The vulnerability is located within the FIFO parsing and debug logging subsystem inside the function bhi360_parse_debug_message() in bhi360_parse.c (lines 1852-1875).
The parser trusts the first payload byte of a debug frame as the message length (msg_length) and copies that many bytes into a fixed-size 17-byte stack buffer (debug_msg) via memcpy without performing any bounds checking.
A locally or physically positioned attacker (e.g., via a malicious sensor, counterfeit hardware module, or a Man-in-the-Middle on the communication bus) can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a crafted debug frame with a length byte exceeding 16.
This corrupts adjacent stack data, including the saved return address.
Furthermore, because the overflowed buffer is subsequently passed to a printf-style logging sink, the attacker can supply format string specifiers (e.g., %n) to execute arbitrary code on the host microcontroller/SoC or cause a reliable system crash (Denial of Service).
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bosch Sensortec | BHI360_SensorAPI (C-Library) | affected |
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Thu, 10 Sep 2026 10:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Stack Buffer Overflow in Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI Enables Arbitrary Code Execution |
Thu, 10 Sep 2026 09:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C-Library) in versions up to and including commit d6b200416a. The vulnerability is located within the FIFO parsing and debug logging subsystem inside the function bhi360_parse_debug_message() in bhi360_parse.c (lines 1852-1875). The parser trusts the first payload byte of a debug frame as the message length (msg_length) and copies that many bytes into a fixed-size 17-byte stack buffer (debug_msg) via memcpy without performing any bounds checking. A locally or physically positioned attacker (e.g., via a malicious sensor, counterfeit hardware module, or a Man-in-the-Middle on the communication bus) can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a crafted debug frame with a length byte exceeding 16. This corrupts adjacent stack data, including the saved return address. Furthermore, because the overflowed buffer is subsequently passed to a printf-style logging sink, the attacker can supply format string specifiers (e.g., %n) to execute arbitrary code on the host microcontroller/SoC or cause a reliable system crash (Denial of Service). | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-121 | |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: bosch
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-10T08:56:14.315Z
Reserved: 2026-04-30T08:03:11.875Z
Link: CVE-2026-42804
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-10T09:17:01.880
Modified: 2026-09-10T09:17:01.880
Link: CVE-2026-42804
Redhat
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OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-09-10T10:30:04Z