| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From version 10.3.0 to before version 12.2.0, processing a malicious PSD file could lead to memory corruption, potentially resulting in a crash or arbitrary code execution. This issue has been patched in version 12.2.0. |
| A flaw was found in glib. This vulnerability allows a heap buffer overflow and denial-of-service (DoS) via an integer overflow in GLib's GIO (GLib Input/Output) escape_byte_string() function when processing malicious file or remote filesystem attribute values. |
| A flaw was found in GLib (Gnome Lib). This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to cause heap corruption, leading to a denial of service or potential code execution via a buffer-underflow in the GVariant parser when processing maliciously crafted input strings. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: fix u8 overflow in SSID scan buffer size calculation
The variable valuesize is declared as u8 but accumulates the total
length of all SSIDs to scan. Each SSID contributes up to 33 bytes
(IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN + 1), and with WILC_MAX_NUM_PROBED_SSID (10)
SSIDs the total can reach 330, which wraps around to 74 when stored
in a u8.
This causes kmalloc to allocate only 75 bytes while the subsequent
memcpy writes up to 331 bytes into the buffer, resulting in a 256-byte
heap buffer overflow.
Widen valuesize from u8 to u32 to accommodate the full range. |
| A flaw was found in the libtiff library. A remote attacker could exploit a signed integer overflow vulnerability in the putcontig8bitYCbCr44tile function by providing a specially crafted TIFF file. This flaw can lead to an out-of-bounds heap write due to incorrect memory pointer calculations, potentially causing a denial of service (application crash) or arbitrary code execution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: delete attr leaf freemap entries when empty
Back in commit 2a2b5932db6758 ("xfs: fix attr leaf header freemap.size
underflow"), Brian Foster observed that it's possible for a small
freemap at the end of the end of the xattr entries array to experience
a size underflow when subtracting the space consumed by an expansion of
the entries array. There are only three freemap entries, which means
that it is not a complete index of all free space in the leaf block.
This code can leave behind a zero-length freemap entry with a nonzero
base. Subsequent setxattr operations can increase the base up to the
point that it overlaps with another freemap entry. This isn't in and of
itself a problem because the code in _leaf_add that finds free space
ignores any freemap entry with zero size.
However, there's another bug in the freemap update code in _leaf_add,
which is that it fails to update a freemap entry that begins midway
through the xattr entry that was just appended to the array. That can
result in the freemap containing two entries with the same base but
different sizes (0 for the "pushed-up" entry, nonzero for the entry
that's actually tracking free space). A subsequent _leaf_add can then
allocate xattr namevalue entries on top of the entries array, leading to
data loss. But fixing that is for later.
For now, eliminate the possibility of confusion by zeroing out the base
of any freemap entry that has zero size. Because the freemap is not
intended to be a complete index of free space, a subsequent failure to
find any free space for a new xattr will trigger block compaction, which
regenerates the freemap.
It looks like this bug has been in the codebase for quite a long time. |
| jq is a command-line JSON processor. In 1.8.1 and earlier, when decNumberFromString is given a number literal of INT_MAX-1 (2147483646) digits, the D2U() macro overflows during signed-int arithmetic. The wrapped negative value bypasses the heap-allocation size check, causes the function to use a 30-byte stack buffer, and then writes ≈715 million 16-bit units (≈1.4 GiB) at an offset 1.43 GiB below the stack frame. The written content is fully attacker-controlled (the parsed decimal digits, packed 3-per-unit). |
| jq is a command-line JSON processor. In 1.8.1 and earlier, the jq bytecode VM's data stack tracks its allocation size in a signed int. When the stack grows beyond ≈1 GiB (via deeply nested generator forks), the doubling arithmetic overflows. The wrapped value is passed to realloc and then used for a memmove with attacker-influenced offsets. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: atomisp: prevent integer overflow in sh_css_set_black_frame()
The "height" and "width" values come from the user so the "height * width"
multiplication can overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hfi1: Fix potential integer multiplication overflow errors
When multiplying of different types, an overflow is possible even when
storing the result in a larger type. This is because the conversion is
done after the multiplication. So arithmetic overflow and thus in
incorrect value is possible.
Correct an instance of this in the inter packet delay calculation. Fix by
ensuring one of the operands is u64 which will promote the other to u64 as
well ensuring no overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: tcp - fix packet extraction from stream
When processing TCP stream data in ovpn_tcp_recv, we receive large
cloned skbs from __strp_rcv that may contain multiple coalesced packets.
