| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr()
reparse_buf_ptr() reads buf->ReparseDataLength before checking that
count covers the full fixed header:
buf = (struct reparse_data_buffer *)((u8 *)io + off);
len = sizeof(*buf); /* 8 bytes */
rdlen = le16_to_cpu(buf->ReparseDataLength); /* offset 4, 2 bytes */
if (count < len || count < rdlen + len) /* check comes after */
struct reparse_data_buffer has ReparseDataLength at offset 4. If a
server returns OutputCount < 6, the read at offset 4-5 reaches past
the end of the received data. The off+count bounds against iov_len
were already validated, but that does not protect against count being
smaller than sizeof(*buf).
Split the check: verify count >= sizeof(*buf) before reading
ReparseDataLength, then verify count covers the data region. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: renesas: Fix out-of-bounds access for newdevs mask
When software initiates DAA (Dynamic Address Assignment), the controller
reports the result via the NRSPQP (Normal Response Queue Port Register).
The data length field of the response descriptor, which is accessible
through the NRSPQP register, indicates the number of devices remaining
after DAA. Consequently, when the bus is empty, this field contains the
maximum number of devices supported by the controller (8 for the Renesas
I3C controller).
Adjust the condition that computes the newly discovered devices bitmask
to prevent an out-of-bounds when the I3C bus is empty. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: fix out-of-bounds access in writeback_store()
Patch series "zram: fix stale scan bounds after reinitialization".
Both writeback_store() and read_block_state() derive their table scan
bounds from zram->disksize before acquiring dev_lock. If the device is
reset and reinitialized with a smaller disksize between that read and lock
acquisition, the bound can describe the old table while the scan operates
on the new one. This can lead to out-of-bounds slot accesses.
Move both bound calculations under dev_lock so each bound remains
consistent with the table throughout its scan. Keep the fixes separate
because the affected interfaces originate from different commits and can
be backported independently.
This patch (of 2):
writeback_store() calculates the table scan bounds before taking dev_lock.
A reset followed by reconfiguration with a smaller disksize can therefore
replace zram->table while writeback_store() is waiting for the lock. Once
it acquires the lock, it sees an initialized device but scans the new
table using the old upper bound, resulting in an out-of-bounds access.
Calculate the number of pages while holding dev_lock so the scan bound
matches the table protected by the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fpga: altera-cvp: Avoid out-of-bounds read in trailing byte write
The trailing byte path in altera_cvp_send_block() dereferences a u32
pointer even when only 1-3 bytes remain in the input buffer. If the buffer
ends at a page or scatterlist boundary, this can read past the valid image
data and fault.
Copy the remaining bytes into a zero-initialized u32 before writing the
final word so only valid bytes are read from the input buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uvc: Fix null pointer dereference in uvcg_video_init()
In uvcg_video_init(), if kthread_run_worker() fails,
the error logged uses uvcg_err(), however, the pointer it uses:
video->uvc is not assigned at this point, triggering a null
pointer dereference. Fix this by directly using uvc->func which
is assigned already. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: bound GET_REPORT response to the caller buffer
quickspi_hid_raw_request() receives the caller's buffer length in len, but
quickspi_get_report() never sees it and copies the whole device-supplied
response into buf regardless:
memcpy(buf, qsdev->report_buf, qsdev->report_len);
qsdev->report_len comes from the input report the touch controller returns,
while buf is sized to whatever the caller asked hidraw for through
HIDIOCGFEATURE or HIDIOCGINPUT. A response larger than that overflows buf
with device-controlled content.
The intel-quicki2c sibling already passes the caller length down to
quicki2c_get_report() and validates the response against it before the
copy. Do the same here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: restore rq_status_counter to even on all nfsd_dispatch() exit paths
nfsd_dispatch() sets rq_status_counter to an odd value once a request has
been decoded, and back to an even value once it has been fully processed,
forming a seq-lock like protocol with the lockless reader in
nfsd_nl_rpc_status_get_dumpit().
