| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nbd: fix uaf in nbd_genl_connect() error path
There is a use-after-free issue in nbd:
block nbd6: Receive control failed (result -104)
block nbd6: shutting down sockets
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in recv_work+0x694/0xa80 drivers/block/nbd.c:1022
Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880295de478 by task kworker/u33:0/67
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 67 Comm: kworker/u33:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5-syzkaller-00123-g2c89c1b655c0 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: nbd6-recv recv_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
print_report+0xc3/0x670 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0xef/0x1a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:96 [inline]
atomic_dec include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:592 [inline]
recv_work+0x694/0xa80 drivers/block/nbd.c:1022
process_one_work+0x9cc/0x1b70 kernel/workqueue.c:3238
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline]
worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3400
kthread+0x3c2/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:464
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
nbd_genl_connect() does not properly stop the device on certain
error paths after nbd_start_device() has been called. This causes
the error path to put nbd->config while recv_work continue to use
the config after putting it, leading to use-after-free in recv_work.
This patch moves nbd_start_device() after the backend file creation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Fix transport_{g2h,h2g} TOCTOU
vsock_find_cid() and vsock_dev_do_ioctl() may race with module unload.
transport_{g2h,h2g} may become NULL after the NULL check.
Introduce vsock_transport_local_cid() to protect from a potential
null-ptr-deref.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f]
RIP: 0010:vsock_find_cid+0x47/0x90
Call Trace:
__vsock_bind+0x4b2/0x720
vsock_bind+0x90/0xe0
__sys_bind+0x14d/0x1e0
__x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f]
RIP: 0010:vsock_dev_do_ioctl.isra.0+0x58/0xf0
Call Trace:
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x12d/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm: clip: Fix NULL pointer dereference in vcc_sendmsg()
atmarpd_dev_ops does not implement the send method, which may cause crash
as bellow.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5324 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6-syzkaller-00346-g5723cc3450bc #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d3cf778 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 1ffffffff1910dd1 RBX: 00000000000000c0 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: ffffc9000dc82000 RSI: ffff88803e4c4640 RDI: ffff888052cd0000
RBP: ffffc9000d3cf8d0 R08: ffff888052c9143f R09: 1ffff1100a592287
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff92001a79f00
R13: ffff888052cd0000 R14: ffff88803e4c4640 R15: ffffffff8c886e88
FS: 00007fbc762566c0(0000) GS:ffff88808d6c2000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000041f1b000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vcc_sendmsg+0xa10/0xc50 net/atm/common.c:644
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:727
____sys_sendmsg+0x52d/0x830 net/socket.c:2566
___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2620
__sys_sendmmsg+0x227/0x430 net/socket.c:2709
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2736 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2733 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xc0 net/socket.c:2733
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi:msghandler: Fix potential memory corruption in ipmi_create_user()
The "intf" list iterator is an invalid pointer if the correct
"intf->intf_num" is not found. Calling atomic_dec(&intf->nr_users) on
and invalid pointer will lead to memory corruption.
We don't really need to call atomic_dec() if we haven't called
atomic_add_return() so update the if (intf->in_shutdown) path as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/exynos: exynos7_drm_decon: add vblank check in IRQ handling
If there's support for another console device (such as a TTY serial),
the kernel occasionally panics during boot. The panic message and a
relevant snippet of the call stack is as follows:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000000
Call trace:
drm_crtc_handle_vblank+0x10/0x30 (P)
decon_irq_handler+0x88/0xb4
[...]
Otherwise, the panics don't happen. This indicates that it's some sort
of race condition.
Add a check to validate if the drm device can handle vblanks before
calling drm_crtc_handle_vblank() to avoid this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix null-ptr-deref in l2cap_sock_resume_cb()
syzbot reported null-ptr-deref in l2cap_sock_resume_cb(). [0]
l2cap_sock_resume_cb() has a similar problem that was fixed by commit
1bff51ea59a9 ("Bluetooth: fix use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested()").
Since both l2cap_sock_kill() and l2cap_sock_resume_cb() are executed
under l2cap_sock_resume_cb(), we can avoid the issue simply by checking
if chan->data is NULL.
