| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Frappe Framework version 17.0.0-dev due to improper neutralization of user-controlled input in the MultiSelectDialog component. |
| Inappropriate implementation in Autofill in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.197 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. From 1.11.1 until 1.14.1, userId/workspaceId scoping to the parsed-files read/delete paths was added. However, the POST /api/workspace/:slug/embed-parsed-file/:fileId flow still deletes the target file by primary key only, with no ownership check, inside two finally{} blocks that run even when the ownership-checked read fails. As a result a manager or admin (multi-user mode) can delete any other user's parsed file in any workspace — including workspaces they are not a member of — by enumerating integer fileIds. The server even returns "File not found" while still deleting the file. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.14.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "wireguard: device: enable threaded NAPI"
This reverts commit 933466fc50a8e4eb167acbd0d8ec96a078462e9c which is
commit db9ae3b6b43c79b1ba87eea849fd65efa05b4b2e upstream.
We have had three independent production user reports in combination
with Cilium utilizing WireGuard as encryption underneath that k8s Pod
E/W traffic to certain peer nodes fully stalled. The situation appears
as follows:
- Occurs very rarely but at random times under heavy networking load.
- Once the issue triggers the decryption side stops working completely
for that WireGuard peer, other peers keep working fine. The stall
happens also for newly initiated connections towards that particular
WireGuard peer.
- Only the decryption side is affected, never the encryption side.
- Once it triggers, it never recovers and remains in this state,
the CPU/mem on that node looks normal, no leak, busy loop or crash.
- bpftrace on the affected system shows that wg_prev_queue_enqueue
fails, thus the MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS (1024 skbs!) for the peer's
rx_queue is reached.
- Also, bpftrace shows that wg_packet_rx_poll for that peer is never
called again after reaching this state for that peer. For other
peers wg_packet_rx_poll does get called normally.
- Commit db9ae3b ("wireguard: device: enable threaded NAPI")
switched WireGuard to threaded NAPI by default. The default has
not been changed for triggering the issue, neither did CPU
hotplugging occur (i.e. 5bd8de2 ("wireguard: queueing: always
return valid online CPU in wg_cpumask_choose_online()")).
- The issue has been observed with stable kernels of v5.15 as well as
v6.1. It was reported to us that v5.10 stable is working fine, and
no report on v6.6 stable either (somewhat related discussion in [0]
though).
- In the WireGuard driver the only material difference between v5.10
stable and v5.15 stable is the switch to threaded NAPI by default.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CA+wXwBTT74RErDGAnj98PqS=wvdh8eM1pi4q6tTdExtjnokKqA@mail.gmail.com/
Breakdown of the problem:
1) skbs arriving for decryption are enqueued to the peer->rx_queue in
wg_packet_consume_data via wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer.
2) The latter only moves the skb into the MPSC peer queue if it does
not surpass MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS (1024) which is kept track in an
atomic counter via wg_prev_queue_enqueue.
3) In case enqueueing was successful, the skb is also queued up
in the device queue, round-robin picks a next online CPU, and
schedules the decryption worker.
4) The wg_packet_decrypt_worker, once scheduled, picks these up
from the queue, decrypts the packets and once done calls into
wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_rx.
5) The latter updates the state to PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED on success
and calls napi_schedule on the per peer->napi instance.
6) NAPI then polls via wg_packet_rx_poll. wg_prev_queue_peek checks
on the peer->rx_queue. It will wg_prev_queue_dequeue if the
queue->peeked skb was not cached yet, or just return the latter
otherwise. (wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked later clears the cache.)
7) From an ordering perspective, the peer->rx_queue has skbs in order
while the device queue with the per-CPU worker threads from a
global ordering PoV can finish the decryption and signal the skb
PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED out of order.
8) A situation can be observed that the first packet coming in will
be stuck waiting for the decryption worker to be scheduled for
a longer time when the system is under pressure.
9) While this is the case, the other CPUs in the meantime finish
decryption and call into napi_schedule.
10) Now in wg_packet_rx_poll it picks up the first in-order skb
from the peer->rx_queue and sees that its state is still
PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED. The NAPI poll routine then exits e
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/dma-buf: fix UAF with retry loop
Retry doesn't work here, since bo will be freed on error, leading to
UAF. However, now that we do the alloc & init before the attach, we can
now combine this as one unit and have the init do the alloc for us. This
should make the retry safe.
