| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi: Fix stale-data leak into the SCSI sense buffer
iscsi_scsi_cmd_rsp() copies the sense data of a SCSI Response from the
target-supplied data segment. The segment carries a 2-byte sense length
followed by the sense bytes, so it must hold 2 + senselen bytes, but the
bounds check only requires datalen >= senselen:
senselen = get_unaligned_be16(data);
if (datalen < senselen)
goto invalid_datalen;
memcpy(sc->sense_buffer, data + 2,
min_t(uint16_t, senselen, SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE));
A target that returns a SCSI Response whose datalen equals senselen
(with senselen <= SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE) makes the memcpy() from data +
2 read up to two bytes past the received data. Those bytes are stale
conn->data contents and end up in the command's sense buffer, which is
returned to userspace.
Account for the 2-byte sense length prefix in the check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi_tcp: Bound SCSI Response data segment to the connection buffer
iscsi_tcp_hdr_dissect() receives the data segment of several PDU types
into the fixed-size conn->data buffer, which is allocated for
ISCSI_DEF_MAX_RECV_SEG_LEN (8192) bytes. For the LOGIN_RSP, TEXT_RSP,
REJECT and ASYNC_EVENT opcodes the dissect path already rejects a PDU
whose DataSegmentLength exceeds that buffer.
The SCSI Command Response (ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP) path also copies its
data segment (sense/response data) into conn->data via
iscsi_tcp_data_recv_prep(), but it does so without the same check. The
only upstream bound on in.datalen is conn->max_recv_dlength, the
initiator's advertised MaxRecvDataSegmentLength, which is commonly
negotiated well above 8192 (open-iscsi defaults to 262144). A target
that returns a SCSI Response with a DataSegmentLength between 8193 and
max_recv_dlength therefore overflows the 8192-byte conn->data buffer.
Once the same bound applies, ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP is handled exactly
like those responses: bound the data segment, receive it into conn->data
when present, and otherwise complete the PDU with no data. Fold the
opcode into that case group rather than duplicating the check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nzxt-smart2) DMA-align output buffer
Sashiko reports:
When send_output_report() calls hid_hw_output_report(), the underlying USB
HID core calls usb_interrupt_msg() which maps this buffer directly for DMA.
When the DMA mapping flushes or invalidates the cacheline, it will corrupt
the adjacent variables (mutex, update_interval) that were modified
concurrently by the CPU. This causes memory corruption due to cacheline
sharing on non-coherent CPU architectures (such as ARM or MIPS). The DMA
API debugging tool (CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG) will trigger runtime warnings
for this violation.
Any operation that triggers send_output_report() (like setting a fan speed
or updating the interval) causes the USB DMA mapping. On systems with
non-coherent caches, this structural bug causes immediate and deterministic
memory corruption.
Align the output buffer to ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN to fix the problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nct6775-core) Prevent access to unsupported weight registers
Sashiko reports:
During initialization of the nct6116 chip, the driver sets data->pwm_num
to 5. However, it assigns several NCT6106 register arrays (such as
NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_DUTY_STEP, NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_SEL, and
NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_*) to data->REG_PWM and data->REG_WEIGHT_TEMP.
These arrays only contain 3 elements.
In nct6775_update_pwm(), the driver iterates up to data->pwm_num. If
data->has_pwm has bits 3 or 4 set (which is structurally possible for
nct6116), the loop attempts to read elements at index 3 and 4 from these
3-element arrays. This results in a global out-of-bounds read, which can
be caught by KASAN.
Furthermore, the driver uses these garbage out-of-bounds values as
hardware register addresses for subsequent read and write operations. This
leads to invalid hardware register access, potentially causing hardware
misconfiguration or system crashes.
The underlying problem is that the chip does support up to five fan
control channels, but only the first three support weight control.