The current implementation has two bugs:
1. Header offset overflow: Using pskb_pull with large offsets on
coalesced skbs causes skb->data - skb->head to exceed the u16 storage
of skb->network_header. This causes skb_reset_network_header to fail
on the inner decapsulated packet, resulting in packet drops.
2. Unaligned protocol headers: Extracting packets from arbitrary
positions within the coalesced TCP stream provides no alignment
guarantees for the packet data causing performance penalties on
architectures without efficient unaligned access. Additionally,
openvpn's 2-byte length prefix on TCP packets causes the subsequent
4-byte opcode and packet ID fields to be inherently misaligned.
Fix both issues by allocating a new skb for each openvpn packet and
using skb_copy_bits to extract only the packet content into the new
buffer, skipping the 2-byte length prefix. Also, check the length before
invoking the function that performs the allocation to avoid creating an
invalid skb.
If the packet has to be forwarded to userspace the 2-byte prefix can be
pushed to the head safely, without misalignment.
As a side effect, this approach also avoids the expensive linearization
that pskb_pull triggers on cloned skbs with page fragments. In testing,
this resulted in TCP throughput improvements of up to 74%. |
| Grid is a data structure grid for rust. From version 0.17.0 to before version 1.0.1, an integer overflow in Grid::expand_rows() can corrupt the relationship between the grid’s logical dimensions and its backing storage. After the internal invariant is broken, the safe API get() may invoke get_unchecked() with an invalid index, resulting in Undefined Behavior. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1. |
| An integer overflow in network packet parsing code in PgBouncer before 1.25.2 bypasses a boundary check and can lead to a crash. An unauthenticated remote attacker can crash PgBouncer with a malformed SCRAM authentication packet. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
that can be triggered by a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY. In
ceph_handle_auth_reply(), the value of the payload_len field of such a
message is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than
INT_MAX leads to an integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative
value. This leads to decrementing the pointer address by this value and
subsequently accessing it because ceph_decode_need() only checks that
the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation.
This patch fixes the issue by changing the data type of payload_len to
u32. Additionally, the data type of result_msg_len is changed to u32,
as it is also a variable holding a non-negative length.
Also, an additional layer of sanity checks is introduced, ensuring that
directly after reading it from the message, payload_len and
result_msg_len are not greater than the overall segment length.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811404df14 by task kworker/20:1/262
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 262 Comm: kworker/20:1 Not tainted 6.19.2 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0
print_report+0xd1/0x620
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x210
kasan_report+0xe7/0x130
? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
__asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20
ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
mon_dispatch+0x973/0x23d0 [libceph]
? apparmor_socket_recvmsg+0x6b/0xa0
? __pfx_mon_dispatch+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30i
? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0
? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_do_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
ceph_con_process_message+0x1f1/0x650 [libceph]
process_message+0x1e/0x450 [libceph]
ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x2e48/0x6c80 [libceph]
? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0xb0/0x230
? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x17/0xa0
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x13b/0x760
? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
ceph_con_workfn+0x248/0x10c0 [libceph]
process_one_work+0x629/0xf80
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10
? kasan_print_address_stack_frame+0x1f7/0x280
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x396/0x830
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
? recalc_sigpending+0x180/0x210
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x3f7/0x610
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
[ idryomov: replace if statements with ceph_decode_need() for
payload_len and result_msg_len ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Fix potential overflow of shmem scatterlist length
When a scatterlists table of a GEM shmem object of size 4 GB or more is
populated with pages allocated from a folio, unsigned int .length
attribute of a scatterlist may get overflowed if total byte length of
pages allocated to that single scatterlist happens to reach or cross the
4GB limit. As a consequence, users of the object may suffer from hitting
unexpected, premature end of the object's backing pages.
[278.780187] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[278.780377] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2326 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_mm.c:55 remap_sg+0x199/0x1d0 [i915]
...
[278.780654] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2326 Comm: gem_mmap_offset Tainted: G S U 6.17.0-rc1-CI_DRM_16981-ged823aaa0607+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[278.780656] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER
[278.780658] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Meteor Lake Client Platform/MTL-P LP5x T3 RVP, BIOS MTLPFWI1.R00.3471.D91.2401310918 01/31/2024
[278.780659] RIP: 0010:remap_sg+0x199/0x1d0 [i915]
...