Only the fully successful path restored the counter to even. The cache-hit
(RC_REPLY), drop (RC_DROPIT / RQ_DROPME) and encode-error paths all return
after the odd-valued store without ever bringing the counter back to even.
Once one of those paths is taken, rq_status_counter is left odd: the next
request's decode ORs in 1 (still odd) and only a subsequent successful
encode restores even. While stuck odd, the dumpit reader treats the rqstp
fields as stable and its retry check compares against the same unchanging
odd value, so it never detects concurrent mutation. This exposes actively
mutating fields (e.g. args->ops / args->opcnt during compound decode and
release) to the lockless reader, which can read past the end of the
8-element inline ops array.
Add a helper that advances the counter to the next even value and call it
on every return path that follows the odd-valued store. The decode-error
path is left untouched as it is reached before the counter is set odd. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc3: gadget: Fix use-after-free in dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints due to race condition
In dwc3_gadget_init_endpoint, &dep->nostream_work is bound with
dwc3_nostream_work, and dwc3_gadget_endpoint_stream_event can queue
this delayed work on system_percpu_wq when a DEPEVT_STREAM_NOSTREAM
event is received.
If we remove the gadget, dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints makes cleanup and
the memory allocated for dep with kzalloc() is released by kfree(dep),
while the delayed work mentioned above may still be pending or
running. The sequence of operations that may lead to a UAF bug is as
follows:
CPU0 CPU1
| dwc3_thread_interrupt
| dwc3_endpoint_interrupt
| dwc3_gadget_endpoint_stream_event
| queue_delayed_work(system_percpu_wq,
| &dep->nostream_work)
dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints |
dwc3_free_trb_pool(dep) |
list_del(&dep->endpoint.ep_list) |
dwc3_debugfs_remove_endpoint_dir(dep) |
kfree(dep) |
// dep is freed |
| dwc3_nostream_work
| // use dep (use-after-free)
Fix it by canceling the delayed work before kfree(dep) in
dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: clear opcnt on compound arg release to prevent OOB read
nfsd4_release_compoundargs() resets args->ops to the inline iops[8]
array when the dynamically-allocated ops buffer is freed, but leaves
args->opcnt at its original value (which can be up to 200 for NFSv4.1+
compounds).
If rq_status_counter is stuck at an odd value (which can happen when
nfsd_dispatch() hits an error path after setting it odd), the RPC
status dumpit handler reads min(opcnt, 16) entries from args->ops[].
Since iops only has 8 elements and is the last field in struct
nfsd4_compoundargs, reading indices 8-15 accesses adjacent slab memory
and leaks it to userspace via netlink.
Zero opcnt unconditionally in nfsd4_release_compoundargs() so stale
compound metadata is never exposed through the status interface.
[ cel: Remove the kvfree_rcu_mightsleep() sleep from the exposure window ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: block non-SAVEFH ops after FOREIGN PUTFH to prevent NULL deref
When CONFIG_NFSD_V4_2_INTER_SSC is enabled, nfsd4_putfh() can return
success with fh_dentry and fh_export both NULL if fh_verify() returns
nfserr_stale and putfh->no_verify is true. The NFSD4_FH_FOREIGN flag
is set, but the compound dispatch loop only uses this flag to bypass
the nfserr_nofilehandle check -- it does not prevent subsequent ops
from running with a NULL fh_dentry.
A remote client can exploit this by crafting a COMPOUND that includes
an inter-SSC COPY (which causes check_if_stalefh_allowed() to set
no_verify=true on the saved PUTFH) with an additional op inserted
between the source PUTFH and SAVEFH. For example, SETATTR calls
fh_want_write() which dereferences fh_export->ex_path.mnt without
calling fh_verify() first, causing a NULL pointer dereference in the
nfsd kthread.
