| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Use scratch field in MMIO fragment to hold small write values
When exiting to userspace to service an emulated MMIO write, copy the
to-be-written value to a scratch field in the MMIO fragment if the size
of the data payload is 8 bytes or less, i.e. can fit in a single chunk,
instead of pointing the fragment directly at the source value.
This fixes a class of use-after-free bugs that occur when the emulator
initiates a write using an on-stack, local variable as the source, the
write splits a page boundary, *and* both pages are MMIO pages. Because
KVM's ABI only allows for physically contiguous MMIO requests, accesses
that split MMIO pages are separated into two fragments, and are sent to
userspace one at a time. When KVM attempts to complete userspace MMIO in
response to KVM_RUN after the first fragment, KVM will detect the second
fragment and generate a second userspace exit, and reference the on-stack
variable.
The issue is most visible if the second KVM_RUN is performed by a separate
task, in which case the stack of the initiating task can show up as truly
freed data.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888009c378d1 by task syz-executor417/984
CPU: 1 PID: 984 Comm: syz-executor417 Not tainted 5.10.0-182.0.0.95.h2627.eulerosv2r13.x86_64 #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170
__kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84
kasan_report+0x3a/0x50
check_memory_region+0xfd/0x1f0
memcpy+0x20/0x60
complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x63f/0x6d0
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20
__se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
RIP: 0033:0x42477d
Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007faa8e6890e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004d7338 RCX: 000000000042477d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00000000004d7330 R08: 00007fff28d546df R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004d733c
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000040a200 R15: 00007fff28d54720
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:0000000029f6a428 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9c37
flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000270dc8 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888009c37780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888009c37800: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff888009c37880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff888009c37900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888009c37980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
==================================================================
The bug can also be reproduced with a targeted KVM-Unit-Test by hacking
KVM to fill a large on-stack variable in complete_emulated_mmio(), i.e. by
overwrite the data value with garbage.
Limit the use of the scratch fields to 8-byte or smaller accesses, and to
just writes, as larger accesses and reads are not affected thanks to
implementation details in the emulator, but add a sanity check to ensure
those details don't change in the future. Specifically, KVM never uses
on-stack variables for accesses larger that 8 bytes, e.g. uses an operand
in the emulator context, and *al
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix trace_marker copy link list updates
When the "copy_trace_marker" option is enabled for an instance, anything
written into /sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker is also copied into that
instances buffer. When the option is set, that instance's trace_array
descriptor is added to the marker_copies link list. This list is protected
by RCU, as all iterations uses an RCU protected list traversal.
When the instance is deleted, all the flags that were enabled are cleared.
This also clears the copy_trace_marker flag and removes the trace_array
descriptor from the list.
The issue is after the flags are called, a direct call to
update_marker_trace() is performed to clear the flag. This function
returns true if the state of the flag changed and false otherwise. If it
returns true here, synchronize_rcu() is called to make sure all readers
see that its removed from the list.
But since the flag was already cleared, the state does not change and the
synchronization is never called, leaving a possible UAF bug.
Move the clearing of all flags below the updating of the copy_trace_marker
option which then makes sure the synchronization is performed.
Also use the flag for checking the state in update_marker_trace() instead
of looking at if the list is empty. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix dangling pointer on mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete
This fixes the condition checking so mgmt_pending_valid is executed
whenever status != -ECANCELED otherwise calling mgmt_pending_free(cmd)
would kfree(cmd) without unlinking it from the list first, leaving a
dangling pointer. Any subsequent list traversal (e.g.,
mgmt_pending_foreach during __mgmt_power_off, or another
mgmt_pending_valid call) would dereference freed memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/efa: Fix use of completion ctx after free
On admin queue completion handling, if the admin command completed with
error we print data from the completion context. The issue is that we
already freed the completion context in polling/interrupts handler which
means we print data from context in an unknown state (it might be
already used again).
Change the admin submission flow so alloc/dealloc of the context will be
symmetric and dealloc will be called after any potential use of the
context. |
| A flaw was found in virtio-win, specifically within the VirtIO Block (BLK) device. When the device undergoes a reset, it fails to properly manage memory, resulting in a use-after-free vulnerability. This issue could allow a local attacker to corrupt system memory, potentially leading to system instability or unexpected behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ti: icssg-prueth: fix use-after-free of CPPI descriptor in RX path
cppi5_hdesc_get_psdata() returns a pointer into the CPPI descriptor.