Let's not access to the killed socket in l2cap_sock_resume_cb().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in instrument_atomic_write include/linux/instrumented.h:82 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in clear_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h:41 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in l2cap_sock_resume_cb+0xb4/0x17c net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1711
Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000570 by task kworker/u9:0/52
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-syzkaller-g7482bb149b9f #0 PREEMPT
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work
Call trace:
show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:501 (C)
__dump_stack+0x30/0x40 lib/dump_stack.c:94
dump_stack_lvl+0xd8/0x12c lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_report+0x58/0x84 mm/kasan/report.c:524
kasan_report+0xb0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2a4 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
__kasan_check_write+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/shadow.c:37
instrument_atomic_write include/linux/instrumented.h:82 [inline]
clear_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h:41 [inline]
l2cap_sock_resume_cb+0xb4/0x17c net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1711
l2cap_security_cfm+0x524/0xea0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7357
hci_auth_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2092 [inline]
hci_auth_complete_evt+0x2e8/0xa4c net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3514
hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7511 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0x650/0xe9c net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7565
hci_rx_work+0x320/0xb18 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070
process_one_work+0x7e8/0x155c kernel/workqueue.c:3238
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3321 [inline]
worker_thread+0x958/0xed8 kernel/workqueue.c:3402
kthread+0x5fc/0x75c kernel/kthread.c:464
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:847 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: net: sierra: check for no status endpoint
The driver checks for having three endpoints and
having bulk in and out endpoints, but not that
the third endpoint is interrupt input.
Rectify the omission. |
| JWCrypto implements JWK, JWS, and JWE specifications using python-cryptography. Prior to version 1.5.6, an attacker can cause a denial of service attack by passing in a malicious JWE Token with a high compression ratio. When the server processes this token, it will consume a lot of memory and processing time. Version 1.5.6 fixes this vulnerability by limiting the maximum token length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: bpf: Only mitigate cBPF programs loaded by unprivileged users
Support for eBPF programs loaded by unprivileged users is typically
disabled. This means only cBPF programs need to be mitigated for BHB.
In addition, only mitigate cBPF programs that were loaded by an
unprivileged user. Privileged users can also load the same program
via eBPF, making the mitigation pointless. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: bpf: Add BHB mitigation to the epilogue for cBPF programs
A malicious BPF program may manipulate the branch history to influence
what the hardware speculates will happen next.
On exit from a BPF program, emit the BHB mititgation sequence.
This is only applied for 'classic' cBPF programs that are loaded by
seccomp. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Avoid potential UAF in LPI translation cache
There is a potential UAF scenario in the case of an LPI translation
cache hit racing with an operation that invalidates the cache, such
as a DISCARD ITS command. The root of the problem is that
vgic_its_check_cache() does not elevate the refcount on the vgic_irq
before dropping the lock that serializes refcount changes.
Have vgic_its_check_cache() raise the refcount on the returned vgic_irq
and add the corresponding decrement after queueing the interrupt. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seg6: Fix validation of nexthop addresses
The kernel currently validates that the length of the provided nexthop
address does not exceed the specified length. This can lead to the
kernel reading uninitialized memory if user space provided a shorter
length than the specified one.
Fix by validating that the provided length exactly matches the specified
one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptp: remove ptp->n_vclocks check logic in ptp_vclock_in_use()
There is no disagreement that we should check both ptp->is_virtual_clock
and ptp->n_vclocks to check if the ptp virtual clock is in use.
However, when we acquire ptp->n_vclocks_mux to read ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use(), we observe a recursive lock in the call trace
starting from n_vclocks_store().
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6 #1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz.0.1540/13807 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
ptp_vclock_in_use drivers/ptp/ptp_private.h:103 [inline]
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
ptp_clock_unregister+0x21/0x250 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:415
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888030704868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
n_vclocks_store+0xf1/0x6d0 drivers/ptp/ptp_sysfs.c:215
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);
lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);
*** DEADLOCK ***
....
============================================
The best way to solve this is to remove the logic that checks
ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use().
The reason why this is appropriate is that any path that uses
ptp->n_vclocks must unconditionally check if ptp->n_vclocks is greater
than 0 before unregistering vclocks, and all functions are already
written this way. And in the function that uses ptp->n_vclocks, we
already get ptp->n_vclocks_mux before unregistering vclocks.
Therefore, we need to remove the redundant check for ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use() to prevent recursive locking. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix NULL pointer deference on eir_get_service_data
The len parameter is considered optional so it can be NULL so it cannot
be used for skipping to next entry of EIR_SERVICE_DATA. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: sun8i-ce-cipher - fix error handling in sun8i_ce_cipher_prepare()
Fix two DMA cleanup issues on the error path in sun8i_ce_cipher_prepare():
1] If dma_map_sg() fails for areq->dst, the device driver would try to free
DMA memory it has not allocated in the first place. To fix this, on the
"theend_sgs" error path, call dma unmap only if the corresponding dma
map was successful.
2] If the dma_map_single() call for the IV fails, the device driver would
try to free an invalid DMA memory address on the "theend_iv" path:
------------[ cut here ]------------
DMA-API: sun8i-ce 1904000.crypto: device driver tries to free an invalid DMA memory address
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 69 at kernel/dma/debug.c:968 check_unmap+0x123c/0x1b90
Modules linked in: skcipher_example(O+)
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 69 Comm: 1904000.crypto- Tainted: G O 6.15.0-rc3+ #24 PREEMPT
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: OrangePi Zero2 (DT)
pc : check_unmap+0x123c/0x1b90
lr : check_unmap+0x123c/0x1b90
...
