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Search Results (9 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-42284 | 1 Gitpython Project | 1 Gitpython | 2026-05-08 | 8.1 High |
| GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.47, _clone() validates multi_options as the original list, then executes shlex.split(" ".join(multi_options)). A string like "--branch main --config core.hooksPath=/x" passes validation (starts with --branch), but after split becomes ["--branch", "main", "--config", "core.hooksPath=/x"]. Git applies the config and executes attacker hooks during clone. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.47. | ||||
| CVE-2026-42215 | 1 Gitpython Project | 1 Gitpython | 2026-05-08 | 8.8 High |
| GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. From version 3.1.30 to before version 3.1.47, GitPython blocks dangerous Git options such as --upload-pack and --receive-pack by default, but the equivalent Python kwargs upload_pack and receive_pack bypass that check. If an application passes attacker-controlled kwargs into Repo.clone_from(), Remote.fetch(), Remote.pull(), or Remote.push(), this leads to arbitrary command execution even when allow_unsafe_options is left at its default value of False. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.47. | ||||
| CVE-2026-44244 | 1 Gitpython Project | 1 Gitpython | 2026-05-07 | 7.8 High |
| GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.49, GitConfigParser.set_value() passes values to Python's configparser without validating for newlines. GitPython's own _write() converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. \n becomes \n\t), but Git still accepts an indented [core] stanza as a section header — so the injected core.hooksPath becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.49. | ||||
| CVE-2026-44243 | 1 Gitpython Project | 1 Gitpython | 2026-05-07 | 7.1 High |
| GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.48. | ||||
| CVE-2023-41040 | 2 Gitpython Project, Redhat | 5 Gitpython, Ansible Automation Platform, Openstack and 2 more | 2025-11-03 | 4 Medium |
| GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. In order to resolve some git references, GitPython reads files from the `.git` directory, in some places the name of the file being read is provided by the user, GitPython doesn't check if this file is located outside the `.git` directory. This allows an attacker to make GitPython read any file from the system. This vulnerability is present in https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/1c8310d7cae144f74a671cbe17e51f63a830adbf/git/refs/symbolic.py#L174-L175. That code joins the base directory with a user given string without checking if the final path is located outside the base directory. This vulnerability cannot be used to read the contents of files but could in theory be used to trigger a denial of service for the program. This issue has been addressed in version 3.1.37. | ||||
| CVE-2023-40267 | 2 Gitpython Project, Redhat | 4 Gitpython, Ansible Automation Platform, Satellite and 1 more | 2025-11-03 | 9.8 Critical |
| GitPython before 3.1.32 does not block insecure non-multi options in clone and clone_from. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2022-24439. | ||||
| CVE-2022-24439 | 4 Debian, Fedoraproject, Gitpython Project and 1 more | 5 Debian Linux, Fedora, Gitpython and 2 more | 2025-11-03 | 8.1 High |
| All versions of package gitpython are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) due to improper user input validation, which makes it possible to inject a maliciously crafted remote URL into the clone command. Exploiting this vulnerability is possible because the library makes external calls to git without sufficient sanitization of input arguments. | ||||
| CVE-2024-22190 | 1 Gitpython Project | 1 Gitpython | 2024-11-21 | 7.8 High |
| GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. There is an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-40590. On Windows, GitPython uses an untrusted search path if it uses a shell to run `git`, as well as when it runs `bash.exe` to interpret hooks. If either of those features are used on Windows, a malicious `git.exe` or `bash.exe` may be run from an untrusted repository. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.41. | ||||
| CVE-2023-40590 | 1 Gitpython Project | 1 Gitpython | 2024-11-21 | 7.8 High |
| GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. When resolving a program, Python/Windows look for the current working directory, and after that the PATH environment. GitPython defaults to use the `git` command, if a user runs GitPython from a repo has a `git.exe` or `git` executable, that program will be run instead of the one in the user's `PATH`. This is more of a problem on how Python interacts with Windows systems, Linux and any other OS aren't affected by this. But probably people using GitPython usually run it from the CWD of a repo. An attacker can trick a user to download a repository with a malicious `git` executable, if the user runs/imports GitPython from that directory, it allows the attacker to run any arbitrary commands. There is no fix currently available for windows users, however there are a few mitigations. 1: Default to an absolute path for the git program on Windows, like `C:\\Program Files\\Git\\cmd\\git.EXE` (default git path installation). 2: Require users to set the `GIT_PYTHON_GIT_EXECUTABLE` environment variable on Windows systems. 3: Make this problem prominent in the documentation and advise users to never run GitPython from an untrusted repo, or set the `GIT_PYTHON_GIT_EXECUTABLE` env var to an absolute path. 4: Resolve the executable manually by only looking into the `PATH` environment variable. | ||||
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