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Search Results (4 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-82727 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Phoenix | 2026-08-31 | N/A |
| Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix writes the entire raw submitted param map into an exception message, so secrets submitted alongside a union form field leak into logs, crash reports and the dev error page. When AshPhoenix.Form.Auto builds a union sub-form and the submitted _union_type does not match a configured type, both raise sites built the message with inspect(params, pretty: true), embedding the full untrusted param map, and also inspected the internal union constraints[:types]. Because the message is constructed by the library rather than Phoenix's parameter logger, config :phoenix, :filter_parameters never redacts it. An attacker controls both the trigger and the contents: submitting %{"_union_type" => "nope", "password" => "..."} puts the password verbatim in the raised message. The fix reports only the offending _union_type and the valid type names, dropping the param and constraints dumps. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 1.2.17 before 2.3.25. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82726 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Phoenix | 2026-08-31 | N/A |
| Permissive Regular Expression vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets a remote client select the tenant an Ash application uses, or degrade the request, by sending a crafted Host header. AshPhoenix.Helpers.get_subdomain/2 stripped the root domain with String.replace(host, ~r/.?#{root_host}/, ""). The root host was interpolated raw, so each . became a wildcard and any metacharacter a pattern, and the replace was global and unanchored, so a match was removed from anywhere in the string. With root_host example.com, Host: foo.exampleXcom.attacker.net returned the tenant foo.attacker.net. A metacharacter-bearing or nil root host degraded the pattern or raised on every request. The comparison was also case-sensitive, so TENANT.EXAMPLE.COM and EXAMPLE.COM slipped past the root-host allowlist. conn.host comes from the client Host header. The fix matches the root host case-insensitively and only as an exact trailing suffix. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 2.1.26 before 2.3.25. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82725 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Phoenix | 2026-08-31 | N/A |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data. AshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82724 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Phoenix | 2026-08-31 | N/A |
| Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix invokes the SubdomainHook authorization callback with a nil tenant, so tenant-scoped access checks never see the tenant they are meant to enforce. AshPhoenix.LiveView.SubdomainHook.on_mount/4 attached a handle_params hook to assign the tenant and then immediately called handle_subdomain in the same on_mount. The tenant assign is only written when LiveView later runs handle_params, strictly after on_mount returns, so handle_subdomain read an unset assign and ran as apply(m, f, [socket, nil | a]). A consumer gate that halts when the user does not belong to the tenant instead evaluated nil, either crashing or taking a permissive branch, and it was never re-run once the real subdomain was assigned or on later navigations. The fix runs handle_subdomain inside the handle_params hook with the real tenant on every navigation. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 2.1.26 before 2.3.25. | ||||
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