| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
flex_proportions: make fprop_new_period() hardirq safe
Bernd has reported a lockdep splat from flexible proportions code that is
essentially complaining about the following race:
<timer fires>
run_timer_softirq - we are in softirq context
call_timer_fn
writeout_period
fprop_new_period
write_seqcount_begin(&p->sequence);
<hardirq is raised>
...
blk_mq_end_request()
blk_update_request()
ext4_end_bio()
folio_end_writeback()
__wb_writeout_add()
__fprop_add_percpu_max()
if (unlikely(max_frac < FPROP_FRAC_BASE)) {
fprop_fraction_percpu()
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&p->sequence);
- sees odd sequence so loops indefinitely
Note that a deadlock like this is only possible if the bdi has configured
maximum fraction of writeout throughput which is very rare in general but
frequent for example for FUSE bdis. To fix this problem we have to make
sure write section of the sequence counter is irqsafe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: Fix potential block overflow that cause system hang
When a user executes the FITRIM command, an underflow can occur when
calculating nblocks if end_block is too small. Since nblocks is of
type sector_t, which is u64, a negative nblocks value will become a
very large positive integer. This ultimately leads to the block layer
function __blkdev_issue_discard() taking an excessively long time to
process the bio chain, and the ns_segctor_sem lock remains held for a
long period. This prevents other tasks from acquiring the ns_segctor_sem
lock, resulting in the hang reported by syzbot in [1].
If the ending block is too small, typically if it is smaller than 4KiB
range, depending on the usage of the segment 0, it may be possible to
attempt a discard request beyond the device size causing the hang.
Exiting successfully and assign the discarded size (0 in this case)
to range->len.
Although the start and len values in the user input range are too small,
a conservative strategy is adopted here to safely ignore them, which is
equivalent to a no-op; it will not perform any trimming and will not
throw an error.
[1]
task:segctord state:D stack:28968 pid:6093 tgid:6093 ppid:2 task_flags:0x200040 flags:0x00080000
Call Trace:
rwbase_write_lock+0x3dd/0x750 kernel/locking/rwbase_rt.c:272
nilfs_transaction_lock+0x253/0x4c0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:357
nilfs_segctor_thread_construct fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2569 [inline]
nilfs_segctor_thread+0x6ec/0xe00 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2684
[ryusuke: corrected part of the commit message about the consequences] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: Reduce TSN TX packet buffer from 7KB to 5KB per queue
The previous 7 KB per queue caused TX unit hangs under heavy
timestamping load. Reducing to 5 KB avoids these hangs and matches
the TSN recommendation in I225/I226 SW User Manual Section 7.5.4.
The 8 KB "freed" by this change is currently unused. This reduction
is not expected to impact throughput, as the i226 is PCIe-limited
for small TSN packets rather than TX-buffer-limited. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: annotate data-race in ndisc_router_discovery()
syzbot found that ndisc_router_discovery() could read and write
in6_dev->ra_mtu without holding a lock [1]
This looks fine, IFLA_INET6_RA_MTU is best effort.
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to document the race.
Note that we might also reject illegal MTU values
(mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU || mtu > skb->dev->mtu) in a future patch.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ndisc_router_discovery / ndisc_router_discovery
read to 0xffff888119809c20 of 4 bytes by task 25817 on cpu 1:
ndisc_router_discovery+0x151d/0x1c90 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1558
ndisc_rcv+0x2ad/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1841
icmpv6_rcv+0xe5a/0x12f0 net/ipv6/icmp.c:989
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xb2a/0x10d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
ip6_input_finish+0xf0/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
ip6_input+0x5e/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500
ip6_mc_input+0x27c/0x470 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590
dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x336/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
...
write to 0xffff888119809c20 of 4 bytes by task 25816 on cpu 0:
ndisc_router_discovery+0x155a/0x1c90 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1559
ndisc_rcv+0x2ad/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1841
icmpv6_rcv+0xe5a/0x12f0 net/ipv6/icmp.c:989
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xb2a/0x10d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
ip6_input_finish+0xf0/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
ip6_input+0x5e/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500
ip6_mc_input+0x27c/0x470 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590
dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x336/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
...
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0xe5400659 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: omap - Allocate OMAP_CRYPTO_FORCE_COPY scatterlists correctly
The existing allocation of scatterlists in omap_crypto_copy_sg_lists()
was allocating an array of scatterlist pointers, not scatterlist objects,
resulting in a 4x too small allocation.