Fix this by gating the dispatch loop: when NFSD4_FH_FOREIGN is set
and fh_dentry is NULL, only OP_SAVEFH (needed for the inter-SSC flow)
and ops with ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH (which don't need a resolved
filehandle) may proceed. All other ops receive nfserr_stale, per
RFC 7862 Section 15.2.3 which specifies that foreign filehandle
validation is deferred to the consuming operation and NFS4ERR_STALE
returned at that point. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: Do not WARN on remotely-controlled oversized SGL allocations
When fuzzing the nvme target code, I tripped a kernel warning in
nvmet_tcp_map_data() because the length passed into the allocator is
controlled by the remote initiator.
A remote initiator that sends a command with an SGL claiming a huge
number, can create a scatterlist and iovec allocation of over 1 million
entries, which causes the backing kmalloc call to exceed MAX_PAGE_ORDER
and then the page allocator will trip on a WARN_ON_ONCE_GFP() message:
WARNING: mm/page_alloc.c:5280 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof
Workqueue: nvmet_tcp_wq nvmet_tcp_io_work
...
sgl_alloc_order
nvmet_tcp_map_data
nvmet_tcp_try_recv_pdu
As it's never good to trip a kernel warning remotely due to many systems
having panic-on-warn enabled, let's silence it by just add GFP_NOWARN to
the allocation flags. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Skip Update HDCP Config In Transition State
Transition state does not have a valid dm_stream_ctx that should skip
configuring HDCP routine. The routine is valid to go through only when
a valid stream is created. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: write-protect folios during data writeback
commit 095be159f3eb ("btrfs: unify folio dirty flag clearing") replaced
the folio_clear_dirty_for_io() call in extent_write_cache_pages() with a
plain folio_test_dirty() check. Besides clearing the dirty flag,
folio_clear_dirty_for_io() also calls folio_mkclean(), which write-protects
the shared mmap PTEs mapping the folio. Note that we still do call
folio_clear_dirty_for_io() later in submit_one_sector() when we clear
dirty on the last sector of the folio (the only sector for non-subpage
cases). But we lost this early call in extent_write_cache_pages().
Without the extra write-protection, a process with the file mmap-ed can
modify a sector while it is being used by writeback in a way that
expects a stable folio (checksumming, compressing, copying, etc...)
without faulting, which manifests as a handful of concrete bugs.
1. For large folios or subpage sectorsize, it is possible to submit a bio
which does not cover the whole folio. When this happens, we will have a
bio in flight for a folio that we have *not* called
folio_clear_dirty_for_io() on. If a task with an existing mmap-ed PTE
writes (without faulting..) in this window, it can result in
corruptions. If the write arrives while the checksumming or writing itself
is underway, this can result in an invalid checksum and later corruption
reports on read. If the write arrives after checksumming/writing is done
but before the last sector dirty is cleared, then the write is present
in page cache but doesn't affect the dirty tracking and will be lost
when the folio is fully finished being submitted and the dirty bit
is cleared. This results in losing the write even if fsync() is called.
2. For zoned submissions which are done in batch separate from the main
extent_writepage() loop, we also risk csum violations for those
submissions. Zoned writes are clamped to max_zone_append_size and are
not aligned with folios, so a submission can span two folios. The first
folio being processed in extent_write_cache_pages() will call
extent_write_locked_range() which will submit the partial range of the
next folio, while the rest of that folio could still be dirty. So
clearing dirty on the submitted sectors doesn't call
folio_clear_dirty_for_io() and we have the same issue. Since
extent_write_cache_pages() skips these batch submitted folios (they are
already marked for writeback from submission by the preceding folio), we
must add the extra write protection in lock_delalloc_folios().
3. For inline extents this will subtly risk losing writes that happen
after/while we copy the inline extent but before we clear dirty on
the folio.
4. For folios spanning EOF, mmap could tamper with the zeroed bytes past
EOF and cause them to be persisted where future faults would improperly
see them instead of zeros.
5. Finally, for compressed extents, we risk modifying the folios while we
work on compressing them which will result in corrupted compressed data.