In both emac_rx_packet() and emac_rx_packet_zc(), the descriptor is
freed via k3_cppi_desc_pool_free() before the psdata pointer is used
by emac_rx_timestamp(), which dereferences psdata[0] and psdata[1].
This constitutes a use-after-free on every received packet that goes
through the timestamp path.
Defer the descriptor free until after all accesses through the psdata
pointer are complete. For emac_rx_packet(), move the free into the
requeue label so both early-exit and success paths free the descriptor
after all accesses are done. For emac_rx_packet_zc(), move the free to
the end of the loop body after emac_dispatch_skb_zc() (which calls
emac_rx_timestamp()) has returned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: fix teardown order issue (UAF)
There is a teardown order issue in the driver. The SPI controller is
registered using devm_spi_register_controller(), which delays
unregistration of the SPI controller until after the fsl_lpspi_remove()
function returns.
As the fsl_lpspi_remove() function synchronously tears down the DMA
channels, a running SPI transfer triggers the following NULL pointer
dereference due to use after free:
| fsl_lpspi 42550000.spi: I/O Error in DMA RX
| Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[...]
| Call trace:
| fsl_lpspi_dma_transfer+0x260/0x340 [spi_fsl_lpspi]
| fsl_lpspi_transfer_one+0x198/0x448 [spi_fsl_lpspi]
| spi_transfer_one_message+0x49c/0x7c8
| __spi_pump_transfer_message+0x120/0x420
| __spi_sync+0x2c4/0x520
| spi_sync+0x34/0x60
| spidev_message+0x20c/0x378 [spidev]
| spidev_ioctl+0x398/0x750 [spidev]
[...]
Switch from devm_spi_register_controller() to spi_register_controller() in
fsl_lpspi_probe() and add the corresponding spi_unregister_controller() in
fsl_lpspi_remove(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/pf: Fix use-after-free in migration restore
When an error is returned from xe_sriov_pf_migration_restore_produce(),
the data pointer is not set to NULL, which can trigger use-after-free
in subsequent .write() calls.
Set the pointer to NULL upon error to fix the problem.
(cherry picked from commit 4f53d8c6d23527d734fe3531d08e15cb170a0819) |
| Use after free in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 147.0.7727.117 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: Fix kernel panic due to __initconst misuse
Fix a kernel panic when probing the driver as a module:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address
ffffd9c18eb05000
of_find_matching_node_and_match+0x5c/0x1a0
hantro_probe+0x2f4/0x7d0 [hantro_vpu]
The imx8mq_vpu_shared_resources array is referenced by variant
structures through their shared_devices field. When built as a
module, __initconst causes this data to be freed after module
init, but it's later accessed during probe, causing a page fault.
The imx8mq_vpu_shared_resources is referenced from non-init code,
so keeping __initconst or __initconst_or_module here is wrong.
Drop the __initconst annotation and let it live in the normal .rodata
section.
A bug of __initconst called from regular non-init probe code
leading to bugs during probe deferrals or during unbind-bind cycles. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: 6fire: fix use-after-free on disconnect
In usb6fire_chip_abort(), the chip struct is allocated as the card's
private data (via snd_card_new with sizeof(struct sfire_chip)). When
snd_card_free_when_closed() is called and no file handles are open, the
card and embedded chip are freed synchronously. The subsequent
chip->card = NULL write then hits freed slab memory.
Call trace:
usb6fire_chip_abort sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:59 [inline]
usb6fire_chip_disconnect+0x348/0x358 sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:182
usb_unbind_interface+0x1a8/0x88c drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458
...
hub_event+0x1a04/0x4518 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5953
Fix by moving the card lifecycle out of usb6fire_chip_abort() and into
usb6fire_chip_disconnect(). The card pointer is saved in a local
before any teardown, snd_card_disconnect() is called first to prevent
new opens, URBs are aborted while chip is still valid, and
snd_card_free_when_closed() is called last so chip is never accessed
after the card may be freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (powerz) Fix use-after-free on USB disconnect
After powerz_disconnect() frees the URB and releases the mutex, a
subsequent powerz_read() call can acquire the mutex and call
powerz_read_data(), which dereferences the freed URB pointer.