Reported by Sashiko.
v2: Fix up the error unwind (CI)
(cherry picked from commit 479669418253e0f27f8cf5db01a731352ea592e7) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Fix oops due to out of scope access
Below oops triggers when kill QEMU process:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x7fffffff844eaaa7: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_raw_spin_lock+0xaa/0xc0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x21/0x40
domain_remove_dev_pasid+0x52/0x160
intel_nested_set_dev_pasid+0x1b9/0x1e0
__iommu_set_group_pasid+0x56/0x120
pci_dev_reset_iommu_done+0xe3/0x180
pcie_flr+0x65/0x160
__pci_reset_function_locked+0x5b/0x120
vfio_pci_core_close_device+0x63/0xe0 [vfio_pci_core]
vfio_df_close+0x4f/0xa0
vfio_df_unbind_iommufd+0x2d/0x60
vfio_device_fops_release+0x3e/0x40
__fput+0xe5/0x2c0
task_work_run+0x58/0xa0
do_exit+0x2c8/0x600
do_group_exit+0x2f/0xa0
get_signal+0x863/0x8c0
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x24/0x100
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x87/0x380
do_syscall_64+0x2ff/0x11e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The global static blocked domain is a dummy domain without corresponding
dmar_domain structure, accessing beyond iommu_domain structure triggers
oops easily. Fix it by return early in domain_remove_dev_pasid() like
identity domain. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in osdmap_decode()
When decoding osd_state and osd_weight from an incoming osdmap in
osdmap_decode(), both are decoded for each osd, i.e., map->max_osd
times. The ceph_decode_need() check only accounts for
sizeof(*map->osd_weight) once. This can potentially result in an
out-of-bounds memory access if the incoming message is corrupted such
that the max_osd value exceeds the actual content of the osdmap message.
This patch fixes the issue by changing the corresponding part in the
ceph_decode_need() check to account for
map->max_osd*sizeof(*map->osd_weight). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix a buffer leak in __ceph_setxattr()
The old_blob in __ceph_setxattr() can store
ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob value during the retry.
However, it is never called the ceph_buffer_put()
for the old_blob object. This patch fixes the issue of
the buffer leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Bound MIDI endpoint descriptor scans
snd_usbmidi_get_ms_info() validates the internal MIDIStreaming endpoint
descriptor size before using baAssocJackID[], but the descriptor walker can
still return a class-specific endpoint descriptor whose bLength exceeds the
remaining bytes in the endpoint-extra scan.
That leaves later flexible-array reads bounded by bLength, but not by the
remaining bytes in the endpoint-extra scan.
Stop walking when bLength is zero or
extends past the remaining endpoint-extra scan. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU walk on swapout failure
When ttm_tt_swapout() fails, the current code calls
ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() followed by ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail()
to restore the resource's bulk_move membership.
However, ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() places the resource at the tail
of the LRU list which, relative to the walk cursor's hitch node (placed
immediately after the resource when it was yielded), puts the resource
*in front of the* the hitch. The next list_for_each_entry_continue() from
the hitch finds the same resource again, causing an infinite loop.
Fix by deferring del_bulk_move to the success path only.
On the success path, TTM_TT_FLAG_SWAPPED has just been set by
ttm_tt_swapout() but the resource is still tracked in the bulk_move range,
so ttm_resource_del_bulk_move()'s !ttm_resource_unevictable() guard would
incorrectly skip the removal. Introduce
ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() which bypasses that guard. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: Replace old pointer to new idr
Commit 5e28b7b94408 introduced a logical error by failing to replace the
newly generated IDR pointer to old id's pointer at the correct location
within the "change handle" logic; this resulted in the issue reported by
syzbot [1].
Specifically, the new IDR object pointer is intended to replace the original
id's pointer during the normal execution flow.
Additionally, an unnecessary conditional check for the ret exit path has
been removed.
[1]
!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&prime_fpriv->dmabufs)
WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_prime.c:224 at drm_prime_destroy_file_private+0x48/0x60 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_prime.c:224, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5833
Call Trace:
drm_file_free.part.0+0x7e6/0xcc0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:269
drm_file_free drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:237 [inline]
drm_close_helper.isra.0+0x186/0x200 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:290
drm_release+0x1ab/0x360 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:438 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: pci: fix GAIT table indexing due to double-scaling pointer arithmetic
kvm_s390_pci_aif_enable(), kvm_s390_pci_aif_disable(), and
aen_host_forward() index the GAIT by manually multiplying the index
with sizeof(struct zpci_gaite).
Since aift->gait is already a struct zpci_gaite pointer, this
double-scales the offset, accessing element aisb*16 instead of aisb.
This causes out-of-bounds accesses when aisb >= 32 (with
ZPCI_NR_DEVICES=512)
Fix by removing the erroneous sizeof multiplication. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Reject wrapped offset in kvm_reset_dirty_gfn()
kvm_reset_dirty_gfn() guards the gfn range with
if (!memslot || (offset + __fls(mask)) >= memslot->npages)
return;
but offset is u64 and the addition is unchecked. The check can be
silently bypassed by a u64 wrap.
