| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in the buildah/copier Go package. When used outside of Buildah by a non-root caller, a crafted tar archive containing malicious symlinks can escape the target extraction directory and create files outside the intended destination. Buildah itself uses chroot hardening and is not affected. |
| A flaw was found in ansible-runner. The unstream_dir() function, which receives and extracts a streamed zip archive on the worker side of the ansible-runner transmit/worker protocol, re-creates symbolic links from archive content without validating the link target and applies chmod() and utime() to an unsanitized filesystem path derived from the archive member name. A crafted archive processed by a worker that consumes attacker-influenced input can create files, create symbolic links, or change permissions outside the intended target directory, which can be leveraged toward code execution. |
| A path traversal vulnerability was found in pulpcore. The content upload API accepts a 'file_url' parameter that allows users with file repository privileges to specify a local file URL for Pulp to download and store. A URL scheme validation check uses a string prefix comparison that only rejects URLs beginning with 'file://', but Python's URL parser recognizes the 'file:' scheme without double slashes, creating a mismatch between what is validated and what is dispatched to the file downloader. An authenticated user with low-privilege repository permissions can supply a specially crafted URL using relative path traversal sequences to read any file accessible to the Pulp server process. In deployments that include Pulp Container, successful exploitation allows an attacker to read the container registry token signing private key and forge bearer tokens, granting unauthorized access to all private container repositories in the affected registry. |
| An argument-injection flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller
system-job subsystem. The system-job template launch endpoint stores a user-supplied "days"
variable without running the integer validation defined elsewhere for that field, and the
dispatcher flattens the management-command argument list into a single string with spaces before
the job runner re-splits it, so spaces in the value become additional command-line arguments.
Because system jobs are executed in-process on the control node without the container isolation
applied to all other job types, an authenticated user with superuser privileges can inject
arbitrary arguments — including Python's path option — into the control-plane awx-manage process,
controlling its argument vector and the first entry of its module search path. Full remote code
execution requires an additional import gadget that is not present in the current management
commands, so the demonstrated impact is argument injection with control of the process search
path rather than confirmed code execution. |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. The unauthenticated
Bitbucket Data Center webhook receiver skips HMAC signature verification for diagnostics:ping
events after it has already looked up the target template, causing the endpoint to return HTTP
200 for a template that has a Bitbucket DC webhook configured and HTTP 403 otherwise. An
unauthenticated remote attacker can use this response discrepancy as an oracle to enumerate
which Job Template and Workflow Job Template IDs have Bitbucket DC webhooks configured, without
knowing the secret webhook_key. |
| A flaw was found in Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. The custom
Credential Type environment-variable injector validates variable names against a
deny-list (an ANSIBLE_* prefix check plus a fixed ENV_BLOCKLIST) that omits
process-hijacking loader variables such as BASH_ENV, ENV, LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH,
PYTHONSTARTUP and GIT_SSH_COMMAND. Combined with the credential file injector, a
privileged user can write an attacker-controlled script into the execution environment
and point BASH_ENV at it, obtaining arbitrary code execution inside the
execution-environment container for any job that attaches a credential of that type. |
| A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-
controller. Survey questions of type password are write-only and stored
encrypted, displayed only as a placeholder on read. When a schedule or
workflow job template node is revalidated against a tightened survey
specification, the controller decrypts the stored password and includes its
plaintext value in the minimum/maximum length validation error message
returned in the HTTP response. A user with the delegated JobTemplate Admin
role can tighten the survey length constraint and trigger revalidation of a
schedule or node created by another, higher-privileged user, thereby
recovering that user's stored password in plaintext. |
| CopyAPIView (awx/awx/api/generics.py:873) sets permission_classes =
(IsAuthenticated,), so DRF's get_object() performs no object-level
RBAC. The get() handler (lines 988–991) explicitly guards with
request.user.can_access(obj._class_, 'read', obj) — but post()
(lines 1001–1010) does not. POST only checks:
can_access(model, 'add', create_kwargs_check)
can_access(model, 'copy_related', obj)
For JobTemplate, can_add (awx/awx/main/access.py:1465–1520) gates on
inventory.use_role + project.use_role +
execution_environment.read_role — resource-level roles that do not
imply read on the source JT — and can_copy_related (1522–1534) checks
only credentials.use_role. None of these imply the caller can read the
source JT. |
| HostList.list() catches bare Exception and returns str(e)
verbatim. Via host_filter, any authenticated user triggers
Django FieldError (leaking complete Host model relation
graph including internal reverse accessors) or PostgreSQL
DataError (leaking raw database error strings). Two
primitives: credential__search=x dumps ORM schema,
name__regex=[bad reflects PostgreSQL errors. |
| An authorization bypass was found in the Ansible Automation Platform (AAP) gateway. The gateway API allows an authenticated administrator to create a new service key for the Controller service cluster. Because service-key creation is not restricted to the installer-provisioned provisioning path, an administrator-issued key is cryptographically indistinguishable from a legitimate one and can be used to forge a service-authentication token that impersonates the Controller service. Combined with the gateway OIDC workload-identity endpoint (enabled via FEATURE_OIDC_WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ENABLED), the attacker can drive the gateway to sign Workload Identity Tokens (WITs) for arbitrary Controller workloads. A downstream resource server such as HashiCorp Vault that trusts the gateway OIDC key will accept the forged WIT and return the AAP credentials bound to that workload, disclosing secrets beyond the attacker's authorization boundary. |
| A flaw was found in the automation-controller instance
install-bundle endpoint. When a System Administrator downloads
an execution/hop node's install bundle, the controller signs an
X.509 certificate with the receptor mesh certificate authority
in which the Common Name, DNS subject-alternative-name, and
receptor node-id are taken verbatim from the caller-chosen
instance hostname, with a hard-coded ten-year validity, a random
serial, and no issuance log or revocation list. Because the
hostname charset validator is case-insensitive while the
uniqueness validator is case-sensitive, an administrator can
register a case variant of an existing control node's hostname
and obtain a mesh-CA-signed certificate that TLS peers, which
match hostnames case-insensitively, accept as that control node.