Fix the problem by extending the affected weight register arrays with
zeroed fields. The driver uses zeroed register addresses to determine
if a register is supported or not, and skips accesses for unsupported
registers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_u32: validate offshift to prevent shift-out-of-bounds
u32_change() copies the user-provided tc_u32_sel.offshift (unsigned char,
0-255) into the kernel knode object without bounds validation. When a
packet later hits u32_classify() with TC_U32_VAROFFSET set, it evaluates
`ntohs(offmask & *data) >> offshift` where the left operand is a 16-bit
value promoted to a 32-bit int. Any offshift >= 32 is undefined behavior
per C11 6.5.7p3, triggerable by an unprivileged user via user/network
namespaces.
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sched/cls_u32.c:236:43
shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type int
Fix this by rejecting offshift >= 16 during filter creation in
u32_change(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/iommufd: Fix IOPF group ownership UAF
iopf_group_alloc() links each last-page IOPF group into the generic IOPF
pending list before invoking the domain fault handler.
iommufd_fault_iopf_handler() also queued an accepted group in the
IOMMUFD deliver list without removing it from the generic pending list.
When detach or HWPT replacement drops the device's IOPF reference count
to zero, an IOMMU driver may call iopf_queue_remove_device(). That
function responds to and frees groups through the generic pending list
without removing the same groups from IOMMUFD's deliver list or response
xarray. A later read, response, or cleanup can then access the freed
group and cause a UAF.
Fix this by dequeuing an accepted group from the generic pending list
before IOMMUFD queues it for userspace response.
Make iopf_group_response() send a response regardless of pending-list
membership, so the dequeued group can still be completed by IOMMUFD. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: devicetree: don't free uninitialized dev_name on error path
dt_remember_or_free_map() duplicates dev_name for each map entry. If
kstrdup_const() fails, dt_free_map() frees dev_name in all num_maps
entries, including entries that have not been initialized.
Some pinctrl drivers, including pinctrl-imx, allocate the map with
kmalloc() and leave dev_name for the core to initialize. The untouched
entries therefore contain uninitialized data which is passed to
kfree_const().
Reproduced on qemu's mcimx6ul-evk (pinctrl-imx) with failslab injection
while binding the pinctrl-consuming device, under KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: double-free in dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4
Free of addr c425a900 by task init/1
kfree from dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4
dt_free_map from dt_remember_or_free_map+0x184/0x198
dt_remember_or_free_map from pinctrl_dt_to_map+0x33c/0x4c8
pinctrl_dt_to_map from create_pinctrl+0x9c/0x5c0
Initialize all dev_name fields to NULL before duplicating the device
name, making the full-map cleanup safe after a partial failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Update x2APIC MSR intercepts if AVIC is inhibited while L2 is active
Always update x2APIC MSR intercepts for L1 when AVIC is deactivated, even
if L2 is active and KVM is using a separate MSR bitmap to run L2. If AVIC
is fully enabled prior to running L2, and is then inhibited while L2 is
active (for a VM-scoped inhibit), then KVM will run L1 with AVIC disabled,
but with x2APIC MSR intercepts disabled, i.e. will allow L1 to read most of
the host's APIC state, send arbitrary interrupts, change task priority, and
ultimately trivially DoS the host.
E.g. sending a self-IPI in L1 on HYPERV_REENLIGHTENMENT_VECTOR, 0xee, with
CONFIG_HYPERV=n in the host kernel as a "safe" PoC, yields:
Spurious interrupt (vector 0xee) on CPU#425. Acked
And hacking KVM to abuse kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler() to register a
handler and WARN on POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR yields:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:5594 at pi_wakeup_handler+0x9/0x10 [kvm_amd], CPU#156: nested_x2apic_t/316940
CPU: 156 UID: 0 PID: 316940 Comm: nested_x2apic_t Tainted: G S U
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER
Hardware name: Google Astoria-Turin/astoria, BIOS 0.20260209.0-0 02/09/2026
RIP: 0010:pi_wakeup_handler+0x9/0x10 [kvm_amd]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_ipi+0x64/0x80
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_ipi+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:vcpu_run+0x1430/0x1e40 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x2c1/0x600 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x580/0x6b0 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x6d/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x46ff4b
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: mgmt: fix pending command UAF in EIR updates
MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME is handled asynchronously on powered controllers
and can run set_name_sync(). When the controller is BR/EDR capable,
set_name_sync() updates the local name and then rebuilds EIR data through
eir_create(). The EIR builder walks hdev->uuids, but the UUID list can
be changed and entries can be freed by MGMT_OP_ADD_UUID and
MGMT_OP_REMOVE_UUID.