Call trace:
check_unmap+0x123c/0x1b90 (P)
debug_dma_unmap_page+0xac/0xc0
dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x1f4/0x5fc
sun8i_ce_cipher_do_one+0x1bd4/0x1f40
crypto_pump_work+0x334/0x6e0
kthread_worker_fn+0x21c/0x438
kthread+0x374/0x664
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
To fix this, check for !dma_mapping_error() before calling
dma_unmap_single() on the "theend_iv" path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
EDAC/skx_common: Fix general protection fault
After loading i10nm_edac (which automatically loads skx_edac_common), if
unload only i10nm_edac, then reload it and perform error injection testing,
a general protection fault may occur:
mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged
Oops: general protection fault ...
...
Workqueue: events mce_gen_pool_process
RIP: 0010:string+0x53/0xe0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x37/0x90
? exc_general_protection+0x1e7/0x3f0
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? string+0x53/0xe0
vsnprintf+0x23e/0x4c0
snprintf+0x4d/0x70
skx_adxl_decode+0x16a/0x330 [skx_edac_common]
skx_mce_check_error.part.0+0xf8/0x220 [skx_edac_common]
skx_mce_check_error+0x17/0x20 [skx_edac_common]
...
The issue arose was because the variable 'adxl_component_count' (inside
skx_edac_common), which counts the ADXL components, was not reset. During
the reloading of i10nm_edac, the count was incremented by the actual number
of ADXL components again, resulting in a count that was double the real
number of ADXL components. This led to an out-of-bounds reference to the
ADXL component array, causing the general protection fault above.
Fix this issue by resetting the 'adxl_component_count' in adxl_put(),
which is called during the unloading of {skx,i10nm}_edac. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Add cond_resched() to ftrace_graph_set_hash()
When the kernel contains a large number of functions that can be traced,
the loop in ftrace_graph_set_hash() may take a lot of time to execute.
This may trigger the softlockup watchdog.
Add cond_resched() within the loop to allow the kernel to remain
responsive even when processing a large number of functions.
This matches the cond_resched() that is used in other locations of the
code that iterates over all functions that can be traced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
objtool, media: dib8000: Prevent divide-by-zero in dib8000_set_dds()
If dib8000_set_dds()'s call to dib8000_read32() returns zero, the result
is a divide-by-zero. Prevent that from happening.
Fixes the following warning with an UBSAN kernel:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dib8000.o: warning: objtool: dib8000_tune() falls through to next function dib8096p_cfg_DibRx() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
aoe: clean device rq_list in aoedev_downdev()
An aoe device's rq_list contains accepted block requests that are
waiting to be transmitted to the aoe target. This queue was added as
part of the conversion to blk_mq. However, the queue was not cleaned out
when an aoe device is downed which caused blk_mq_freeze_queue() to sleep
indefinitely waiting for those requests to complete, causing a hang. This
fix cleans out the queue before calling blk_mq_freeze_queue(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mpls: Use rcu_dereference_rtnl() in mpls_route_input_rcu().
As syzbot reported [0], mpls_route_input_rcu() can be called
from mpls_getroute(), where is under RTNL.
net->mpls.platform_label is only updated under RTNL.
Let's use rcu_dereference_rtnl() in mpls_route_input_rcu() to
silence the splat.
[0]:
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.15.0-rc7-syzkaller-00082-g5cdb2c77c4c3 #0 Not tainted
----------------------------
net/mpls/af_mpls.c:84 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by syz.2.4451/17730:
#0: ffffffff9012a3e8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_lock net/core/rtnetlink.c:80 [inline]
#0: ffffffff9012a3e8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x371/0xe90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6961
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 17730 Comm: syz.2.4451 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-syzkaller-00082-g5cdb2c77c4c3 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x16c/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x166/0x260 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6865
mpls_route_input_rcu+0x1d4/0x200 net/mpls/af_mpls.c:84
mpls_getroute+0x621/0x1ea0 net/mpls/af_mpls.c:2381
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3c9/0xe90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6964
netlink_rcv_skb+0x16d/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x53a/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339
netlink_sendmsg+0x8d1/0xdd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:727 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0xa98/0xc70 net/socket.c:2566
___sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2620
__sys_sendmmsg+0x200/0x420 net/socket.c:2709
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2736 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2733 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9c/0x100 net/socket.c:2733
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x230 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f0a2818e969
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f0a28f52038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f0a283b5fa0 RCX: 00007f0a2818e969
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000200000000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f0a28210ab1 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f0a283b5fa0 R15: 00007ffce5e9f268
</TASK> |
