| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles. |
| AES-GCM encryption/decryption with extremely large cumulative single message sizes (>64 GiB) were not properly rejected by the streaming APIs, allowing counter wrap, keystream reuse, and consequent plaintext recovery. |
| X.509 trust-chain bypass (path-depth exhaustion) in the OpenSSL compatibility certificate verifier (wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert()). This affects only builds with --enable-opensslextra whose application calls X509_verify_cert() with caller-supplied untrusted intermediates; for those users it is critical, otherwise the library is unaffected. Native wolfSSL TLS/DTLS usage is not impacted. X509_verify_cert() returned success based only on the last verified link rather than on reaching a trust anchor: when the supplied chain is deeper than the verifier's maximum path depth (default 100), path building runs out of depth while still walking untrusted intermediates and the chain is accepted even though it never reaches a configured trust anchor, allowing acceptance of an attacker-controlled certificate. The default TLS handshake (WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER) is not affected; only applications doing manual or deferred verification through this API are. |
| Missing hash/digest size and OID checks allow digests smaller than allowed when verifying ECDSA certificates, or smaller than is appropriate for the relevant key type, to be accepted by signature verification functions. This could lead to reduced security of ECDSA certificate-based authentication if the public CA key used is also known. This affects ECDSA/ECC verification when EdDSA or ML-DSA is also enabled. |
| A stack buffer overflow vulnerability exists in wolfSSL's PKCS7 SignedData encoding functionality. In wc_PKCS7_BuildSignedAttributes(), when adding custom signed attributes, the code passes an incorrect capacity value (esd->signedAttribsCount) to EncodeAttributes() instead of the remaining available space in the fixed-size signedAttribs[7] array. When an application sets pkcs7->signedAttribsSz to a value greater than MAX_SIGNED_ATTRIBS_SZ (default 7) minus the number of default attributes already added, EncodeAttributes() writes beyond the array bounds, causing stack memory corruption. In WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK builds, this becomes heap corruption. Exploitation requires an application that allows untrusted input to control the signedAttribs array size when calling wc_PKCS7_EncodeSignedData() or related signing functions. |
| Integer underflow in wolfSSL packet sniffer <= 5.8.4 allows an attacker to cause a buffer overflow in the AEAD decryption path by injecting a TLS record shorter than the explicit IV plus authentication tag into traffic inspected by ssl_DecodePacket. The underflow wraps a 16-bit length to a large value that is passed to AEAD decryption routines, causing heap buffer overflow and a crash. An unauthenticated attacker can trigger this remotely via malformed TLS Application Data records. |
| In wolfSSL 5.8.2 and earlier, a logic flaw existed in the TLS 1.2 server state machine implementation. The server could incorrectly accept the CertificateVerify message before the ClientKeyExchange message had been received. This issue affects wolfSSL before 5.8.4 (wolfSSL 5.8.2 and earlier is vulnerable, 5.8.4 is not vulnerable). In 5.8.4 wolfSSL would detect the issue later in the handshake. 5.9.0 was further hardened to catch the issue earlier in the handshake. |
| A heap-buffer-overflow vulnerability exists in wolfSSL's wolfSSL_d2i_SSL_SESSION() function. When deserializing session data with SESSION_CERTS enabled, certificate and session id lengths are read from an untrusted input without bounds validation, allowing an attacker to overflow fixed-size buffers and corrupt heap memory. A maliciously crafted session would need to be loaded from an external source to trigger this vulnerability. Internal sessions were not vulnerable. |
| Two buffer overflow vulnerabilities existed in the wolfSSL CRL parser when parsing CRL numbers: a heap-based buffer overflow could occur when improperly storing the CRL number as a hexadecimal string, and a stack-based overflow for sufficiently sized CRL numbers. With appropriately crafted CRLs, either of these out of bound writes could be triggered. Note this only affects builds that specifically enable CRL support, and the user would need to load a CRL from an untrusted source. |
| Protection mechanism failure in wolfCrypt post-quantum implementations (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) in wolfSSL on ARM Cortex-M microcontrollers allows a physical attacker to compromise key material and/or cryptographic outcomes via induced transient faults that corrupt or redirect seed/pointer values during Keccak-based expansion.