The dirty ring backing those entries is MAP_SHARED at
KVM_DIRTY_LOG_PAGE_OFFSET of the vcpu fd, so the VMM can rewrite the
slot and offset fields of any entry between when the kernel pushes
them and when KVM_RESET_DIRTY_RINGS consumes them. On reset,
kvm_dirty_ring_reset() re-reads the values via READ_ONCE() and feeds
them straight back into this check; only the flags handshake is
treated as the handover, the slot/offset payload is taken on trust.
Crafting two entries
entry[i].offset = 0xffffffffffffffc1
entry[i+1].offset = 0
makes the coalescing loop in kvm_dirty_ring_reset() compute
delta = (s64)(0 - 0xffffffffffffffc1) = 63
which falls in [0, BITS_PER_LONG), so it folds entry[i+1] into the
existing mask by setting bit 63. The trailing kvm_reset_dirty_gfn()
call then sees offset = 0xffffffffffffffc1 and __fls(mask) = 63;
the sum is 0 in u64 and the bounds check passes.
That offset propagates into kvm_arch_mmu_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked()
unchanged. On the legacy MMU path -- kvm_memslots_have_rmaps() ==
true, i.e. shadow paging, any VM that has allocated shadow roots, or
a write-tracked slot -- it reaches gfn_to_rmap(), which indexes
slot->arch.rmap[0][] with a near-U64_MAX gfn. That is an
out-of-bounds load of a kvm_rmap_head, followed by a conditional
clear of PT_WRITABLE_MASK in whatever the loaded pointer points at.
The path is reachable from any process holding /dev/kvm.
Range-check offset on its own first, so the addition cannot wrap.
memslot->npages is bounded well below U64_MAX, so once offset <
npages holds, offset + __fls(mask) (with __fls(mask) < BITS_PER_LONG)
stays in range. |
| Warp is an agentic development environment. From 0.2025.04.09.08.11.stable_00 until 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01, Warp contains a command execution policy bypass in Agent code search tools. The affected Grep and FileGlob actions are authorized as read/search operations, but their implementations build shell command strings from Agent-controlled inputs (search text, paths, glob patterns) and execute them in the active terminal session. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01. |
| Warp is an agentic development environment. From 0.2024.02.20.08.01.stable_01 until 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01, Warp contains a command injection issue in the Linux external editor launcher. Warp expanded freedesktop .desktop Exec templates for affected editor integrations and executed the expanded command through a shell. A user who opens an attacker-controlled local file path through an affected external editor or system-default editor route can cause shell syntax embedded in that path to execute as the local user. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01. |
| A missing authorization vulnerability was found in the Event-Driven Ansible (EDA) websocket API. The /api/eda/ws/ansible-rulebook endpoint does not verify user permissions when processing Worker messages. Any authenticated user can send a forged message with an arbitrary activation_id to receive plaintext credentials associated with that activation, including OAuth tokens, vault passwords, and SSH keys. |
| Jellyfin is an open source self hosted media server. Prior to 10.11.10, a specifically crafted MKV file containing forged filename tags can be leveraged to exploit missing path sanitization during playback. Jellyfin treats the MKV file name tag on MKV attachments as trusted and passes it unsanitized into Path.Combine(attachmentFolder, fileName) inside PathManager.GetAttachmentPath. Because .NET's Path.Combine neither normalises .. nor rejects a rooted second argument, a crafted MKV can redirect Jellyfin's MKV attachment extraction to any absolute path on disk. This triggers on any playback action of the affected video on a client which will attempt to burn in the subtitles by default.g This vulnerability is fixed in 10.11.10. |
| A flaw was found in foreman-mcp-server. This component utilizes two distinct logging mechanisms that can expose sensitive session and authentication data. One mechanism logs session identifiers, which are treated as authentication credentials, at an informational level. The other, when debug logging is enabled, incompletely sanitizes HTTP request headers, leading to the cleartext logging of sensitive information such as authorization tokens and API keys. This vulnerability can result in a confidentiality breach, as sensitive authentication data is persisted in plain text within container logs, increasing the risk if logs are forwarded to a centralized platform. |
| Jellyfin is an open source self hosted media server. From 10.9.0 until 10.11.10, the POST /ClientLog/Document endpoint accepts the Authorization header's Client and Version fields and uses them unsanitized as components of the on-disk filename when persisting client-uploaded log documents. As a result, any authenticated non-admin user can include ../ sequences in the Client field to cause Jellyfin to write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary paths reachable by the Jellyfin service user, with a forced .log suffix. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.11.10. |
| A vulnerability in the iCagenda extension for Joomla allows the upload of arbitrary files in the file attachment feature, ultimately resulting in PHP code upload and execution. |
