| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| TimescaleDB through 2.29.1, fixed in commit 517c13e, contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to cause query-result integrity failures or backend crashes by supplying a crafted Simple8b selector-11 value, which is stored in the signed int16 Arrow dictionary-index type and bypasses index validation checks in bulk text dictionary decompression. Attackers with direct DML access to a non-frozen physical compressed hypertable relation can trigger an out-of-bounds read before the base of the live offsets array through the VectorAgg single-text hashing strategy, resulting in incorrect aggregation output, backend SIGSEGV, or PostgreSQL crash recovery depending on build configuration. |
| Contiki-NG's LwM2M TLV parser lwm2m_tlv_read() in os/services/lwm2m/lwm2m-tlv.c ignores its caller-supplied buffer length argument and reads up to six bytes from the input buffer with no bounds check. The caller in lwm2m-engine.c iterates while there is at least one byte remaining, so a crafted CoAP WRITE to any LwM2M endpoint whose final TLV supplies exactly one byte triggers up to five out-of-bounds reads of heap memory adjacent to the CoAP input buffer, disclosing memory contents (including key material and peer addresses) through the parsed tlv->id, tlv->length, and tlv->value fields. Corrupted tlv_len derived from the out-of-bounds memory further corrupts the caller's parse offset. In LwM2M NoSec mode, the default for constrained devices, no authentication is required. |
| Contiki-NG's DNS/mDNS resolver skip_name() in os/services/resolv/resolv.c walks DNS wire-format name labels with no packet-boundary check, and the caller in newdata() invokes it in a loop iterating nquestions times from the attacker-controlled DNS header before validating the transaction ID. An attacker who sets nquestions higher than the number of complete questions present causes skip_name() to walk past the UDP packet buffer, and the returned pointer is cast to struct dns_answer * for further memory reads. On builds with RESOLV_CONF_SUPPORTS_MDNS enabled, any peer on the local segment can trigger the read unauthenticated via a multicast UDP 5353 packet with no outstanding query required; on standard DNS builds an attacker who can inject a UDP response from port 53 during an outstanding query can trigger the same read. Impact is out-of-bounds read of uip_buf and adjacent memory, disclosing memory contents or crashing the resolver. |
| node-re2 provides RE2 regular expression bindings for Node.js. Prior to version 1.26.1, passing a Buffer whose final bytes form a truncated (incomplete) multi-byte UTF-8 sequence could cause the native binding to read past the end of the allocated buffer while attempting to decode the final, incomplete code point. This could result in an out-of-bounds read and potential disclosure of adjacent memory contents. This issue is fixed in version 1.26.1. |
| A heap-buffer-overflow read vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. A missing bounds check in the SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control function allows setting a spatial_layer_id exceeding the configured number of layers. This causes an out-of-bounds heap read of approximately 40,728 bytes when computing a layer context array index. An attacker who can influence SVC encoder parameters in a network-facing service could exploit this for information disclosure (heap content leak) or denial of service (segmentation fault from hitting unmapped memory). |
| A maliciously crafted TIF file, when parsed through certain Autodesk products during image import, can cause an Out-of-Bounds Read in the image handling library. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service |
| A maliciously crafted PDF file, when parsed through Autodesk Revit, can force an Out-of-Bounds Read vulnerability. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to cause a crash, read sensitive data, or execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process. |
| S2OPC 1.7.3 contains an out-of-bounds read in RepublishResponse handling. This allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service |
| Buffer Overflow vulnerability in open62541 v1.5.5 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the Service_Call validates input arguments against runtime-resolved InputArguments metadata |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.10, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, offscreen rendering frame data received from the GPU process was not fully validated by the main process. A compromised GPU process could cause the main process to read out-of-bounds memory while producing paint event images, disclosing memory or crashing the app. This issue is fixed in 39.8.10, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3. |
| A flaw was found in the file-icns plugin in GIMP. When applying a decompressed mask during ICNS image processing, the plugin reads from the mask data buffer without verifying if the cursor exceeds the allocated resource size. If a crafted file contains a truncated mask resource, the icns_decompress function continues reading past the bounds of the buffer. This out-of-bounds read vulnerability results in information disclosure of heap contents, where memory contents are leaked as alpha channel pixel values, or a crash leading to a denial of service if unmapped memory is accessed. |
| open62541 1.5.5 contains an out-of-bounds read in the client-side function responseReadNamespacesArray() in src/client/ua_client_connect.c. |
| nanoMODBUS through v1.23.0 contains an out-of-bounds stack read leading to a wild-pointer write in nmbs_read_device_identification_basic() / recv_read_device_identification_res() in nanomodbus.c. A fixed 3-element stack array order[3] = {0,1,2} maps object IDs to buffer indices. The server-supplied object_id field (0-255, read directly from the wire) is used without any bounds check as buf_index = order[object_id]. When a malicious Modbus server sends a Read Device Identification response with object_id >= 3, this reads an out-of-bounds/garbage byte from the stack adjacent to order[], which is then used as an index into a 3-element buffers[] array of char* pointers. The resulting wild pointer is passed to strncpy() as the destination, causing an arbitrary-address write with server-controlled data. |
| OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the find_line_delimiter() function in the multipart body parser performs an out-of-bounds read via strncmp() when searching for MIME boundary delimiters. After finding a -- pattern near the end of the body, the function compares delimiter.len bytes (typically 20-70) starting from a position at or past the logical end of the body buffer, reading past the body boundary. The bug triggers when a SIP message has Content-Type: multipart/mixed with a boundary parameter and its body contains -- within two to three bytes of the body's end without being followed by the actual boundary delimiter. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1. |