Fix by:
- Setting priv->urb to NULL in powerz_disconnect() so that
powerz_read_data() can detect the disconnected state.
- Adding a !priv->urb check at the start of powerz_read_data()
to return -ENODEV on a disconnected device.
- Moving usb_set_intfdata() before hwmon registration so the
disconnect handler can always find the priv pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mediatek: vcodec: fix use-after-free in encoder release path
The fops_vcodec_release() function frees the context structure (ctx)
without first cancelling any pending or running work in ctx->encode_work.
This creates a race window where the workqueue handler (mtk_venc_worker)
may still be accessing the context memory after it has been freed.
Race condition:
CPU 0 (release path) CPU 1 (workqueue)
--------------------- ------------------
fops_vcodec_release()
v4l2_m2m_ctx_release()
v4l2_m2m_cancel_job()
// waits for m2m job "done"
mtk_venc_worker()
v4l2_m2m_job_finish()
// m2m job "done"
// BUT worker still running!
// post-job_finish access:
other ctx dereferences
// UAF if ctx already freed
// returns (job "done")
kfree(ctx) // ctx freed
Root cause: The v4l2_m2m_ctx_release() only waits for the m2m job
lifecycle (via TRANS_RUNNING flag), not the workqueue lifecycle.
After v4l2_m2m_job_finish() is called, the m2m framework considers
the job complete and v4l2_m2m_ctx_release() returns, but the worker
function continues executing and may still access ctx.
The work is queued during encode operations via:
queue_work(ctx->dev->encode_workqueue, &ctx->encode_work)
The worker function accesses ctx->m2m_ctx, ctx->dev, and other ctx
fields even after calling v4l2_m2m_job_finish().
This vulnerability was confirmed with KASAN by running an instrumented
test module that widens the post-job_finish race window. KASAN detected:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mtk_venc_worker+0x159/0x180
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800326e000 by task kworker/u8:0/12
Workqueue: mtk_vcodec_enc_wq mtk_venc_worker
Allocated by task 47:
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
fops_vcodec_open+0x85/0x1a0
Freed by task 47:
__kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
kfree+0xee/0x3a0
fops_vcodec_release+0xb7/0x190
Fix this by calling cancel_work_sync(&ctx->encode_work) before kfree(ctx).
This ensures the workqueue handler is both cancelled (if pending) and
synchronized (waits for any running handler to complete) before the
context is freed.
Placement rationale: The fix is placed after v4l2_ctrl_handler_free()
and before list_del_init(&ctx->list). At this point, all m2m operations
are done (v4l2_m2m_ctx_release() has returned), and we need to ensure
the workqueue is synchronized before removing ctx from the list and
freeing it.
Note: The open error path does NOT need cancel_work_sync() because
INIT_WORK() only initializes the work structure - it does not schedule
it. Work is only scheduled later during device_run() operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lan966x: fix use-after-free and leak in lan966x_fdma_reload()
When lan966x_fdma_reload() fails to allocate new RX buffers, the restore
path restarts DMA using old descriptors whose pages were already freed
via lan966x_fdma_rx_free_pages(). Since page_pool_put_full_page() can
release pages back to the buddy allocator, the hardware may DMA into
memory now owned by other kernel subsystems.
Additionally, on the restore path, the newly created page pool (if
allocation partially succeeded) is overwritten without being destroyed,
leaking it.
Fix both issues by deferring the release of old pages until after the
new allocation succeeds. Save the old page array before the allocation
so old pages can be freed on the success path. On the failure path, the
old descriptors, pages and page pool are all still valid, making the
restore safe. Also ensure the restore path re-enables NAPI and wakes
the netdev, matching the success path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: hold claim backbone gateways by reference
batadv_bla_add_claim() can replace claim->backbone_gw and drop the old
gateway's last reference while readers still follow the pointer.
The netlink claim dump path dereferences claim->backbone_gw->orig and
takes claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock without pinning the underlying
backbone gateway. batadv_bla_check_claim() still has the same naked
pointer access pattern.
Reuse batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw() in both readers so they operate
on a stable gateway reference until the read-side work is complete.
