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Search Results (55 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-71458 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 5 Medium |
| URLModificationMiddleware resolves named-URL lookups against unfiltered Model.objects before RBAC. The 403→404 shim only rewrites 403 responses, leaving the pk=0 miss path with a different 404 detail string. Differential "Not found." vs "No <Model> matches..." reveals whether a named resource (org, credential, inventory, host) exists anywhere on the platform. Enables cross-tenant internal hostname enumeration. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71465 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 3.1 Low |
| RunAdHocCommand.build_args() appends limit as bare positional (args.append(limit)) instead of using args.extend(['-l', limit]) like RunJob. A limit beginning with - is parsed as an ansible CLI option. Currently limited to short-circuit flags (--version, --help) since injected element displaces required pattern positional. Would escalate if ansible-core ever defaults pattern. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71464 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 3.1 Low |
| LaunchConfigurationBaseSerializer.scm_branch has no validate_scm_branch() leading-dash check, unlike Project/JobTemplate/JobLaunch serializers. Schedule and WFJT Node accept --upload-pack=/bin/id as scm_branch. Currently blocked at runtime by jobs.py:1502 ValueError check (defense-in-depth), but the API validation gap means sole reliance on a task-layer guard. Refactoring that guard away would promote this to RCE. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71463 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 2.7 Low |
| Notification template Jinja AST whitelist only inspects static Getattr nodes. Dynamic subscripts (job['job'+'_env']) and {% if job.id > 100 %} conditional gating bypass both the AST check and the test-render (stub has small job.id). At runtime, the gated branch executes and exceptions write full tracebacks into notification body, which is POSTed to attacker-controlled webhook URL. Leaks install paths, Python version, source line numbers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84724 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 6.6 Medium |
| An argument-injection flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller system-job subsystem. The system-job template launch endpoint stores a user-supplied "days" variable without running the integer validation defined elsewhere for that field, and the dispatcher flattens the management-command argument list into a single string with spaces before the job runner re-splits it, so spaces in the value become additional command-line arguments. Because system jobs are executed in-process on the control node without the container isolation applied to all other job types, an authenticated user with superuser privileges can inject arbitrary arguments — including Python's path option — into the control-plane awx-manage process, controlling its argument vector and the first entry of its module search path. Full remote code execution requires an additional import gadget that is not present in the current management commands, so the demonstrated impact is argument injection with control of the process search path rather than confirmed code execution. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84720 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 6.5 Medium |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. The WorkflowJobNode.ancestor_artifacts database column, which stores the raw merged set_stats artifacts propagated between workflow nodes, is not wrapped in prevent_search() and is therefore accepted for arbitrary field lookups by the REST filter backend, even though it is omitted from the API serializer. Because the column is persisted before Ansible's no_log masking is applied, a user with only read access to a workflow — or, via a regular-expression lookup that bypasses the JSON cross-relation filter guard through the world-readable credential-types endpoint, any authenticated user with no roles — can use the result count as a boolean/count oracle to recover, character by character, secret values that a playbook author explicitly marked no_log, including across organizations. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84718 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 4.3 Medium |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. In the shipped production configuration, the Controller trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For header as the request's client IP without verifying that it originated from a trusted proxy, and selects the leftmost (attacker-controlled) header value. As a result, an attacker can forge the source IP address recorded for their requests in the Controller's audit and access logs, degrading the integrity of forensic and SIEM attribution. The flaw does not grant additional access. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84717 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 5.3 Medium |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. The unauthenticated Bitbucket Data Center webhook receiver skips HMAC signature verification for diagnostics:ping events after it has already looked up the target template, causing the endpoint to return HTTP 200 for a template that has a Bitbucket DC webhook configured and HTTP 403 otherwise. An unauthenticated remote attacker can use this response discrepancy as an oracle to enumerate which Job Template and Workflow Job Template IDs have Bitbucket DC webhooks configured, without knowing the secret webhook_key. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84716 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 6.6 Medium |
| A flaw was found in the automation-controller instance install-bundle endpoint. When a System Administrator downloads an execution/hop node's install bundle, the controller signs an X.509 certificate with the receptor mesh certificate authority in which the Common Name, DNS subject-alternative-name, and receptor node-id are taken verbatim from the caller-chosen instance hostname, with a hard-coded ten-year validity, a random serial, and no issuance log or revocation list. Because the hostname charset validator is case-insensitive while the uniqueness validator is case-sensitive, an administrator can register a case variant of an existing control node's hostname and obtain a mesh-CA-signed certificate that TLS peers, which match hostnames case-insensitively, accept as that control node. In managed/hosted deployments — where the customer holds controller superuser but the platform operator runs the mesh — this yields a long-lived, non-revocable mesh peer credential and, with an on-path position, TLS impersonation or interception of control/hybrid mesh nodes. It does not grant direct remote code execution, because receptor work submission is gated by a separate signing key not included in the bundle. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84712 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 5.3 Medium |
| A flaw was found in the automation-controller API. The unauthenticated health-check endpoint /api/v2/ping/ (ApiV2PingView, AllowAny) over-serializes RBAC-gated automation-mesh data into its anonymous response, exposing the full instance inventory (node hostnames, node types, UUIDs, heartbeats, capacities, and exact versions), all instance-group names and membership, the deployment install UUID, and the active control node. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can use this to map the control plane and fingerprint software versions for targeted attacks. This flaw affects confidentiality only; it does not expose secrets, credentials, or tenant data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84499 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 7.7 High |