| driftregion iso14229 through 0.9.0 contains an integer underflow and downstream out-of-bounds read in the Handle_0x27_SecurityAccess() function in iso14229.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to crash a UDS server and potentially read memory past the receive buffer by sending a single-byte 0x27 SecurityAccess request that follows any earlier well-formed 0x27 message. The handler reads the SecurityAccess subFunction from recv_buf[1] without first checking that recv_len is at least 2, then computes the key-data length as the unsigned subtraction (uint16_t)(recv_len - UDS_0X27_REQ_BASE_LEN); when recv_len equals 1 the result underflows to 65535 and is passed as args.len to the application's SecAccessValidateKey or SecAccessRequestSeed callback, which typically iterates or copies that many bytes from the 4-KB receive buffer. Every other UDS sub-function handler in the library (0x10, 0x11, 0x14, 0x19, 0x22, 0x23, 0x28, and others) performs an explicit recv_len lower-bound check before indexing; Handle_0x27_SecurityAccess is the sole outlier. The vulnerable handler reaches over CAN bus, OBD-II, ISO-TP, and DoIP transports and is exposed in the default diagnostic session without prior authentication; deployments on automotive ECUs, industrial controllers, and IoT devices that ship iso14229 as their UDS server are affected. |
| LiamBindle MQTT-C through version 1.1.6 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read and integer underflow in the mqtt_unpack_publish_response() function in src/mqtt.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker controlling an MQTT broker - or able to inject MQTT traffic into an unencrypted session - to crash a subscribed MQTT-C client and potentially disclose adjacent heap memory by sending a single crafted PUBLISH packet. The function validates only that the fixed-header remaining_length is at least 4, then reads the 16-bit topic_name_size field from the broker-controlled packet and advances the parse pointer by that value without verifying that topic_name_size plus the surrounding overhead fits within remaining_length; it subsequently computes application_message_size as remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) or - 4 (QoS greater than 0) in unsigned arithmetic, producing an integer underflow that is then passed to memmove(). A PUBLISH packet with topic_name_size = 0xFFFF and remaining_length = 7 advances the parse pointer 65535 bytes past the receive buffer (out-of-bounds read) and causes an application_message_size near 2^32, crashing the process when the resulting memmove() is executed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate compound request size before reading StructureSize2
When ksmbd validates a compound (chained) SMB2 request,
ksmbd_smb2_check_message() reads pdu->StructureSize2 without first
checking that the compound element is large enough to contain it.
StructureSize2 is a 2-byte field at offset 64
(__SMB2_HEADER_STRUCTURE_SIZE) from the start of each element.
The compound-walking logic only guarantees that a full 64-byte SMB2
header is present for the trailing element: when NextCommand is 0, len is
reduced to the number of bytes remaining after next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off. A
remote client can craft a compound request whose last element has exactly
64 bytes, so the 2-byte StructureSize2 read at offset 64 extends one byte
past the receive buffer, producing a slab-out-of-bounds read.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_smb2_check_message (fs/smb/server/smb2misc.c:402)
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888012ae31ac by task kworker/0:1/14
The buggy address is located 172 bytes inside of allocated 173-byte region
Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
Call Trace:
...
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
ksmbd_smb2_check_message (fs/smb/server/smb2misc.c:402)
handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:119)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Reject any compound element that is too small to hold StructureSize2
before dereferencing it. |
| An out-of-bounds read vulnerability was found in libsoup's multipart processing subsystem. The flaw exists in the soup_multipart_input_stream_read_headers() function inside soup-multipart-input-stream.c, which does not adequately restrict or validate the size of incoming multipart boundary strings. When processing a crafted HTTP response containing a malformed or oversized boundary parameter, the internal stream reader reads past the allocated buffer bounds. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this behavior to cause a service denial (DoS) through application failure or potentially read fragments of unauthorized memory metadata. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages
When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes
num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk
btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key
with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is
validated before the load trusts it.
The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current
one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -> io_ctl_map_page(), which
does io_ctl->pages[io_ctl->index++]. But pages[] is allocated in
io_ctl_init() from the cache inode's i_size, not from num_entries:
num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE);
io_ctl->pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS);
So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl->index
runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because
io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once
io_ctl->index >= io_ctl->num_pages; the read side just never had the same
check.
To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = <N> here), set num_entries
in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes
the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and
pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read
65536 entries, io_ctl->index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is read past the
array:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800c833a80 by task kworker/u8:3/58
io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565)
__load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:655 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:820)
load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:1017)
caching_thread (fs/btrfs/block-group.c:880)
btrfs_work_helper (fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:312)
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
free-space-cache.c:420 is io_ctl_map_page(), inlined into io_ctl_check_crc()
at line 565, which is why that is the frame KASAN names. The out-of-bounds
slot is then treated as a struct page and handed to crc32c(), so the bad
read turns into a GP fault.
Add the missing check to io_ctl_check_crc(), which is where both the entry
loop and the bitmap loop end up. When num_entries is too large the load now
fails like any corrupt cache: __load_free_space_cache() drops it and rebuilds
the free space from the extent tree, so a valid cache is never rejected. |