[278.780786] Call Trace:
[278.780787] <TASK>
[278.780788] ? __apply_to_page_range+0x3e6/0x910
[278.780795] ? __pfx_remap_sg+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[278.780906] apply_to_page_range+0x14/0x30
[278.780908] remap_io_sg+0x14d/0x260 [i915]
[278.781013] vm_fault_cpu+0xd2/0x330 [i915]
[278.781137] __do_fault+0x3a/0x1b0
[278.781140] do_fault+0x322/0x640
[278.781143] __handle_mm_fault+0x938/0xfd0
[278.781150] handle_mm_fault+0x12c/0x300
[278.781152] ? lock_mm_and_find_vma+0x4b/0x760
[278.781155] do_user_addr_fault+0x2d6/0x8e0
[278.781160] exc_page_fault+0x96/0x2c0
[278.781165] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
...
That issue was apprehended by the author of a change that introduced it,
and potential risk even annotated with a comment, but then never addressed.
When adding folio pages to a scatterlist table, take care of byte length
of any single scatterlist not exceeding max_segment.
(cherry picked from commit 06249b4e691a75694c014a61708c007fb5755f60) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/ipv6: ioam6: prevent schema length wraparound in trace fill
ioam6_fill_trace_data() stores the schema contribution to the trace
length in a u8. With bit 22 enabled and the largest schema payload,
sclen becomes 1 + 1020 / 4, wraps from 256 to 0, and bypasses the
remaining-space check. __ioam6_fill_trace_data() then positions the
write cursor without reserving the schema area but still copies the
4-byte schema header and the full schema payload, overrunning the trace
buffer.
Keep sclen in an unsigned int so the remaining-space check and the write
cursor calculation both see the full schema length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: solo6x10: Check for out of bounds chip_id
Clang with CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT=y noticed a condition where a signed type
(literal "1" is an "int") could end up being shifted beyond 32 bits,
so instrumentation was added (and due to the double is_tw286x() call
seen via inlining), Clang decides the second one must now be undefined
behavior and elides the rest of the function[1]. This is a known problem
with Clang (that is still being worked on), but we can avoid the entire
problem by actually checking the existing max chip ID, and now there is
no runtime instrumentation added at all since everything is known to be
within bounds.
Additionally use an unsigned value for the shift to remove the
instrumentation even without the explicit bounds checking.
[hverkuil: fix checkpatch warning for is_tw286x] |
| OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From versions 3.0.0 to before 3.2.9, 3.3.0 to before 3.3.11, and 3.4.0 to before 3.4.11, readVariableLengthInteger() decodes a variable-length integer from untrusted EXR input without bounding the shift count. After enough continuation bytes, the code executes a left shift by 70 on a 64-bit value, which is undefined behavior. This issue has been patched in versions 3.2.9, 3.3.11, and 3.4.11. |
| OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From versions 3.0.0 to before 3.2.9, 3.3.0 to before 3.3.11, and 3.4.0 to before 3.4.11, there is an integer overflow in ImageChannel::resize that leads to heap OOB write via OpenEXRUtil public API. This issue has been patched in versions 3.2.9, 3.3.11, and 3.4.11. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: handle wraparound when searching for blocks for indirect mapped blocks
Commit 4865c768b563 ("ext4: always allocate blocks only from groups
inode can use") restricts what blocks will be allocated for indirect
block based files to block numbers that fit within 32-bit block
numbers.
However, when using a review bot running on the latest Gemini LLM to
check this commit when backporting into an LTS based kernel, it raised
this concern:
If ac->ac_g_ex.fe_group is >= ngroups (for instance, if the goal
group was populated via stream allocation from s_mb_last_groups),
then start will be >= ngroups.
Does this allow allocating blocks beyond the 32-bit limit for
indirect block mapped files? The commit message mentions that
ext4_mb_scan_groups_linear() takes care to not select unsupported
groups. However, its loop uses group = *start, and the very first
iteration will call ext4_mb_scan_group() with this unsupported
group because next_linear_group() is only called at the end of the
iteration.
After reviewing the code paths involved and considering the LLM
review, I determined that this can happen when there is a file system
where some files/directories are extent-mapped and others are
indirect-block mapped. To address this, add a safety clamp in
ext4_mb_scan_groups(). |