Specifically, in run_delalloc_compressed() we queue up work to do
compress_file_range() in BTRFS_COMPRESSION_CHUNK_SIZE (512K) chunks which
will call btrfs_folio_clamp_clear_dirty() on the range. For non-subpage,
this will always clear the whole folio, safely. For subpage, we risk a
partial clear here as well. In particular, imagine a 2M folio broken up
into 512K chunks of work which might start compression work on one chunk
before all the chunks compress_file_range() workers have gotten far
enough to finish clearing all the dirty bitmaps of the folio and getting
to folio_clear_dirty_for_io(). Large folios on the edges of submission
ranges are similarly at risk to be only partly cleared.
This particular gap was introduced by a second patch in the same series:
commit a4ef54dbb576 ("btrfs: make extent_range_clear_dirty_for_io() to handle sector size < page size cases")
We cannot simply restore the call to folio_clear
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Fix subbuf resize race with ring buffer readers
trace_buffer subbuf_size is read lockless in ring_buffer_read_page() and
ring_buffer_read_start(), while it can simultaneously be resized with
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set().
Instead of trace_buffer::subbuf_size, use bpage::order in
ring_buffer_read_start() and ring_buffer_read_page().
In ring_buffer_read_start(), even with resize_disabled, there is still a
possibility of a race with a buffer modification. Hold the trace_buffer
mutex to synchronise with any pending ring buffer order modification.
trace_buffer::subbuf_size is now actually useless, remove it. Also,
create accessors rb_subbuf_capacity() and rb_page_capacity() which
return the actual size available for storing events, while
rb_subbuf_size() returns the actual subbuf page-size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clocksource/drivers/nxp-pit: Fix IRQ leak on cpuhp_setup_state error path
When cpuhp_setup_state fails after pit_clockevent_per_cpu_init has
successfully called request_irq, the error handling jumps directly to
out_pit_clocksource_unregister without freeing the registered IRQ.
This leaks the IRQ line and, since kfree(pit) follows, leaves a
dangling pointer registered as the interrupt handler's dev_id,
potentially leading to a use-after-free if the IRQ fires afterwards.
Fix it by calling pit_clockevent_per_cpu_exit to properly release the
IRQ before falling through to the existing cleanup chain. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: fix user path of nested backing files
backing_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing
file from user_file->f_path. This is incorrect when user_file itself
is a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems,
e.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged
directory of another. Since commit def3ae83da02 ("fs: store real path
instead of fake path in backing file f_path") the f_path of a backing
file holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that
the user opened.
Commit 924577e4f6ca ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") fixed this
for such configurations by passing file_user_path() from
ovl_open_realfile(). However, commit 6af36aeb147a ("lsm: add
backing_file LSM hooks") changed the first argument of
backing_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and
derived the path from user_file->f_path again, silently re-introducing
the problem.
As a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong
path in /proc/<pid>/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records. For example,
with two nested overlayfs mounts:
mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested
echo hello > /ovl/lower/foo
mount -t overlay overlay \
-o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \
/ovl/merged
# at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent
mount -t overlay overlay \
-o lowerdir=/ovl/merged:/ovl/lower /ovl/nested
mapping /ovl/nested/foo shows a disconnected path instead of the user
path:
# readlink /proc/self/fd/3
/ovl/nested/foo
# grep foo /proc/self/maps
7f6e2c100000-7f6e2c101000 r--s 00000000 00:24 15813027 /foo
The bogus path is derived from the f_path of the intermediate backing
file, whose mount is a private clone that d_path() cannot resolve.