Use sizeof(*new_sg) to get the correct object size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: Set __nocfi on swsusp_arch_resume()
A DABT is reported[1] on an android based system when resume from hiberate.
This happens because swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() is marked with SYM_CODE_*()
and does not have a CFI hash, but swsusp_arch_resume() will attempt to
verify the CFI hash when calling a copy of swsusp_arch_suspend_exit().
Given that there's an existing requirement that the entrypoint to
swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() is the first byte of the .hibernate_exit.text
section, we cannot fix this by marking swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() with
SYM_FUNC_*(). The simplest fix for now is to disable the CFI check in
swsusp_arch_resume().
Mark swsusp_arch_resume() as __nocfi to disable the CFI check.
[1]
[ 22.991934][ T1] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000109170ffc
[ 22.991934][ T1] Mem abort info:
[ 22.991934][ T1] ESR = 0x0000000096000007
[ 22.991934][ T1] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 22.991934][ T1] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 22.991934][ T1] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 22.991934][ T1] FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
[ 22.991934][ T1] Data abort info:
[ 22.991934][ T1] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 22.991934][ T1] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 22.991934][ T1] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 22.991934][ T1] [0000000109170ffc] user address but active_mm is swapper
[ 22.991934][ T1] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 22.991934][ T1] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 22.991934][ T1] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 22.991934][ T1] Modules linked in:
[ 22.991934][ T1] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.98-android15-8-g0b1d2aee7fc3-dirty-4k #1 688c7060a825a3ac418fe53881730b355915a419
[ 22.991934][ T1] Hardware name: Unisoc UMS9360-base Board (DT)
[ 22.991934][ T1] pstate: 804000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 22.991934][ T1] pc : swsusp_arch_resume+0x2ac/0x344
[ 22.991934][ T1] lr : swsusp_arch_resume+0x294/0x344
[ 22.991934][ T1] sp : ffffffc08006b960
[ 22.991934][ T1] x29: ffffffc08006b9c0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 22.991934][ T1] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000820
[ 22.991934][ T1] x23: ffffffd0817e3000 x22: ffffffd0817e3000 x21: 0000000000000000
[ 22.991934][ T1] x20: ffffff8089171000 x19: ffffffd08252c8c8 x18: ffffffc080061058
[ 22.991934][ T1] x17: 00000000529c6ef0 x16: 00000000529c6ef0 x15: 0000000000000004
[ 22.991934][ T1] x14: ffffff8178c88000 x13: 0000000000000006 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 22.991934][ T1] x11: 0000000000000015 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffffffd082533000
[ 22.991934][ T1] x8 : 0000000109171000 x7 : 205b5d3433393139 x6 : 392e32322020205b
[ 22.991934][ T1] x5 : 000000010916f000 x4 : 000000008164b000 x3 : ffffff808a4e0530
[ 22.991934][ T1] x2 : ffffffd08058e784 x1 : 0000000082326000 x0 : 000000010a283000
[ 22.991934][ T1] Call trace:
[ 22.991934][ T1] swsusp_arch_resume+0x2ac/0x344
[ 22.991934][ T1] hibernation_restore+0x158/0x18c
[ 22.991934][ T1] load_image_and_restore+0xb0/0xec
[ 22.991934][ T1] software_resume+0xf4/0x19c
[ 22.991934][ T1] software_resume_initcall+0x34/0x78
[ 22.991934][ T1] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x370
[ 22.991934][ T1] do_initcall_level+0xc8/0x19c
[ 22.991934][ T1] do_initcalls+0x70/0xc0
[ 22.991934][ T1] do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x28
[ 22.991934][ T1] kernel_init_freeable+0xe0/0x148
[ 22.991934][ T1] kernel_init+0x20/0x1a8
[ 22.991934][ T1] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 22.991934][ T1] Code: a9400a61 f94013e0 f9438923 f9400a64 (b85fc110)
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: commit log updated by Mark Rutland] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efivarfs: fix error propagation in efivar_entry_get()
efivar_entry_get() always returns success even if the underlying
__efivar_entry_get() fails, masking errors.
This may result in uninitialized heap memory being copied to userspace
in the efivarfs_file_read() path.
Fix it by returning the error from __efivar_entry_get(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix segmentation of forwarding fraglist GRO
This patch enhances GSO segment handling by properly checking
the SKB_GSO_DODGY flag for frag_list GSO packets, addressing
low throughput issues observed when a station accesses IPv4
servers via hotspots with an IPv6-only upstream interface.