| A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation- controller. Survey questions of type password are write-only and stored encrypted, displayed only as a placeholder on read. When a schedule or workflow job template node is revalidated against a tightened survey specification, the controller decrypts the stored password and includes its plaintext value in the minimum/maximum length validation error message returned in the HTTP response. A user with the delegated JobTemplate Admin role can tighten the survey length constraint and trigger revalidation of a schedule or node created by another, higher-privileged user, thereby recovering that user's stored password in plaintext. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84470 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 6.4 Medium |
| A flaw was found in Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller (AWX). The Bulk Job Launch API (POST /api/v2/bulk/job_launch/) authorizes the requested instance_groups with only a read-level permission check, whereas the standard single-job launch path requires use-level permission on the same field. A principal that holds read (but not use) permission on an instance group -- for example the built-in read-only System Auditor role -- together with execute permission on a job template can launch bulk jobs onto instance groups they are not authorized to use, bypassing execution-placement isolation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71462 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 4.1 Medium |
| StringListPathField.to_internal_value() calls os.path.exists() on unbounded user-supplied paths. 200 vs 400 response reveals existence of arbitrary absolute paths on the controller-web pod. Tenant superuser can confirm /etc/tower/SECRET_KEY, k8s service-account token, receptor sockets, ConfigMap mount points. Mainly impactful on managed AAP (ansiblecloud.com) where tenant admin != host admin. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71460 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 4.3 Medium |
| /api/v2/config/ is protected only by IsAuthenticated. license_info (account_number, subscription_id, pool_id, sku, support_level, instance counts) returned to any authenticated user. The superuser/auditor gate only covers project_base_dir/project_local_paths/custom_virtualenvs, not license_info. Enables social engineering against Red Hat support and estate sizing reconnaissance. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71459 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 5 Medium |
| JobJobEventsChildrenSummary view has no model/parent_model. ModelAccessPermission.check_get_permissions() falls through (returns True) for any authenticated user. The view uses raw get_object_or_404(Job, pk) without DRF object-level permission check. Zero-privilege user reads event tree structure, event_processing_finished status, and enumerates Job IDs platform-wide via 200/404 oracle. Sibling endpoint /jobs/{id}/job_events/ correctly returns 403. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84719 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 9.9 Critical |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. When a WorkflowJobTemplate is copied, the deep-copy permission sanitizer validates only the inventory, unified_job_template, and credentials of each cloned node and fails to check the instance_groups (and execution_environment and labels) that were preserved from the original. A user with organization workflow-admin permission but no role on the referenced instance groups can copy a workflow, become its administrator, and launch jobs pinned to instance groups they are not authorized to use — including the control-plane instance group — bypassing the InstanceGroup use_role boundary and causing attacker-influenced automation to run in the control-plane execution context. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84714 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 7.1 High |
| A flaw was found in the automation-controller input-validation guard sanitize_jinja(). The function uses two regular expressions to reject user-supplied Jinja, but the patterns stop at the first interior '}' or '%' character, so a Jinja expression containing an inner brace (for example an empty dict) is accepted while remaining valid Jinja. Because sanitize_jinja() is the sole guard on several launch-time fields — ad-hoc command module_args, Machine-credential username / become_method / become_user, and inventory host names — a low-privileged user can inject Jinja that ansible-core evaluates in the execution environment. This enables execution of arbitrary commands in the execution environment (bypassing an administrator's AD_HOC_COMMANDS module allowlist) and disclosure of secrets belonging to credentials the attacker cannot read (by templating a co-attached credential's injected environment variables), across the credential access-control boundary. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84706 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 7.6 High |
| A flaw was found in Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. The custom Credential Type environment-variable injector validates variable names against a deny-list (an ANSIBLE_* prefix check plus a fixed ENV_BLOCKLIST) that omits process-hijacking loader variables such as BASH_ENV, ENV, LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, PYTHONSTARTUP and GIT_SSH_COMMAND. Combined with the credential file injector, a privileged user can write an attacker-controlled script into the execution environment and point BASH_ENV at it, obtaining arbitrary code execution inside the execution-environment container for any job that attaches a credential of that type. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84691 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 8.7 High |
| A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation- controller. The setting that formats the log message emitted for API 4XX errors is an administrator-controlled Python format-string template that is rendered with a live user object as an argument. Because Python string formatting permits attribute and item traversal on its arguments, an administrator can craft a template that walks from the user object into the application settings and reads the Django secret key and the database password. The formatted message is written to a logger that can be forwarded to an external log aggregator, whose destination is also administrator-controlled, allowing the secrets to be sent off the host. An authenticated administrator can thereby obtain the master encryption key used to protect all stored credentials and the database service password, enabling offline decryption of every stored credential, forgery of user sessions, and direct access to the controller database. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84683 | 1 Redhat | 3 Ansible Automation Platform, Ansible Automation Platform Developer, Ansible Automation Platform Inside | 2026-09-23 | 8.7 High |
| A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation- controller. The HTML view of job, ad hoc command, project update, and inventory update standard output escapes HTML metacharacters but does not remove ANSI terminal escape sequences before conversion to HTML. An ANSI OSC 8 hyperlink sequence in the output is expanded into an HTML anchor whose href is not scheme- filtered or escaped, so a low-privileged user who can produce output -- or an external party whose data a playbook echoes -- can embed a javascript: link that is rendered into a text/html response with no Content-Security-Policy. When a higher-privileged user views the output page and clicks the link, attacker- controlled JavaScript executes in their authenticated session, allowing actions as that user up to full platform takeover. | ||||