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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68124 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only: if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) { dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR; } else { dev->rxlen = c; dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; ... } A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c; dev->rxpos++; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) { dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER; } With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled 1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded. Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which the bytes arrive via the tty receive path. Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can no longer occur. KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this change): UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370 index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]' BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0 mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf tty_ldisc_receive_buf flush_to_ldisc Allocated by task 152: alloc_netdev_mqs mctp_serial_open v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr). Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68125 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the AEAD request as assoclen += datalen - authlen; where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that only spans the real frame. The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction. Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68128 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: reject out-of-range ptype in ice_parser_profile_init set_bit(rslt->ptype, prof->ptypes) operates on a DECLARE_BITMAP of ICE_FLOW_PTYPE_MAX (1024) bits. Nothing prevents a malicious VF from providing ptype >= 1024 through VIRTCHNL, resulting in a write past the end of the bitmap and a kernel page fault. Reproduced with a custom kernel module injecting a crafted VIRTCHNL_OP_ADD_RSS_CFG on E810-C QSFP (8086:1592), FW 4.91 0x800214af 1.3909.0, ICE COMMS DDP 1.3.53.0, kernel 7.1.0-rc1. crash_parser: ice_parser_profile_init @ ffffffffc0d61b60 crash_parser: setting ptype=0xffff (max valid=1023) crash_parser: calling ice_parser_profile_init -- expect OOB crash! BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 56 UID: 0 PID: 165011 Comm: insmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S U OE 7.1.0-rc1 #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB RIP: 0010:ice_parser_profile_init+0x2d/0x1d0 [ice] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __pfx_ice_parser_profile_init+0x10/0x10 [ice] crash_init+0x127/0xff0 [crash_parser] do_one_initcall+0x45/0x310 do_init_module+0x64/0x270 init_module_from_file+0xcc/0xf0 idempotent_init_module+0x17b/0x280 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x6e/0xe0 Bail out early with -EINVAL when ptype is out of range. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68184 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cdrom: fix stack out-of-bounds read in CDROMVOLCTRL mmc_ioctl_cdrom_volume() first reads the audio control mode page into a 32-byte stack buffer with cgc->buflen set to 24. If the device reports a block descriptor, the function increases cgc->buflen to include that descriptor and reads the page again. For CDROMVOLCTRL, the function then builds a MODE SELECT parameter list by moving cgc->buffer forward by offset - 8 bytes. This drops the block descriptor from the outgoing payload and leaves a new 8-byte mode parameter header in front of the audio control page. However, cgc->buflen is left unchanged. With a standard 8-byte block descriptor, cgc->buffer points at buffer + 8 but cgc->buflen remains 32. cdrom_mode_select() therefore asks the low level packet path to write 32 bytes from that adjusted pointer, reading 8 bytes past the end of the 32-byte stack buffer. This is not hit by CDROMVOLREAD, and CDROMVOLCTRL only triggers it on drives that return a non-zero block descriptor length, which helps explain why it has gone unnoticed. The overread is also sent to the device as extra MODE SELECT payload, so it may not produce an obvious local failure. Reduce cgc->buflen by the same amount as the buffer pointer adjustment so the MODE SELECT transfer covers only the intended parameter list. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68270 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/sysfb: Avoid possible truncation with calculating visible size Calculating the visible size of the system framebuffer can result in truncation of the result. The calculation uses 32-bit arithmetics, which can overflow if the values for height and stride are large. Fix the issue by multiplying with mul_u32_u32(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-8247 | 1 Watchguard | 1 Fireware Os | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| An Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS may allow an unauthenticated attacker on the same local network segment to execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability affects Fireware OS 11.0 up to and including 11.12.4_Update1, 12.0 up to and including 12.12 and 2025.1 up to and including 2026.