This keeps the dump and claim-check paths aligned with the lifetime
rules introduced for the other BLA claim readers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Require sys_futex_requeue() to have identical flags
Nicholas reported that his LLM found it was possible to create a UaF
when sys_futex_requeue() is used with different flags. The initial
motivation for allowing different flags was the variable sized futex,
but since that hasn't been merged (yet), simply mandate the flags are
identical, as is the case for the old style sys_futex() requeue
operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path
Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered:
WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524
When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY
and stores a refcounted task pointer in 'exiting'.
After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer
is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a
different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting().
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
// acquires the PI futex
exit()
futex_cleanup_begin()
futex_state = EXITING;
futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
futex_lock_pi_atomic()
attach_to_pi_owner()
// observes EXITING
*exiting = owner; // takes ref
return -EBUSY
wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner)
put_task_struct(); // drops ref
// exiting still points to owner
goto retry;
futex_lock_pi_atomic()
lock_pi_update_atomic()
cmpxchg(uaddr)
*uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever
// value changed
return -EAGAIN;
wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale
WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting)
Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi. |
| A use-after-free vulnerability was found in libxslt while parsing xsl nodes that may lead to the dereference of expired pointers and application crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: fix use-after-free in timeout object destroy
nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy() frees the timeout object with kfree()
immediately after nf_ct_untimeout(), without waiting for an RCU grace
period. Concurrent packet processing on other CPUs may still hold
RCU-protected references to the timeout object obtained via
rcu_dereference() in nf_ct_timeout_data().
Add an rcu_head to struct nf_ct_timeout and use kfree_rcu() to defer
freeing until after an RCU grace period, matching the approach already
used in nfnetlink_cttimeout.c.
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881035fe19c by task exploit/80
Call Trace:
nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
nf_conntrack_in+0x612/0x8b0
nf_hook_slow+0x70/0x100
__ip_local_out+0x1b2/0x210
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x722/0x1580
__sys_sendto+0x2d8/0x320
Allocated by task 75:
nft_ct_timeout_obj_init+0xf6/0x290
nft_obj_init+0x107/0x1b0
nf_tables_newobj+0x680/0x9c0
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xc29/0xe00
Freed by task 26:
nft_obj_destroy+0x3f/0xa0
nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x51c/0x5c0
process_one_work+0x2c4/0x5a0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: EC: clean up handlers on probe failure in acpi_ec_setup()
When ec_install_handlers() returns -EPROBE_DEFER on reduced-hardware
platforms, it has already started the EC and installed the address
space handler with the struct acpi_ec pointer as handler context.
However, acpi_ec_setup() propagates the error without any cleanup.
The caller acpi_ec_add() then frees the struct acpi_ec for non-boot
instances, leaving a dangling handler context in ACPICA.
Any subsequent AML evaluation that accesses an EC OpRegion field
dispatches into acpi_ec_space_handler() with the freed pointer,
causing a use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:289)
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800721de38 by task init/1
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:289)
acpi_ec_space_handler (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1362)
acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch (drivers/acpi/acpica/evregion.c:293)
acpi_ex_access_region (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:246)
acpi_ex_field_datum_io (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:509)
acpi_ex_extract_from_field (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:700)
acpi_ex_read_data_from_field (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfield.c:327)
acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value (drivers/acpi/acpica/exresolv.c:392)
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1:
acpi_ec_alloc (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1424)
acpi_ec_add (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1692)
Freed by task 1:
kfree (mm/slub.c:6876)
acpi_ec_add (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1751)
The bug triggers on reduced-hardware EC platforms (ec->gpe < 0)
when the GPIO IRQ provider defers probing. Once the stale handler
exists, any unprivileged sysfs read that causes AML to touch an
EC OpRegion (battery, thermal, backlight) exercises the dangling
pointer.
Fix this by calling ec_remove_handlers() in the error path of
acpi_ec_setup() before clearing first_ec. ec_remove_handlers()
checks each EC_FLAGS_* bit before acting, so it is safe to call
regardless of how far ec_install_handlers() progressed:
-ENODEV (handler not installed): only calls acpi_ec_stop()
-EPROBE_DEFER (handler installed): removes handler, stops EC |