Specifically, it fixes a bug in GSO segmentation when forwarding
GRO packets containing a frag_list. The function skb_segment_list
cannot correctly process GRO skbs that have been converted by XLAT,
since XLAT only translates the header of the head skb. Consequently,
skbs in the frag_list may remain untranslated, resulting in protocol
inconsistencies and reduced throughput.
To address this, the patch explicitly sets the SKB_GSO_DODGY flag
for GSO packets in XLAT's IPv4/IPv6 protocol translation helpers
(bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6 and bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4). This marks GSO
packets as potentially modified after protocol translation. As a
result, GSO segmentation will avoid using skb_segment_list and
instead falls back to skb_segment for packets with the SKB_GSO_DODGY
flag. This ensures that only safe and fully translated frag_list
packets are processed by skb_segment_list, resolving protocol
inconsistencies and improving throughput when forwarding GRO packets
converted by XLAT. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: sdhci-of-dwcmshc: Prevent illegal clock reduction in HS200/HS400 mode
When operating in HS200 or HS400 timing modes, reducing the clock frequency
below 52MHz will lead to link broken as the Rockchip DWC MSHC controller
requires maintaining a minimum clock of 52MHz in these modes.
Add a check to prevent illegal clock reduction through debugfs:
root@debian:/# echo 50000000 > /sys/kernel/debug/mmc0/clock
root@debian:/# [ 30.090146] mmc0: running CQE recovery
mmc0: cqhci: Failed to halt
mmc0: cqhci: spurious TCN for tag 0
WARNING: drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-core.c:797 at cqhci_irq+0x254/0x818, CPU#1: kworker/1:0H/24
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/1:0H Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1-00001-g09db0998649d-dirty #204 PREEMPT
Hardware name: Rockchip RK3588 EVB1 V10 Board (DT)
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_run_work_fn
pstate: 604000c9 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : cqhci_irq+0x254/0x818
lr : cqhci_irq+0x254/0x818
... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/io-wq: check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside work run loop
Currently this is checked before running the pending work. Normally this
is quite fine, as work items either end up blocking (which will create a
new worker for other items), or they complete fairly quickly. But syzbot
reports an issue where io-wq takes seemingly forever to exit, and with a
bit of debugging, this turns out to be because it queues a bunch of big
(2GB - 4096b) reads with a /dev/msr* file. Since this file type doesn't
support ->read_iter(), loop_rw_iter() ends up handling them. Each read
returns 16MB of data read, which takes 20 (!!) seconds. With a bunch of
these pending, processing the whole chain can take a long time. Easily
longer than the syzbot uninterruptible sleep timeout of 140 seconds.
This then triggers a complaint off the io-wq exit path:
INFO: task syz.4.135:6326 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #0
Blocked by coredump.
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz.4.135 state:D stack:26824 pid:6326 tgid:6324 ppid:5957 task_flags:0x400548 flags:0x00080000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5256 [inline]
__schedule+0x1139/0x6150 kernel/sched/core.c:6863
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6945 [inline]
schedule+0xe7/0x3a0 kernel/sched/core.c:6960
schedule_timeout+0x257/0x290 kernel/time/sleep_timeout.c:75
do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:100 [inline]
__wait_for_common+0x2fc/0x4e0 kernel/sched/completion.c:121
io_wq_exit_workers io_uring/io-wq.c:1328 [inline]
io_wq_put_and_exit+0x271/0x8a0 io_uring/io-wq.c:1356
io_uring_clean_tctx+0x10d/0x190 io_uring/tctx.c:203
io_uring_cancel_generic+0x69c/0x9a0 io_uring/cancel.c:651
io_uring_files_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:19 [inline]
do_exit+0x2ce/0x2bd0 kernel/exit.c:911
do_group_exit+0xd3/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1112
get_signal+0x2671/0x26d0 kernel/signal.c:3034
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x8f/0x7e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
__exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:41 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x8c/0x540 kernel/entry/common.c:75
__exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:226 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:256 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:159 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:194 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x4ee/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa02738f749
RSP: 002b:00007fa0281ae0e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca
RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00007fa0275e6098 RCX: 00007fa02738f749
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: 00007fa0275e6098
RBP: 00007fa0275e6090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fa0275e6128 R14: 00007fff14e4fcb0 R15: 00007fff14e4fd98
There's really nothing wrong here, outside of processing these reads
will take a LONG time. However, we can speed up the exit by checking the
IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside the io_worker_handle_work() loop, as syzbot will
exit the ring after queueing up all of these reads. Then once the first
item is processed, io-wq will simply cancel the rest. That should avoid
syzbot running into this complaint again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Fix SVE writes on !SME systems
When SVE is supported but SME is not supported, a ptrace write to the
NT_ARM_SVE regset can place the tracee into an invalid state where
(non-streaming) SVE register data is stored in FP_STATE_SVE format but
TIF_SVE is clear. This can result in a later warning from
fpsimd_restore_current_state(), e.g.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7214 at arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c:383 fpsimd_restore_current_state+0x50c/0x748
When this happens, fpsimd_restore_current_state() will set TIF_SVE,
placing the task into the correct state. This occurs before any other
check of TIF_SVE can possibly occur, as other checks of TIF_SVE only
happen while the FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live. Thus, aside from the
warning, there is no functional issue.