pending_eir_or_class() is meant to serialize management commands that
can change EIR or the class of device, but it did not include
MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME. In addition, it walked hdev->mgmt_pending
without hdev->mgmt_pending_lock even though pending commands are added
and removed under that mutex. A racing command completion can therefore
remove and free a pending command while pending_eir_or_class() is still
inspecting it, leading to a use-after-free in the pending-command list or
allowing a local name update to rebuild EIR while UUID entries are being
removed.
Take hdev->mgmt_pending_lock while scanning hdev->mgmt_pending and treat
MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME as an EIR/class-affecting pending command on the
powered asynchronous path. Check for a conflicting pending command before
copying the new short name so a rejected SET_LOCAL_NAME request does not
modify hdev->short_name. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Clamp frame size in implicit-feedback mode
snd_usb_handle_sync_urb() scales received sync packet sizes by the sender's
stride and stores the result directly in out_packet->packet_size[i]. If a
connected USB device sends an oversized sync packet, this frame count can
exceed ep->maxframesize.
The un-clamped frame count then propagates to the playback endpoint queue,
potentially driving packet transfers beyond the endpoint's hardware frame
limits.
Cap the calculated frame count against ep->maxframesize in
snd_usb_handle_sync_urb() to prevent oversized packets from entering the
playback queue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page_reporting: use system_freezable_wq to fix UAF during suspend
During PM freeze (e.g. S3 suspend or S4 hibernation), device drivers like
virtio_balloon reset their underlying virtio devices and delete their
virtqueues via vdev->config->del_vqs().
However, page reporting work (page_reporting_process) was scheduled on the
global system_wq. Because system_wq lacks the WQ_FREEZABLE flag, the PM
freezer skips it, leaving page_reporting_process active during suspend.
If pages are freed into the buddy allocator while suspending (for example,
when core MM invokes the balloon shrinker during S4 hibernation image
saving), page reporting triggers virtballoon_free_page_report() on deleted
virtqueues, resulting in a Use-After-Free / General Protection Fault:
[ 196.795226] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xaa1436fe70dae6df: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 196.825967] Workqueue: events page_reporting_process
[ 196.831038] RIP: 0010:virtqueue_add_split+0x233/0x4c0 [virtio_ring]
[ 196.927073] virtballoon_free_page_report+0x3a/0xe0 [virtio_balloon]
[ 196.946943] page_reporting_process+0x370/0x4f0
Fix this by switching page reporting work to system_freezable_wq. This
ensures that the PM freezer pauses page_reporting_process before device
drivers destroy their reporting virtqueues. Because the reporting worker
is frozen, memory reclamation/freeing (e.g. via shrinker execution) can
safely return pages to MM during freeze without triggering unfrozen
reporting work on deleted virtqueues.
This aligns with the driver's existing design. The comment in
virtballoon_freeze() states:
/*
* The workqueue is already frozen by the PM core before this
* function is called.
*/
Testing:
I have verified these fixes using Google’s virtualization infrastructure
by running continuous suspend/resume iterations (40+ cycles) while
churning memory using stress-ng (`stress-ng --vm 4 --vm-bytes 60%
--timeout 1`) to constantly create free pages for the buddy allocator. We
also set the `page_reporting_order` parameter to 0 to make the page
reporting worker highly sensitive, forcing it to pick up any 4K free
pages. This confirmed that the UAF crashes are no longer reproducible. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: stop fast-leave after deleting a port group
br_multicast_leave_group() iterates mp->ports with pp = &p->next in
its fast-leave path. After br_multicast_del_pg() removes p,
continuing the loop advances pp through the deleted entry.
If multicast-to-unicast was enabled, the bridge can hold multiple port
groups for the same port and group with different source MAC
addresses. Once multicast-to-unicast is disabled,
br_port_group_equal() matches those entries by port only. A fast leave
can then delete one entry and continue from its stale next pointer,
leaving mp->ports pointing at a deleted port group.