Fix this by using file_user_path(), which returns the outermost
user-visible path for backing files and falls back to
&user_file->f_path for regular files. This restores the behavior of
commit 924577e4f6ca ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") for
overlayfs and also fixes the same problem for the other
backing_file_open() callers, fuse passthrough and erofs ishare, when
their user file is itself a backing file.
backing_tmpfile_open() has the same pattern but is not affected: it is
only called by ovl_create_tmpfile() for the upper layer, and another
overlayfs is rejected as upperdir by the DCACHE_OP_REAL check in
ovl_mount_dir_check(), so its user_file can never be a backing file. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl
The PIDFD_GET_*_NAMESPACE ioctls in pidfd_ioctl() perform a filesystem
credentials ptrace access check before handing out a namespace file
descriptor. The accompanying comment states that the code "mirrors nsfs
behavior", but, unlike the corresponding procfs paths, it does so without
holding the target task's exec_update_lock.
proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() both take exec_update_lock for
reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup, so that the
credentials used for the access decision match those of the task when its
namespace is read. Without it, a caller can pass the check against the
target's old credentials and then read the namespace after the target has
execve()'d a setuid binary and committed new credentials -- accessing
namespace information it should have been denied.
Hold exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the
namespace lookup so that pidfd truly mirrors nsfs behavior, as the comment
already claims. open_namespace() itself runs outside the lock: once a
namespace reference is obtained it carries its own refcount and is opened
with the caller's own credentials, so a concurrent execve() on the target
can no longer affect the outcome. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
timers/itimer: Zero-init old itimerval before copy to userspace
On native sparc64, struct __kernel_old_timeval contains a four-byte hole
after tv_usec because tv_sec is 64-bit while __kernel_suseconds_t is 32-bit.
put_itimerval() fills only the named fields in a stack-allocated
__kernel_old_itimerval and copies the entire object to userspace, so
getitimer() can expose the two padding holes.
Zero-initialize the aggregate before assigning the fields so implicit
padding is deterministic before it crosses the user/kernel boundary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering
trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest
array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup()
holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while
unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the
synchronization point that must precede backend teardown.
The current order permits this interleaving:
CPU 0 CPU 1
trusted_tpm_exit() key_type_lookup("trusted")
put_device(&chip->dev) trusted_tpm_seal()
kfree(digests) pcrlock()
unregister_key_type() tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests)
CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can
also be released before callbacks stop using it.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89
Call Trace:
tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted]
trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted]
trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted]
__key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0
__key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50
__do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310
Allocated by task 88:
__kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490
do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390
do_init_module+0x2df/0x840
Freed by task 90:
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
trusted_tpm_exit+0x59/0xa0 [trusted]
__do_sys_delete_module+0x346/0x510
Move unregister_key_type() before releasing either resource. This stops
new lookups and waits for in-flight key operations to finish before the
backend state is destroyed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix out-of-bounds write when null terminating a label vec
aa_vec_unique() null terminates at vec[n - dups] when VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE
is passed. If the components are all distinct no duplicates are dropped,
dups is 0 and the terminator goes to vec[n], so the caller has to provide
room for n + 1 entries.
aa_label_strn_parse() sets up its vector with vec_setup(profile, vec, len,
gfp) and then calls aa_vec_unique(vec, len, VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE), but
vec_setup() does not reserve the terminator entry. Up to LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES
it uses the local array of LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES pointers, above that it
allocates exactly len pointers. The terminator therefore lands one entry
past the end of the local array when len is LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES, and one
entry past the end of the allocation when len is larger.
len comes from the number of "//&" separated components in the label name
and label_count_strn_entries() does not bound it. An unprivileged task
reaches the parse by writing to /proc/self/attr/apparmor/current or through
lsm_set_self_attr(2), both of which go through do_setattr(), and the name
is parsed before the change_profile permission is checked.
The query_label() path behind the securityfs .access file, which is
mode 0666, performs no permission check at all. Every component has to
resolve to a loaded profile, so a system with policy loaded is required.
The other two VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE users work on a label vec that
aa_label_alloc() has already sized with "+ 1 for null terminator entry on
vec". Reserve the same entry in vec_setup() and DEFINE_VEC(). Passing
len + 1 from the caller instead would move len == LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES out of
the local array and into kzalloc(). |
