| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in the KCAPI ECC code path of wc_ecc_import_x963_ex() in wolfSSL wolfcrypt allows a remote attacker to write attacker-controlled data past the bounds of the pubkey_raw buffer via a crafted oversized EC public key point. The WOLFSSL_KCAPI_ECC code path copies the input to key->pubkey_raw (132 bytes) using XMEMCPY without a bounds check, unlike the ATECC code path which includes a length validation. This can be triggered during TLS key exchange when a malicious peer sends a crafted ECPoint in ServerKeyExchange. |
| Missing required cryptographic step in the TLS 1.3 client HelloRetryRequest handshake logic in wolfSSL could lead to a compromise in the confidentiality of TLS-protected communications via a crafted HelloRetryRequest followed by a ServerHello message that omits the required key_share extension, resulting in derivation of predictable traffic secrets from (EC)DHE shared secret. This issue does not affect the client's authentication of the server during TLS handshakes. |
| An integer overflow vulnerability existed in the static function wolfssl_add_to_chain, that caused heap corruption when certificate data was written out of bounds of an insufficiently sized certificate buffer. wolfssl_add_to_chain is called by these API: wolfSSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert, wolfSSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert, wolfSSL_add0_chain_cert. These API are enabled for 3rd party compatibility features: enable-opensslall, enable-opensslextra, enable-lighty, enable-stunnel, enable-nginx, enable-haproxy. This issue is not remotely exploitable, and would require that the application context loading certificates is compromised. |
| Heap Overflow in TLS 1.3 ECH parsing. An integer underflow existed in ECH extension parsing logic when calculating a buffer length, which resulted in writing beyond the bounds of an allocated buffer. Note that in wolfSSL, ECH is off by default, and the ECH standard is still evolving. |
| wolfSSL 5.8.4 on RISC-V RV32I architectures lacks a constant-time software implementation for 64-bit multiplication. The compiler-inserted __muldi3 subroutine executes in variable time based on operand values. This affects multiple SP math functions (sp_256_mul_9, sp_256_sqr_9, etc.), leading to a timing side-channel that may expose sensitive cryptographic data. |
| In wolfSSL 5.8.4, constant-time masking logic in sp_256_get_entry_256_9 is optimized into conditional branches (bnez) by GCC when targeting RISC-V RV32I with -O3. This transformation breaks the side-channel resistance of ECC scalar multiplication, potentially allowing a local attacker to recover secret keys via timing analysis. |
| Fault Injection vulnerability in RsaPrivateDecryption function in wolfssl/wolfcrypt/src/rsa.c in WolfSSL wolfssl5.6.6 on Linux/Windows allows remote attacker co-resides in the same system with a victim process to disclose information and escalate privileges via Rowhammer fault injection to the RsaKey structure. |
| Generating the ECDSA nonce k samples a random number r and then
truncates this randomness with a modular reduction mod n where n is the
order of the elliptic curve. Meaning k = r mod n. The division used
during the reduction estimates a factor q_e by dividing the upper two
digits (a digit having e.g. a size of 8 byte) of r by the upper digit of
n and then decrements q_e in a loop until it has the correct size.
Observing the number of times q_e is decremented through a control-flow
revealing side-channel reveals a bias in the most significant bits of
k. Depending on the curve this is either a negligible bias or a
significant bias large enough to reconstruct k with lattice reduction
methods. For SECP160R1, e.g., we find a bias of 15 bits. |
| Remotely executed SEGV and out of bounds read allows malicious packet sender to crash or cause an out of bounds read via sending a malformed packet with the correct length.
|
| Vulnerability in X25519 constant-time cryptographic implementations due to timing side channels introduced by compiler optimizations and CPU architecture limitations, specifically with the Xtensa-based ESP32 chips. If targeting Xtensa it is recommended to use the low memory implementations of X25519, which is now turned on as the default for Xtensa. |
| Improper input validation in the TLS 1.3 KeyShareEntry parsing in wolfSSL v5.8.2 on multiple platforms allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial-of-service by sending a crafted ClientHello message containing duplicate KeyShareEntry values for the same supported group, leading to excessive CPU and memory consumption during ClientHello processing. |
| With TLS 1.3 pre-shared key (PSK) a malicious or faulty server could ignore the request for PFS (perfect forward secrecy) and the client would continue on with the connection using PSK without PFS. This happened when a server responded to a ClientHello containing psk_dhe_ke without a key_share extension. The re-use of an authenticated PSK connection that on the clients side unexpectedly did not have PFS, reduces the security of the connection. |
| Improper input validation in the TLS 1.3 CertificateVerify signature algorithm negotiation in wolfSSL 5.8.2 and earlier on multiple platforms allows for downgrading the signature algorithm used. For example when a client sends ECDSA P521 as the supported signature algorithm the server previously could respond as ECDSA P256 being the accepted signature algorithm and the connection would continue with using ECDSA P256, if the client supports ECDSA P256. |
| Improper Input Validation in the TLS 1.3 CKS extension parsing in wolfSSL 5.8.2 and earlier on multiple platforms allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to potentially cause a denial-of-service via a crafted ClientHello message with duplicate CKS extensions. |
| With TLS 1.2 connections a client can use any digest, specifically a weaker digest that is supported, rather than those in the CertificateRequest. |
| The server previously verified the TLS 1.3 PSK binder using a non-constant time method which could potentially leak information about the PSK binder |
| Integer Underflow Leads to Out-of-Bounds Access in XChaCha20-Poly1305 Decrypt. This issue is hit specifically with a call to the function wc_XChaCha20Poly1305_Decrypt() which is not used with TLS connections, only from direct calls from an application. |
| A malicious TLS1.2 server can force a TLS1.3 client with downgrade capability to use a ciphersuite that it did not agree to and achieve a successful connection. This is because, aside from the extensions, the client was skipping fully parsing the server hello. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2024.i1.457-500 |
| In wolfSSL release 5.8.2 blinding support is turned on by default for Curve25519 in applicable builds. The blinding configure option is only for the base C implementation of Curve25519. It is not needed, or available with; ARM assembly builds, Intel assembly builds, and the small Curve25519 feature. While the side-channel attack on extracting a private key would be very difficult to execute in practice, enabling blinding provides an additional layer of protection for devices that may be more susceptible to physical access or side-channel observation. |
| In the OpenSSL compatibility layer implementation, the function RAND_poll() was not behaving as expected and leading to the potential for predictable values returned from RAND_bytes() after fork() is called. This can lead to weak or predictable random numbers generated in applications that are both using RAND_bytes() and doing fork() operations. This only affects applications explicitly calling RAND_bytes() after fork() and does not affect any internal TLS operations. Although RAND_bytes() documentation in OpenSSL calls out not being safe for use with fork() without first calling RAND_poll(), an additional code change was also made in wolfSSL to make RAND_bytes() behave similar to OpenSSL after a fork() call without calling RAND_poll(). Now the Hash-DRBG used gets reseeded after detecting running in a new process. If making use of RAND_bytes() and calling fork() we recommend updating to the latest version of wolfSSL. Thanks to Per Allansson from Appgate for the report. |
