| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8. Processing a maliciously crafted asset catalog may result in disclosure of process memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness
When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the
COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure
of Staleness that follows the cause header:
err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data);
stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));
err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that
caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is
present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the
4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs
past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb->tail. The value
is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT,
leaking uninitialized memory.
sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so
check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which
reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too
short to hold the staleness field is discarded.
The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into
COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket
in a user and network namespace. |
| A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2, macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.5.2, tvOS 26.6, visionOS 26.6, watchOS 26.6. A malicious accessory may be able to cause unexpected app termination. |
| A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. An app may be able to execute arbitrary code out of its sandbox or with certain elevated privileges. |
| A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. A remote attacker may be able to cause unexpected system termination or corrupt kernel memory. |
| The issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination. |
| An out-of-bounds read flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in __glXDisp_ChangeDrawableAttributes(). A wrong size validation check can read a client-controlled number of bytes, exceeding the request buffer, leading to information disclosure. A write path also exists but requires byte-swapped clients which is disabled by default. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland. The X server has multiple stack buffers sized XkbMaxShiftLevel * XkbNumKbdGroups but CheckKeyTypes() does not verify or clamp non-canonical key types to XkbMaxShiftLevel. A client can change key types to excessive shift levels and trigger stack overflows. This is caused by an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-26597. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland. _XkbSetMapChecks() declares a fixed-size stack buffer mapWidths[256] indexed by key type index. The helper function CheckKeyTypes() writes to this buffer at a client-controlled offset, allowing a stack buffer overflow. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland. A mismatch between the X server and the libXfont2 library's maximum font name length can cause a stack buffer overflow during font alias resolution. The server allocates a 256 byte stack buffer but libXfont2's alias target name length is 1024 bytes. A font alias name between 257 and 1023 bytes causes the X server to copy that name into the undersized stack buffer without further checks. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root. |
| In wifi, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local information disclosure if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS10960006 / BORA00155314, BORA00155001, BORA00154907; Issue ID: MSV-7570. |
| In trusted_mem, there is a possible escalation of privilege due to improper input validation. This could lead to local escalation of privilege if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Patch ID: AUTO00834868; Issue ID: MSV-6533. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: ims-pcu - fix heap-buffer-overflow in ims_pcu_process_data()
The `ims_pcu_process_data()` processes incoming URB data byte by byte.
However, it fails to check if the `read_pos` index exceeds
IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE.
If a malicious USB device sends a packet larger than IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE,
`read_pos` will increment indefinitely. Moreover, since `read_pos` is
located immediately after `read_buf`, the attacker can overwrite
`read_pos` itself to arbitrarily control the index.
This manipulated `read_pos` is subsequently used in
`ims_pcu_handle_response()` to copy data into `cmd_buf`, leading to a
heap buffer overflow.
Specifically, an attacker can overwrite the `cmd_done.wait.head` located
at offset 136 relative to `cmd_buf` in the `ims_pcu_handle_response()`.
Consequently, when the driver calls `complete(&pcu->cmd_done)`, it
triggers a control flow hijack by using the manipulated pointer.
Fix this by adding a bounds check for `read_pos` before writing to
`read_buf`. If the packet is too long, discard it, log a warning,
and reset the parser state.
[dtor: factor out resetting packet state, reset checksum as well] |
| A flaw was found in the libssh library in versions less than 0.11.2. An out-of-bounds read can be triggered in the sftp_handle function due to an incorrect comparison check that permits the function to access memory beyond the valid handle list and to return an invalid pointer, which is used in further processing. This vulnerability allows an authenticated remote attacker to potentially read unintended memory regions, exposing sensitive information or affect service behavior. |
| A weakness has been identified in Systerel S2OPC up to 1.7.3. This affects the function LockedStaMac_ProcessMsg_DeleteMonitoredItemsResponse of the file src/ClientServer/frontend/client_wrapper/internal/state_machine.c of the component DeleteMonitoredItemsRequest Handler. This manipulation causes out-of-bounds read. The attack can only be executed locally. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| The hawkBit device management client in subsys/mgmt/hawkbit accumulates the body of an HTTP response from the update server into a heap buffer in response_json_cb() (subsys/mgmt/hawkbit/hawkbit.c). The buffer is sized to hold the received body bytes but reserves no space for a terminating NUL. When the full response has arrived, the code writes response_data[downloaded_size] = '\0' — and whenever the accumulated body length equals the allocation, that terminator lands one byte past the end of the heap object (a heap-based out-of-bounds write, CWE-122 / CWE-787).
The body length and fragmentation are taken directly from the parsed HTTP response (rsp->body_frag_start / rsp->body_frag_len) and are fully controlled by the remote hawkBit server, which chooses its own response length. The precise trigger depends on how the buffer grows, and both forms are remotely reachable. Since v4.0.0 the reallocation is sized to exactly downloaded_size + body_len, so any response body larger than the 1100-byte initial buffer makes the out-of-bounds write deterministic; such response sizes are normal for hawkBit deployment metadata. Before v4.0.0 the buffer grew by doubling and the growth check ((downloaded_size + body_len) > response_buffer_size) is false at equality, so a response body whose length is exactly the current allocation — 1100 bytes with the default initial buffer — skips the reallocation entirely and writes the terminator at response_data[1100] of an 1100-byte object. The HTTP length-mismatch check does not catch this, because the declared and received lengths genuinely agree. Either form is reachable by a malicious, compromised, or man-in-the-middle update server (TLS is optional and, when enabled, does not protect against a hostile server), with no authentication of response content and no client-side length cap protecting the write.
The out-of-bounds write is a fixed single NUL byte immediately following the allocation, corrupting adjacent allocator metadata or the next allocation. The practical impact is heap corruption leading to denial of service (fault on a subsequent allocation or free), with the bounded, allocator-dependent possibility of further corruption. The fix sizes the buffer to the body length plus one and copies with memcpy, ensuring the terminator always lands within the allocation. |
| A flaw was found in SSSD. The extract_authtok_v1() function in the PAM responder does not validate the auth_token_length field against the remaining buffer size before processing. A local attacker can exploit this via a crafted protocol v1 request to the PAM responder socket, causing an out-of-bounds read and process crash, resulting in a denial of service. |
| Integer overflow in Chromecast in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via malicious network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Insufficient input validation in Amazon Bedrock AgentCore harness might allow an authenticated remote user to execute configured tools bypassing model invocation and security controls via crafted content blocks in conversation messages. AWS has addressed this issue. No customer action is required. |
| An issue was discovered in router/upnp/src/ssdp.c in DD-WRT before 45724. An unsafe strcpy in the UPnP handling functionality allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to send a request that would overflow an internal fixed buffer. Exploitation requires the DD-WRT user to enable UPnP (which is off by default, and only listens on internal interfaces by default). This occurs in ssdp_msearch (reachable by an M-SEARCH request). |