This issue affects wolfSSL (wolfCrypt): commit hash d86575c766e6e67ef93545fa69c04d6eb49400c6. |
| 1-byte OOB heap read in wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData via zero-length encrypted content. A vulnerability existed in wolfSSL 5.8.4 and earlier, where a 1-byte out-of-bounds heap read in wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData could be triggered by a crafted CMS EnvelopedData message with zero-length encrypted content. Note that PKCS7 support is disabled by default. |
| In wolfSSL, ARIA-GCM cipher suites used in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 reuse an identical 12-byte GCM nonce for every application-data record. Because wc_AriaEncrypt is stateless and passes the caller-supplied IV verbatim to the MagicCrypto SDK with no internal counter, and because the explicit IV is zero-initialized at session setup and never incremented in non-FIPS builds. This vulnerability affects wolfSSL builds configured with --enable-aria and the proprietary MagicCrypto SDK (a non-default, opt-in configuration required for Korean regulatory deployments). AES-GCM is not affected because wc_AesGcmEncrypt_ex maintains an internal invocation counter independently of the call-site guard. |
| Heap buffer overflow in CertFromX509 via AuthorityKeyIdentifier size confusion. A heap buffer overflow occurs when converting an X.509 certificate internally due to incorrect size handling of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier extension. |
| URI nameConstraints from constrained intermediate CAs are parsed but not enforced during certificate chain verification in wolfcrypt/src/asn.c. A compromised or malicious sub-CA could issue leaf certificates with URI SAN entries that violate the nameConstraints of the issuing CA, and wolfSSL would accept them as valid. |
| Heap buffer overflow in DTLS 1.3 ACK message processing. A remote attacker can send a crafted DTLS 1.3 ACK message that triggers a heap buffer overflow. |
| A 1-byte stack buffer over-read was identified in the MatchDomainName function (src/internal.c) during wildcard hostname validation when the LEFT_MOST_WILDCARD_ONLY flag is active. If a wildcard * exhausts the entire hostname string, the function reads one byte past the buffer without a bounds check, which could cause a crash. |
| Integer underflow in wolfSSL packet sniffer <= 5.9.0 allows an attacker to cause a program crash in the AEAD decryption path by injecting a TLS record shorter than the explicit IV plus authentication tag into traffic inspected by ssl_DecodePacket. The underflow wraps a 16-bit length to a large value that is passed to AEAD decryption routines, causing a large out-of-bounds read and crash. An unauthenticated attacker can trigger this remotely via malformed TLS Application Data records. |
| A stack buffer overflow exists in wolfSSL's PKCS7 implementation in the wc_PKCS7_DecryptOri() function in wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c. When processing a CMS EnvelopedData message containing an OtherRecipientInfo (ORI) recipient, the function copies an ASN.1-parsed OID into a fixed 32-byte stack buffer (oriOID[MAX_OID_SZ]) via XMEMCPY without first validating that the parsed OID length does not exceed MAX_OID_SZ. A crafted CMS EnvelopedData message with an ORI recipient containing an OID longer than 32 bytes triggers a stack buffer overflow. Exploitation requires the library to be built with --enable-pkcs7 (disabled by default) and the application to have registered an ORI decrypt callback via wc_PKCS7_SetOriDecryptCb(). |
| A padding oracle exists in wolfSSL's PKCS7 CBC decryption that could allow an attacker to recover plaintext through repeated decryption queries with modified ciphertext. In previous versions of wolfSSL the interior padding bytes are not validated. |
| When restoring a session from cache, a pointer from the serialized session data is used in a free operation without validation. An attacker who can poison the session cache could trigger an arbitrary free. Exploitation requires the ability to inject a crafted session into the cache and for the application to call specific session restore APIs. |