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68159 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE __decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects values large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and apply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size on-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends an OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack out-of-bounds write. An OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer entries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so it also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds Write of size 4 ... by task exploit kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833) calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638) __submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394) ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490) ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164) rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899) do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138) ... kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670! [ idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items() ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-68166 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: userfaultfd: prevent registration of special VMAs Vova Tokarev says: userfaultfd allows registration on shadow stack VMAs. With userfaultfd access, you can register on the shadow stack, discard a page ... and inject a page with chosen return addresses via UFFDIO_COPY. Update vma_can_userfault() to reject VM_SHADOW_STACK. While on it, also reject VM_SPECIAL so that if a driver would implement vm_uffd_ops, it wouldn't be possible to register special VMAs with userfaultfd. Since VM_SPECIAL includes VM_DONTEXPAND which is set but hugetlb, exclude hugetlb VMAs from the check for VM_SPECIAL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68265 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/vm: Fix BO prefetch with CONSULT_MEM_ADVISE_PREF_LOC When prefetch region is DRM_XE_CONSULT_MEM_ADVISE_PREF_LOC for a BO VMA, the code used it as an index into region_to_mem_type[], causing an out-of-bounds access since the value is -1. Resolve the preferred location for BO VMAs directly: local VRAM on dGFX (using the BO's tile placement) or system memory on iGPU. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. v2: -Fix null dereference (cherry picked from commit d9a4906ac03be9f6ed3f3b45c56c866b867fd75b) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68199 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB access from firmware ADDBA window size aggr_recv_addba_req_evt() logs a debug message when the firmware-supplied win_sz is outside [AGGR_WIN_SZ_MIN, AGGR_WIN_SZ_MAX] but does not return. The out-of-range win_sz is then used in TID_WINDOW_SZ() to compute a kzalloc size and stored in rxtid->hold_q_sz, leading to zero-size or overflowed allocations and subsequent out-of-bounds access. Clean up any previously active aggregation session for the TID first, then return early when win_sz is out of the valid range, instead of proceeding with a broken allocation size. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68320 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix auth_chunk_list capacity check in sctp_auth_ep_add_chunkid sctp_auth_ep_add_chunkid() uses SCTP_NUM_CHUNK_TYPES (20) as the capacity limit for ep->auth_chunk_list, allowing it to hold up to 20 chunk entries (param_hdr.length up to 24). However, the copy destination asoc->c.auth_chunks in struct sctp_cookie is only SCTP_AUTH_MAX_CHUNKS (16) entries (20 bytes). When more than 16 chunks are added, sctp_association_init() memcpy overflows the destination by up to 4 bytes. Fix by using SCTP_AUTH_MAX_CHUNKS as the capacity limit, matching the destination capacity. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18370 | 2026-08-10 | N/A | ||
| entr is vulnerable to Heap-based buffer overflow in run_utility() function. The function allocates a fixed-size heap buffer using malloc(ARG_MAX) and copies command-line arguments into it. It advances the destination pointer based on the return value of strlcpy(), which returns the total length of the source string rather than the number of bytes written. When the buffer is exactly filled, the remaining size underflows as an unsigned size_t, causing subsequent copies to write out of bounds. This can be triggered by supplying command-line arguments whose combined length fills the buffer, or via the /_ substitution feature which expands a short token into a longer pathname at runtime. The local attacker can cause memory corruption, process abort, and denial of service. This issue was fixed in commit 2467fe0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-11743 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-08-10 | 6.6 Medium |
| The SF32LB MPI QSPI NOR flash driver (drivers/flash/flash_sf32lb_mpi_qspi_nor.c) validated the flash offset and length on its read and write paths with the test (offset + size) > data->size. Because offset is a signed off_t while size is unsigned, a negative offset is converted to a large unsigned value and the addition can wrap to a small result that passes the check. The read path then performs memcpy(dst, (void *)(data->base + offset), size) and the write path programs flash at offset and cache-invalidates data->base + offset, in both cases accessing memory outside the mapped flash window. The driver's erase path already rejected negative offsets, but read and write did not. In builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE, flash_read and flash_write are syscalls whose verifiers validate the device object and the caller's buffer but deliberately delegate offset bounds checking to the driver. An unprivileged thread that has been granted access to this flash device can therefore call the syscall with a crafted negative offset and a buffer valid in its own memory domain, and reach the unchecked access. The most direct impact is on the read path: by choosing a negative offset and matching size, an attacker slides the memcpy source below the flash base and copies arbitrary CPU-addressable memory into its own buffer, disclosing memory it is not authorized to read. The write path additionally allows programming flash at an out-of-range address and invalidating an attacker-chosen cache range, affecting integrity and availability. Reachability requires userspace to be enabled and the raw flash device object to be granted to an untrusted thread. The fix replaces the check with qspi_nor_range_is_valid(), which rejects negative offsets and performs the bound comparison in overflow-safe 64-bit arithmetic on both paths, and additionally adds an SRAM DMA bounce buffer plus source/destination overlap rejection to prevent a separate DMA bus-hang condition. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68293 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Fix MCIA register buffer overflow on 32 dword reads The MCIA register can return up to 32 dwords (128 bytes) when the device advertises the mcia_32dwords capability, but struct mlx5_ifc_mcia_reg_bits only defines dword_0..11, leaving room for just 12 dwords (48 bytes) of data. mlx5_query_mcia() clamps the read size to mlx5_mcia_max_bytes() and then memcpy()s that many bytes out of the register, potentially reading past the end of the 'out' buffer. On kernels built with FORTIFY_SOURCE this is caught as a buffer overflow while reading the module EEPROM via ethtool: detected buffer overflow in memcpy kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1048! RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 Call Trace: mlx5_query_mcia.isra.0+0x200/0x210 [mlx5_core] mlx5_query_module_eeprom_by_page+0x4a/0xa0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_get_module_eeprom_by_page+0xbb/0x120 [mlx5_core] eeprom_prepare_data+0xf3/0x170 ethnl_default_doit+0xf1/0x3b0 Extend the mcia_reg layout to 32 dwords. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68315 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate stream count in sctp_process_strreset_inreq() When processing a RESET_IN_REQUEST from a peer, sctp_process_strreset_inreq() derives the stream count from the parameter length but does not check whether the resulting RESET_OUT_REQUEST would exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN. The OUT request header (sctp_strreset_outreq, 16 bytes) is 8 bytes larger than the IN request header (sctp_strreset_inreq, 8 bytes). Generally, the IP payload is bounded to 65535 bytes, so the stream list cannot be large enough to trigger the overflow. However, on interfaces with MTU > 65535 (e.g., loopback with IPv6 jumbograms), a stream list that fits within the incoming IN parameter can cause a __u16 overflow in sctp_make_strreset_req() when computing the OUT request size, leading to an undersized skb allocation and a kernel BUG: net/core/skbuff.c:207 skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:2625 skb_put net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1535 sctp_addto_chunk net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:3695 sctp_make_strreset_req net/sctp/stream.c:655 sctp_process_strreset_inreq The local setsockopt path validates the generated reset request size. However, for an incoming-only reset, it accounts for the smaller IN request even though the peer must generate an OUT request with the same stream list. Such a request cannot be completed successfully by the peer. Reject peer IN requests whose corresponding OUT request would exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN. Also tighten the local check so it does not send an IN request that would require an oversized OUT request from the peer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68316 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel: ethosu: Fix element size accounting for cmd stream validation There are 2 issues with the element size handling in the command stream validation which result in too small of a size calculated when the element size is 16/32/64 bits. For NHWC format, the element size is simply missing from the calculation. The bitfield for the element size is different between IFM/IFM2 and OFM. IFM and IFM2 encode the precision in parameter bits 2:3, while OFM uses bits 1:2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68402 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read when checking non-inheritance cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the candidate element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension non-inheritance list. It does so after testing elem->id, but without verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length extension element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it read one octet past the end of the element. _ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a frame once a non-inheritance context exists -- e.g. while parsing a per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response, or a non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds read during element parsing: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited Read of size 1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists. The bug was found by fuzzing ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN. | ||||
| CVE-2026-66409 | 2026-08-10 | 5.3 Medium | ||
| DEEBOT PRO M1 and DEEBOT PRO K1VAC are configured with weak passwords for their Wi-Fi hotspot networks. The password may be analyzed and obtained to connect to the access point of an affected robot. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68196 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res); without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes hif_drv->assoc_resp / assoc_resp_info_len straight in) and must be validated before the driver accesses the fixed header. For a frame shorter than the 6-byte fixed header, the subtraction wraps. For a four-byte response the result is truncated to a u16 ies_len of 65534, so kmemdup() then attempts to copy 65534 bytes starting at buffer + sizeof(*res), beyond the valid association-response data (CWE-125). A response shorter than four bytes can also cause an out-of-bounds read of res->status_code at offsets 2 and 3. Reject frames too short to hold the fixed header before touching the header or computing ies_len. Also set the connection status to a failure on this path: the caller falls through to a "conn_info->status == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS" check after the parser returns, so leaving the status untouched could let a malformed short response be treated as a successful association. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18503 | 2026-08-10 | N/A | ||
| Attacker-controlled CSV samples can trigger super-linear regular-expression work during dialect sniffing and consume significant CPU when applications pass unbounded input to csv.Sniffer.sniff(). | ||||