Fast leave only needs to remove one matching port group. Break after
br_multicast_del_pg() so the loop stops before dereferencing the
removed entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: pktgen: fix proc entry use-after-free
pktgen_change_name() replaces pkt_dev->entry while holding t->if_lock.
pktgen_remove_device() removes the same entry before
_rem_dev_from_if_list() takes that lock.
This allows the following interleaving:
CPU 0 (NETDEV_CHANGENAME) CPU 1 (kpktgend)
if_lock(t)
proc_remove(pkt_dev->entry)
proc_remove(pkt_dev->entry)
pkt_dev->entry = proc_create_data(...)
if_unlock(t)
The kthread can pass the stale proc_dir_entry to proc_remove() after the
rename path has freed it. A reproducer with a widened race window reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in proc_remove+0x78/0x80
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881478fea70 by task kpktgend_0/67
Call Trace:
proc_remove+0x78/0x80
pktgen_remove_device.isra.0+0x11c/0x4c0
pktgen_thread_worker+0x1214/0x6bc0
kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0
Allocated by task 95:
__proc_create+0x204/0x790
proc_create_data+0x72/0xe0
pktgen_thread_write+0xd61/0x1510
Freed by task 28:
kmem_cache_free+0xcb/0x3d0
proc_free_inode+0x5b/0x80
rcu_core+0x50a/0x1850
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881478fea00
which belongs to the cache proc_dir_entry of size 192
Move proc_remove() into the if_lock-protected list removal helper. Keep it
before list_del_rcu() to preserve the ordering required by add_device().
The rename path must then finish replacing the entry before removal, or
it observes that the device is no longer on the list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write
resp_report_zones() sizes the reply buffer from the CDB allocation
length. The v3 fix rounds alloc_len up with ALIGN() before deriving the
descriptor count:
rep_max_zones = (ALIGN((u64)alloc_len, RZONES_DESC_HD) -
RZONES_DESC_HD) >> ilog2(RZONES_DESC_HD);
arr_len = (u64)RZONES_DESC_HD * (rep_max_zones + 1);
For alloc_len in 0xFFFFFFC1..0xFFFFFFFF, ALIGN() rounds up to
0x100000000, so arr_len is 4 GB. On 32-bit, kzalloc()'s size_t is 32-bit
and truncates 0x100000000 to 0; kzalloc(0) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which
passes the !arr check, and desc = arr + 64 is then dereferenced in the
loop -> out-of-bounds write / panic.
Clamp rep_max_zones to devip->nr_zones. The loop already stops at
sdebug_capacity (after nr_zones zones), so a report can never hold more
than nr_zones descriptors; the clamp does not change the report, it only
bounds arr_len to (nr_zones + 1) * RZONES_DESC_HD, a real device
property that can never reach 0x100000000. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: peak_usb: peak_usb_start(): fix double free of transfer buffer on URB submit error
In peak_usb_start(), each RX URB transfer buffer is allocated with kmalloc()
and the URB is flagged URB_FREE_BUFFER so that the final usb_free_urb() also
frees the transfer buffer.
If usb_submit_urb() fails, the error path frees the buffer explicitly with
kfree(buf) and then calls usb_free_urb(urb). Because URB_FREE_BUFFER is set,
usb_free_urb() -> urb_destroy() frees the same buffer a second time, a double
free of the transfer buffer.
BUG: KASAN: double-free in usb_free_urb.part.0+0x91/0xb0
Free of addr ffff8881069ccb80 by task trigger.sh/285
Call Trace:
kfree+0x113/0x3c0
usb_free_urb.part.0+0x91/0xb0
Drop the redundant kfree(buf); usb_free_urb() already releases the transfer
buffer. This mirrors commit 03819abbeb11 ("net: usb: lan78xx: Fix double free
issue with interrupt buffer allocation"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix uint32_t overflow in EOP ring buffer size alignment
eop_ring_buffer_size in struct queue_properties is a u32. In
kfd_queue_acquire_buffers() the expected EOP buffer size is computed as
ALIGN(eop_ring_buffer_size, PAGE_SIZE); ALIGN uses typeof(x), so the
addition is done in 32-bit. A user-supplied size of 0xFFFFF001 wraps to
0, causing kfd_queue_buffer_get() to skip its exact-size check (gated on
size != 0) and accept any BO mapped at the address. On GFX8/GFX9 the MQD
cp_hqd_eop_control is then programmed for an 8KB EOP ring backed by a 4KB
BO, so CP EOP writes can land past the buffer and fault the GPU.
