to avoid TOCTOU race", but the LDAP and OAuth code paths were never updated with the same fix. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0. |
| ** REJECT ** DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: The vendor explains: "The 't0p-s3cr3t' default was dead code on every supported startup path: start.sh, start_windows.bat and `open-webui serve` all set or auto-generate WEBUI_SECRET_KEY before the backend imports env.py. It was only ever reachable by invoking uvicorn directly, which is unsupported and unsafe (the app would then sign tokens/cookies with a public, hardcoded key)." |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.1.124, when attaching files to a promp, the name of the file is derived from the original HTTP upload request and is not validated or sanitized. This allows for users to upload files with names containing dot-segments in the file path and traverse out of the intended uploads directory. Effectively, users can upload files anywhere on the filesystem the user running the web server has permission. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.1.124. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.3, the audio transcription upload endpoint takes the file extension from the user-supplied filename and saves the file under CACHE_DIR/audio/transcriptions/.. The /cache/{path} route serves these files via FileResponse, which sets Content-Type from the on-disk extension and emits no Content-Disposition. A verified user with the default-on chat.stt permission can upload a polyglot WAV+HTML file named pwn.html and trick any other user into opening the resulting URL — the response comes back as text/html and any embedded <script> runs in the Open WebUI origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.3. |