This bug was introduced during rework to error handling in commit:
9f8bf718f2923 ("arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Gracefully handle errors")
... where the setting of TIF_SVE was moved into a block which is only
executed when system_supports_sme() is true.
Fix this by removing the system_supports_sme() check. This ensures that
TIF_SVE is set for (SVE-formatted) writes to NT_ARM_SVE, at the cost of
unconditionally manipulating the tracee's saved svcr value. The
manipulation of svcr is benign and inexpensive, and we already do
similar elsewhere (e.g. during signal handling), so I don't think it's
worth guarding this with system_supports_sme() checks.
Aside from the above, there is no functional change. The 'type' argument
to sve_set_common() is only set to ARM64_VEC_SME (in ssve_set())) when
system_supports_sme(), so the ARM64_VEC_SME case in the switch statement
is still unreachable when !system_supports_sme(). When
CONFIG_ARM64_SME=n, the only caller of sve_set_common() is sve_set(),
and the compiler can constant-fold for the case where type is
ARM64_VEC_SVE, removing the logic for other cases. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: imx8m-blk-ctrl: Remove separate rst and clk mask for 8mq vpu
For i.MX8MQ platform, the ADB in the VPUMIX domain has no separate reset
and clock enable bits, but is ungated and reset together with the VPUs.
So we can't reset G1 or G2 separately, it may led to the system hang.
Remove rst_mask and clk_mask of imx8mq_vpu_blk_ctl_domain_data.
Let imx8mq_vpu_power_notifier() do really vpu reset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fou: Don't allow 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO.
fou_udp_recv() has the same problem mentioned in the previous
patch.
If FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO is set to 0, skb is not freed by
fou_udp_recv() nor "resubmit"-ted in ip_protocol_deliver_rcu().
Let's forbid 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: provide a net pointer to __skb_flow_dissect()
After 3cbf4ffba5ee ("net: plumb network namespace into __skb_flow_dissect")
we have to provide a net pointer to __skb_flow_dissect(),
either via skb->dev, skb->sk, or a user provided pointer.
In the following case, syzbot was able to cook a bare skb.
WARNING: net/core/flow_dissector.c:1131 at __skb_flow_dissect+0xb57/0x68b0 net/core/flow_dissector.c:1131, CPU#1: syz.2.1418/11053
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bond_flow_dissect drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4093 [inline]
__bond_xmit_hash+0x2d7/0xba0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4157
bond_xmit_hash_xdp drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4208 [inline]
bond_xdp_xmit_3ad_xor_slave_get drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5139 [inline]
bond_xdp_get_xmit_slave+0x1fd/0x710 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5515
xdp_master_redirect+0x13f/0x2c0 net/core/filter.c:4388
bpf_prog_run_xdp include/net/xdp.h:700 [inline]
bpf_test_run+0x6b2/0x7d0 net/bpf/test_run.c:421
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x795/0x10e0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1390
bpf_prog_test_run+0x2c7/0x340 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4703
__sys_bpf+0x562/0x860 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6182
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6274 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6272 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6272
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
l2tp: avoid one data-race in l2tp_tunnel_del_work()
We should read sk->sk_socket only when dealing with kernel sockets.