Cast the operand to u64 so the alignment is computed in 64-bit; the size
check in kfd_queue_buffer_get() then rejects the oversized request.
(cherry picked from commit ae443117b742c357bfef3a7bddabf76fcf86e9ef) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down scalable-mode context entry
device_pasid_table_teardown() zeroes the 128-bit scalable-mode context
entry with context_clear_entry() while the Present bit is still set. This
creates a window where the hardware can fetch a torn entry, with some
fields already zeroed while Present is still set, leading to unpredictable
behavior or spurious faults. The context-cache invalidation is issued only
after the entry has been zeroed, and intel_pasid_free_table() then frees
the PASID directory pages, so the IOMMU can keep walking a stale Present=1
entry that points at freed memory.
While x86 provides strong write ordering, the compiler may reorder the two
64-bit writes to the entry, and the hardware fetch is not guaranteed to be
atomic with respect to multiple CPU writes.
Commit c1e4f1dccbe9d ("iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down
context entry") fixed this exact pattern in domain_context_clear_one() and
the copied-context path, but device_pasid_table_teardown() was not
converted.
Align it with the "Guidance to Software for Invalidations" in the VT-d
spec, Section 6.5.3.3, using the same ownership handshake as the sibling
fix: clear only the Present bit, flush it to the IOMMU, perform the
context-cache invalidation, and only then zero the rest of the entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling
rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the
call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers.
A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in
RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued.
In that state call->tx_top is zero and call->tx_queue is NULL, so
rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a
null-pointer dereference.
Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means:
(1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates
that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as
yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything
has been transmitted at least once, but we're now waiting for the
stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK'd (retransmissions may
still happen).
The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned
a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the
first packet is transmitted.
RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate
that all Tx packets have been ACK'd and we're now waiting for the
reply to be received.
(2) As per Wyatt Feng's original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks
that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx
buffer to ACK, but now this includes AWAIT_ACK rather than
AWAIT_REPLY. ACKALL packets are ignored if received in the wrong
state.
Note that unlike Wyatt Feng's patch, it's no longer necessary to check
to see if the Tx buffer exists as this the state set now covers this.
(3) Make the ACKALL handler use call->tx_transmitted rather than
call->tx_top as the former is explicitly the highest packet seq number
transmitted, whereas the latter has a looser definition.
Thanks to Jeffrey Altman for a description of the history of the ACKALL
packet[1]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix the reception of a reply packet before data transmission
Fix rxrpc_receiving_reply() to handle the reception of an apparent reply
DATA packet before rxrpc has had a chance to send any request DATA packets
on a client call by checking to see if the call has been exposed yet by
sending the first packet.
Without this, rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() might oops.
Also fix rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() to handle the Tx queue being empty by
changing the do...while loop into a while loop, just in case a call is
abnormally terminated by an early reply before the last request packet is
transmitted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Fix snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions() off-by-one
Sashiko notes:
> regarding the bounds check in snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions()
> called via walk_iomem_res_desc(): does the check
> if ((range_list->num_elements * 16 + 8) > PAGE_SIZE)
> allow an off-by-one heap buffer overflow?
>
> If range_list->num_elements is 255, 255 * 16 + 8 = 4088, which is <= 4096.
> Writing range->base (8 bytes) fills 4088-4095, but writing range->page_count
> (4 bytes) would write to 4096-4099, overflowing the kzalloc-allocated
> PAGE_SIZE buffer.
Fix this by accounting for the entry about to be written to, in addition to
the entries that are already allocated. |