In managed/hosted deployments — where the customer holds
controller superuser but the platform operator runs the mesh —
this yields a long-lived, non-revocable mesh peer credential and,
with an on-path position, TLS impersonation or interception of
control/hybrid mesh nodes. It does not grant direct remote code
execution, because receptor work submission is gated by a
separate signing key not included in the bundle. |
| A flaw was found in AWX. The container group pod_spec_override field uses an incomplete blocklist that only restricts automountServiceAccountToken, allowing injection of initContainers, serviceAccountName overrides, and projected service account token volumes. An AAP platform administrator can exploit this to escalate privileges to OpenShift namespace-level access and exfiltrate namespace secrets. |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation controller. The
external logging (rsyslog) configuration is generated by interpolating
user-controlled settings — LOG_AGGREGATOR_HOST, LOG_AGGREGATOR_MAX_DISK_USAGE_PATH
and LOG_AGGREGATOR_RSYSLOGD_ERROR_LOG_FILE — into an rsyslog RainerScript config
file without neutralizing RainerScript syntax. A privileged (superuser) user can
inject rsyslog directives, including an omprog action, causing arbitrary command
execution inside the control-plane rsyslog component. This allows disclosure of
the controller SECRET_KEY and database credentials, decryption of all stored
credentials, and full compromise of the control plane. |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. The
WorkflowJobNode.ancestor_artifacts database column, which stores the raw merged set_stats
artifacts propagated between workflow nodes, is not wrapped in prevent_search() and is therefore
accepted for arbitrary field lookups by the REST filter backend, even though it is omitted from
the API serializer. Because the column is persisted before Ansible's no_log masking is applied,
a user with only read access to a workflow — or, via a regular-expression lookup that bypasses
the JSON cross-relation filter guard through the world-readable credential-types endpoint, any
authenticated user with no roles — can use the result count as a boolean/count oracle to recover,
character by character, secret values that a playbook author explicitly marked no_log, including
across organizations. |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. In the shipped
production configuration, the Controller trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For header as
the request's client IP without verifying that it originated from a trusted proxy, and selects
the leftmost (attacker-controlled) header value. As a result, an attacker can forge the source
IP address recorded for their requests in the Controller's audit and access logs, degrading
the integrity of forensic and SIEM attribution. The flaw does not grant additional access. |
| A flaw was found in the automation-controller input-validation
guard sanitize_jinja(). The function uses two regular
expressions to reject user-supplied Jinja, but the patterns
stop at the first interior '}' or '%' character, so a Jinja
expression containing an inner brace (for example an empty
dict) is accepted while remaining valid Jinja. Because
sanitize_jinja() is the sole guard on several launch-time
fields — ad-hoc command module_args, Machine-credential
username / become_method / become_user, and inventory host
names — a low-privileged user can inject Jinja that ansible-core
evaluates in the execution environment. This enables execution
of arbitrary commands in the execution environment (bypassing an
administrator's AD_HOC_COMMANDS module allowlist) and disclosure
of secrets belonging to credentials the attacker cannot read
(by templating a co-attached credential's injected environment
variables), across the credential access-control boundary. |
| A flaw was found in the automation-controller API. The
unauthenticated health-check endpoint /api/v2/ping/
(ApiV2PingView, AllowAny) over-serializes RBAC-gated
automation-mesh data into its anonymous response, exposing the
full instance inventory (node hostnames, node types, UUIDs,
heartbeats, capacities, and exact versions), all instance-group
names and membership, the deployment install UUID, and the
active control node. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can use
this to map the control plane and fingerprint software versions
for targeted attacks. This flaw affects confidentiality only;
it does not expose secrets, credentials, or tenant data. |
| LaunchConfigurationBaseSerializer.scm_branch has no
validate_scm_branch() leading-dash check, unlike
Project/JobTemplate/JobLaunch serializers. Schedule and
WFJT Node accept --upload-pack=/bin/id as scm_branch.
Currently blocked at runtime by jobs.py:1502 ValueError
check (defense-in-depth), but the API validation gap
means sole reliance on a task-layer guard. Refactoring
that guard away would promote this to RCE. |
| RunAdHocCommand.build_args() appends limit as bare
positional (args.append(limit)) instead of using
args.extend(['-l', limit]) like RunJob. A limit beginning
with - is parsed as an ansible CLI option. Currently
limited to short-circuit flags (--version, --help) since
injected element displaces required pattern positional.
Would escalate if ansible-core ever defaults pattern. |
| Notification template Jinja AST whitelist only inspects
static Getattr nodes. Dynamic subscripts (job['job'+'_env'])
and {% if job.id > 100 %} conditional gating bypass both
the AST check and the test-render (stub has small job.id).
At runtime, the gated branch executes and exceptions write
full tracebacks into notification body, which is POSTed
to attacker-controlled webhook URL. Leaks install paths,
Python version, source line numbers. |