syzbot reported the following data-race:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in l2tp_tunnel_del_work / sk_common_release
write to 0xffff88811c182b20 of 8 bytes by task 5365 on cpu 0:
sk_set_socket include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline]
sock_orphan include/net/sock.h:2118 [inline]
sk_common_release+0xae/0x230 net/core/sock.c:4003
udp_lib_close+0x15/0x20 include/net/udp.h:325
inet_release+0xce/0xf0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437
__sock_release net/socket.c:662 [inline]
sock_close+0x6b/0x150 net/socket.c:1455
__fput+0x29b/0x650 fs/file_table.c:468
____fput+0x1c/0x30 fs/file_table.c:496
task_work_run+0x131/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:233
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
__exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:44 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x1fe/0x740 kernel/entry/common.c:75
__exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:226 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:256 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:159 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:194 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x1e1/0x2b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
read to 0xffff88811c182b20 of 8 bytes by task 827 on cpu 1:
l2tp_tunnel_del_work+0x2f/0x1a0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1418
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0x4ce/0x9d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x582/0x770 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x489/0x510 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x149/0x290 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
value changed: 0xffff88811b818000 -> 0x0000000000000000 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mISDN: annotate data-race around dev->work
dev->work can re read locklessly in mISDN_read()
and mISDN_poll(). Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in mISDN_ioctl / mISDN_read
write to 0xffff88812d848280 of 4 bytes by task 10864 on cpu 1:
misdn_add_timer drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:175 [inline]
mISDN_ioctl+0x2fb/0x550 drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:233
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xce/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:583
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x43/0x50 fs/ioctl.c:583
x64_sys_call+0x14b0/0x3000 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
read to 0xffff88812d848280 of 4 bytes by task 10857 on cpu 0:
mISDN_read+0x1f2/0x470 drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:112
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:847 [inline]
vfs_readv+0x3fb/0x690 fs/read_write.c:1020
do_readv+0xe7/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1080
__do_sys_readv fs/read_write.c:1165 [inline]
__se_sys_readv fs/read_write.c:1162 [inline]
__x64_sys_readv+0x45/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1162
x64_sys_call+0x2831/0x3000 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:20
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uacce: fix cdev handling in the cleanup path
When cdev_device_add fails, it internally releases the cdev memory,
and if cdev_device_del is then executed, it will cause a hang error.
To fix it, we check the return value of cdev_device_add() and clear
uacce->cdev to avoid calling cdev_device_del in the uacce_remove. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: virtio - Add spinlock protection with virtqueue notification
When VM boots with one virtio-crypto PCI device and builtin backend,
run openssl benchmark command with multiple processes, such as
openssl speed -evp aes-128-cbc -engine afalg -seconds 10 -multi 32
openssl processes will hangup and there is error reported like this:
virtio_crypto virtio0: dataq.0:id 3 is not a head!
It seems that the data virtqueue need protection when it is handled
for virtio done notification. If the spinlock protection is added
in virtcrypto_done_task(), openssl benchmark with multiple processes
works well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
migrate: correct lock ordering for hugetlb file folios
Syzbot has found a deadlock (analyzed by Lance Yang):
1) Task (5749): Holds folio_lock, then tries to acquire i_mmap_rwsem(read lock).
2) Task (5754): Holds i_mmap_rwsem(write lock), then tries to acquire
folio_lock.
migrate_pages()
-> migrate_hugetlbs()
-> unmap_and_move_huge_page() <- Takes folio_lock!
-> remove_migration_ptes()
-> __rmap_walk_file()
-> i_mmap_lock_read() <- Waits for i_mmap_rwsem(read lock)!
hugetlbfs_fallocate()
-> hugetlbfs_punch_hole() <- Takes i_mmap_rwsem(write lock)!
-> hugetlbfs_zero_partial_page()
-> filemap_lock_hugetlb_folio()
-> filemap_lock_folio()
-> __filemap_get_folio <- Waits for folio_lock!
The migration path is the one taking locks in the wrong order according to
the documentation at the top of mm/rmap.c. So expand the scope of the
existing i_mmap_lock to cover the calls to remove_migration_ptes() too.
This is (mostly) how it used to be after commit c0d0381ade79. That was
removed by 336bf30eb765 for both file & anon hugetlb pages when it should
only have been removed for anon hugetlb pages. |
| A flaw was found in uv. This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute malicious code during package resolution or installation via specially crafted ZIP (Zipped Information Package) archives that exploit parsing differentials, requiring user interaction to install an attacker-controlled package. |
