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Search Results (377377 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68129 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gve: fix Rx queue stall on alloc failure When the system is under extreme memory pressure, page allocations can fail during the Rx buffer refill loop. If the number of buffers posted to hardware falls below a critical low threshold and the refill loop exits due to allocation failures, the queue can stall: 1. The device drops incoming packets because there are no descriptors. 2. Since no packets are processed, no Rx completions are generated. 3. Because no completions occur, NAPI is never scheduled, preventing the refill loop from running again even after memory is freed. This results in a permanent queue stall. Resolve this by introducing a starvation recovery timer for each Rx queue. If the number of buffers posted to hardware falls below a critical low threshold, start a timer to periodically reschedule NAPI. Once NAPI runs and successfully refills the queue above the threshold, the timer is not rescheduled. The threshold is set to 32 because a single maximum-sized Receive Segment Coalescing (RSC) packet can consume up to 19 descriptors in the Rx path. Lower thresholds (such as 8 or 16) would be insufficient to process a complete maximum-sized RSC packet, risking packet drops or unexpected hardware behavior under memory pressure. Setting the threshold to 32 guarantees a safe margin to handle at least one full RSC packet. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68199 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB access from firmware ADDBA window size aggr_recv_addba_req_evt() logs a debug message when the firmware-supplied win_sz is outside [AGGR_WIN_SZ_MIN, AGGR_WIN_SZ_MAX] but does not return. The out-of-range win_sz is then used in TID_WINDOW_SZ() to compute a kzalloc size and stored in rxtid->hold_q_sz, leading to zero-size or overflowed allocations and subsequent out-of-bounds access. Clean up any previously active aggregation session for the TID first, then return early when win_sz is out of the valid range, instead of proceeding with a broken allocation size. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68216 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: pwc: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(), vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued buffers leak. pwc's start_streaming() had two early returns that hit this trap: -ENODEV when the USB device was already disconnected, and -ERESTARTSYS when mutex_lock_interruptible() was interrupted by a signal. Call the existing pwc_cleanup_queued_bufs() helper with VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED before returning (matching the state already used by the pwc_isoc_init() error path in the same function). This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68348 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: tas2781: bound firmware description string parsing The TAS2781 firmware parser reads several variable-length description strings with strlen() before checking that the string terminator is present inside the firmware blob. A malformed firmware image without a NUL terminator can therefore make the parser walk past the end of the firmware buffer before the later size checks run. Add a small bounded string-length helper and use it for all description fields that are parsed from the firmware buffer. Keep the existing size checks for the fixed bytes that follow each string. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68399 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix UAF in sock clone early bailouts Similar to recent commit 9b51a6155d14 ("bpf,fork: wipe ->bpf_storage before bailouts that access it"), sk_clone() performs an initial shallow copy of the socket field ->sk_bpf_storage via sock_copy() for the cloned socket newsk. If sk_clone() bails out early (e.g. if sk_filter_charge() fails) prior to calling bpf_sk_storage_clone(), newsk->sk_bpf_storage still points to the parent socket's BPF local storage. When newsk is subsequently freed via sk_free(), the deallocation path (__sk_destruct() -> bpf_sk_storage_free()) destroys the parent socket's BPF local storage, leading to a use-after-free (UAF) on the parent socket. Fix this by resetting newsk->sk_bpf_storage to NULL immediately after sock_copy() in sk_clone(), and remove the now redundant initialization from bpf_sk_storage_clone(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-45923 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking catc_probe() fills three URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without verifying the endpoint descriptors: - usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) and usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) for TX/RX - usb_rcvintpipe(usbdev, 2) for interrupt status A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types that differ from what the driver assumes. Add a catc_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic constants throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and usb_check_int_endpoints() calls after usb_set_interface() to verify endpoint types before use, rejecting devices with mismatched descriptors at probe time. Similar to - commit 90b7f2961798 ("net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking") which fixed the issue in rtl8150. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68147 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices() When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices, then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(), blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one. Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because: - It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim. - fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free. For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that. (Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68200 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: timer: don't re-enter an instance callback that is still running The userspace-driven timer (utimer) TRIGGER ioctl calls snd_timer_interrupt() directly with no serialization, so two threads triggering the same utimer can run snd_timer_interrupt() on one snd_timer concurrently. snd_timer_process_callbacks() drops timer->lock around each instance callback and marks the in-flight callback with the single SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK bit; snd_timer_close_locked() waits on that bit to drain an in-flight callback before freeing the instance. The bit cannot represent two concurrent callbacks: when a second interrupt re-queues an instance whose callback is still running, both run at once, the first to finish clears the bit, and the close-path drain then frees the instance (and its callback_data) while the other callback is still live - a use-after-free reachable by any user able to open /dev/snd/timer, both via a user timer instance and via a sequencer queue timer bound to the utimer. snd_timer_interrupt() sets IFLG_CALLBACK before dropping timer->lock, so a concurrent interrupt already observes it under the lock. Skip re-queuing an instance (and its slaves) to the ack/sack list while its callback is in flight; the accumulated pticks are delivered on the next tick, so no event is lost. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68202 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: close a re-opened queue timer in the destructor queue_delete() closes the queue timer, then frees it. snd_seq_timer_close() clears q->timer->timeri. snd_use_lock_sync() then drains borrowers, and snd_seq_timer_delete() frees q->timer. A borrower can re-open the timer inside that window. A SET_QUEUE_CLIENT that took a queueptr() use_lock reference before the queue was unlinked runs snd_seq_timer_open() after the close. Open refuses re-open only while timeri is set, and the close just cleared it, so it re-opens timeri. snd_seq_timer_delete() does not close that instance. Its snd_seq_timer_stop() is a no-op, because running was cleared first. So it frees q->timer with the instance still live. The queue is freed next. The instance stays on the global timer with callback_data pointing at the freed queue. A non-owner START on the unlocked queue arms it. The next tick derefs the freed queue in snd_seq_timer_interrupt(). Reachable by an unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/seq. No CAP and no queue ownership required. Close any lingering instance in the destructor. There, ->timeri can no longer change: the queue is unlinked and all use_lock borrowers have drained, so no snd_seq_queue_use() can re-open it. Close it before clearing q->timer. snd_timer_close() waits for any in-flight snd_seq_timer_interrupt() to finish, and that callback still reads q->timer (via snd_seq_check_queue()), so q->timer must stay valid until it drains. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68123 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openvswitch: fix GSO userspace truncation underflow OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment. A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy(). Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a consumer handles it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68124 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 9.6 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only: if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) { dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR; } else { dev->rxlen = c; dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; ... } A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c; dev->rxpos++; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) { dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER; } With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled 1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded. Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which the bytes arrive via the tty receive path. Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can no longer occur. KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this change): UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370 index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]' BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0 mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf tty_ldisc_receive_buf flush_to_ldisc Allocated by task 152: alloc_netdev_mqs mctp_serial_open v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr). Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68125 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the AEAD request as assoclen += datalen - authlen; where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that only spans the real frame. The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction. Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68131 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rbd: Reset positive result codes to zero in object map update path In a reply message to an RBD request, a positive result code indicates a data payload, which is not allowed for writes. While rbd_osd_req_callback() already resets a positive result code for writes to zero, rbd_object_map_callback() does not. This allows a corrupted reply to an object map update to trigger the rbd_assert(*result < 0) in __rbd_obj_handle_request(). This happens, because rbd_object_map_callback() calls rbd_obj_handle_request() -> __rbd_obj_handle_request() and passes this positive result code. From __rbd_obj_handle_request(), rbd_obj_advance_write() is called, which leaves the positive result code unchanged and returns true. Therefore, the if(done && *result) branch is executed in __rbd_obj_handle_request() and the assertion triggers. This patch fixes the issue by adjusting the logic in the rbd_object_map_callback() path. A positive result code for an object map update is now reset to zero (similar to rbd_osd_req_callback()), and the message is subsequently handled the same way as if the result code was zero from the beginning. Additionally, a WARN_ON_ONCE() is added for this case. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68245 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix lifetime issue of amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid() The vm pointer returned from amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() is only valid while the lock is still being held. Once xa_unlock_irqrestore is called and returned, the pointer is no longer under lock and is subject to modification. Since, the caller still dereferences vm->task_info in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_vm() after the lock is removed, this causes a use after unlock problem. Remove the lifetime issue present in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid() through removing the amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() function from amdgpu_vm.c and making the relevant code inline to hold the lock while it is still in use. (cherry picked from commit 9d01579f3f868b333acc901815972685989092c7) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68352 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 8.3 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB read from firmware IE lengths in connect event The firmware-controlled beacon_ie_len, assoc_req_len, and assoc_resp_len fields in ath6kl_wmi_connect_event_rx() are not validated against the buffer length. Their sum (up to 765) can exceed the actual WMI event data, causing out-of-bounds reads during IE parsing and state corruption of wmi->is_wmm_enabled. Add a check that the total IE length fits within the buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68409 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: defer link RX stats percpu free to RCU sta_remove_link() frees a removed MLO link's RX stats percpu buffer right away, but defers only the link container to RCU: sta_info_free_link(&alloc->info); kfree_rcu(alloc, rcu_head); The RX fast path reads link_sta under rcu_read_lock and writes the percpu stats. A reader that resolved link_sta before the removal keeps the pointer. The container stays alive from the kfree_rcu, so the read still works. But the percpu block it points to is already freed. This needs uses_rss. That is when pcpu_rx_stats exists. The full STA teardown frees the deflink stats only after synchronize_net(). The link removal path had no such barrier. The race is hard to win in practice, but the free should still wait for RCU. Free the link together with its data from a single RCU callback, so the percpu block is reclaimed only after readers drain. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68156 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: refresh auth->authorizer_buf{,_len} after authorizer update ceph_x_create_authorizer() caches au->buf->vec.iov_base and au->buf->vec.iov_len in struct ceph_auth_handshake. These cached values are then used by the messenger connect code when sending the authorizer. ceph_x_update_authorizer() can rebuild the authorizer when a newer service ticket is available. If the rebuilt authorizer no longer fits in the existing buffer, ceph_x_build_authorizer() drops its reference to au->buf and allocates a new one. If this is the final reference, ceph_buffer_put() frees the old ceph_buffer and its vec.iov_base, but auth->authorizer_buf still points at that freed memory. A subsequent msgr1 reconnect can therefore queue the stale pointer and trigger a KASAN slab-use-after-free in _copy_from_iter() while tcp_sendmsg() copies the authorizer. Refresh auth->authorizer_buf and auth->authorizer_buf_len after a successful authorizer rebuild so the messenger sends the current buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68161 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: close UDP tunnel sockets during netns teardown proc_sctp_do_udp_port() starts per-net SCTP UDP tunneling sockets when net.sctp.udp_port is set, and stops/restarts them when the sysctl value changes. The netns exit path does not stop these sockets, so a namespace can be torn down while its SCTP UDP tunnel sockets are still installed. Close the UDP tunnel sockets from sctp_ctrlsock_exit() after unregistering the per-net sysctl table. This prevents new sysctl writes from racing in while the sockets are being released, and closes the sockets before the control socket is destroyed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68385 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/checksum: Fix csum_partial() without vector facility Currently csum_partial() calls csum_copy() with copy=false and dst=NULL. On machines without the vector facility, csum_copy() falls back to cksm(dst, ...), causing the checksum to be calculated from address zero instead of the source buffer. The VX implementation already checksums data loaded from src. Make the fallback do the same by passing src to cksm(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68393 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: extend conn_hash lookup critical sections Using RCU-protected pointers outside the critical sections without refcount is incorrect and may result to UAF. Extend critical section to cover both hci_conn_hash lookup and use of the returned conn. Add surrounding rcu_read_lock() also when return value is not used, in preparation for RCU lockdep requirement to hci_lookup_le_connect(). This avoids concurrent deletion of the conn before we are done dereferencing it. Also, make sure to hold hdev->lock when accessing hdev->accept_list. | ||||